fix: various security fixes (#38406)

Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
bircni
2026-07-12 17:14:09 +00:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by TheFox0x7 techknowlogick Lunny Xiao wxiaoguang Zettat123
parent d2bd1589fe
commit f69e15afe7
93 changed files with 1714 additions and 137 deletions
+11 -1
View File
@@ -473,10 +473,20 @@ func runErr(t *testing.T, stdin []byte, args ...string) {
}
}
func Test_PublicKeysAreExternallyManaged(t *testing.T) {
func TestPublicKeysAreExternallyManaged(t *testing.T) {
key1 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &PublicKey{ID: 1})
externals, err := PublicKeysAreExternallyManaged(t.Context(), []*PublicKey{key1})
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Len(t, externals, 1)
assert.False(t, externals[0])
}
// TestCheckPublicKeyStringOversized tests if oversized SSH2 public key strings are rejected before triggering costly operations.
func TestCheckPublicKeyStringOversized(t *testing.T) {
_, err := parseKeyString(strings.Repeat("a", maxKeyContentBytes+1))
assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "SSH public key content is too long")
content := "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\n" + strings.Repeat("a", maxKeyContentBase64Bytes+1) + "\n--- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
_, err = parseKeyString(content)
assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "SSH public key base64 is too long")
}