fix(security): harden access checks and migration validation (#38324) (#38400)

This commit is contained in:
Giteabot
2026-07-10 20:14:38 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent af7ba2edef
commit ed493f0684
15 changed files with 304 additions and 15 deletions
+6 -4
View File
@@ -93,17 +93,19 @@ func TestAllowBlockList(t *testing.T) {
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
// allow wildcard, block some subdomains. if the domain name is allowed, then the local network check is skipped
// allow wildcard, block some subdomains. every resolved address must still be allowed.
init("*.domain.com", "blocked.domain.com", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4"), net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("blocked.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.other.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
// allow wildcard (it could lead to SSRF in production)
// allow wildcard still follows the local network policy for resolved addresses.
init("*", "", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4"), net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
// local network can still be blocked
init("*", "127.0.0.*", false)