fix: various security fixes (#38406)

Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
bircni
2026-07-12 17:14:09 +00:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by TheFox0x7 techknowlogick Lunny Xiao wxiaoguang Zettat123
parent d2bd1589fe
commit f69e15afe7
93 changed files with 1714 additions and 137 deletions
+7 -4
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -310,7 +309,9 @@ func (g *RepositoryDumper) CreateReleases(_ context.Context, releases ...*base.R
}
defer rc.Close()
} else {
resp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL)
// use the migration client so the fetch (including any redirect) is
// validated against the migration host allow/block list
resp, err := getMigrationHTTPClient().Get(*asset.DownloadURL)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -450,8 +451,10 @@ func (g *RepositoryDumper) handlePullRequest(ctx context.Context, pr *base.PullR
}
// SECURITY: We will assume that the pr.PatchURL has been checked
// pr.PatchURL maybe a local file - but note EnsureSafe should be asserting that this safe
resp, err := http.Get(u) // TODO: This probably needs to use the downloader as there may be rate limiting issues here
// pr.PatchURL maybe a local file - but note EnsureSafe should be asserting that this safe.
// Use the migration client so an http(s) PatchURL (and any redirect it follows) is
// validated against the migration host allow/block list at dial time.
resp, err := getMigrationHTTPClient().Get(u)
if err != nil {
return err
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func NewGiteaDownloader(ctx context.Context, baseURL, repoPath, username, passwo
baseURL,
gitea_sdk.SetToken(token),
gitea_sdk.SetBasicAuth(username, password),
gitea_sdk.SetHTTPClient(NewMigrationHTTPClient()),
gitea_sdk.SetHTTPClient(newMigrationHTTPClient()),
)
if err != nil {
log.Error(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to create NewGiteaDownloader for: %s. Error: %v", baseURL, err))
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ func (g *GiteaDownloader) convertGiteaRelease(rel *gitea_sdk.Release) *base.Rele
Created: rel.CreatedAt,
}
httpClient := NewMigrationHTTPClient()
httpClient := newMigrationHTTPClient()
for _, asset := range rel.Attachments {
assetID := asset.ID // Don't optimize this, for closure we need a local variable
+7 -3
View File
@@ -340,7 +340,9 @@ func (g *GiteaLocalUploader) CreateReleases(ctx context.Context, releases ...*ba
return err
}
} else if asset.DownloadURL != nil {
rc, err = uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL)
// use the migration client so the fetch (including any redirect) is
// validated against the migration host allow/block list
rc, err = uri.OpenWithClient(*asset.DownloadURL, getMigrationHTTPClient())
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -585,8 +587,10 @@ func (g *GiteaLocalUploader) updateGitForPullRequest(ctx context.Context, pr *ba
}
// SECURITY: We will assume that the pr.PatchURL has been checked
// pr.PatchURL maybe a local file - but note EnsureSafe should be asserting that this safe
ret, err := uri.Open(pr.PatchURL) // TODO: This probably needs to use the downloader as there may be rate limiting issues here
// pr.PatchURL maybe a local file - but note EnsureSafe should be asserting that this safe.
// Use the migration client so an http(s) PatchURL (and any redirect it follows) is
// validated against the migration host allow/block list at dial time.
ret, err := uri.OpenWithClient(pr.PatchURL, getMigrationHTTPClient())
if err != nil {
return err
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ func (g *GithubDownloaderV3) convertGithubRelease(ctx context.Context, rel *gith
r.Published = rel.PublishedAt.Time
}
httpClient := NewMigrationHTTPClient()
httpClient := newMigrationHTTPClient()
for _, asset := range rel.Assets {
assetID := asset.GetID() // Don't optimize this, for closure we need a local variable TODO: no need to do so in new Golang
+2 -2
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ type GitlabDownloader struct {
// Use either a username/password, personal token entered into the username field, or anonymous/public access
// Note: Public access only allows very basic access
func NewGitlabDownloader(ctx context.Context, baseURL, repoPath, token string) (*GitlabDownloader, error) {
gitlabClient, err := gitlab.NewClient(token, gitlab.WithBaseURL(baseURL), gitlab.WithHTTPClient(NewMigrationHTTPClient()))
gitlabClient, err := gitlab.NewClient(token, gitlab.WithBaseURL(baseURL), gitlab.WithHTTPClient(newMigrationHTTPClient()))
if err != nil {
log.Trace("Error logging into gitlab: %v", err)
return nil, err
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ func (g *GitlabDownloader) convertGitlabRelease(ctx context.Context, rel *gitlab
PublisherName: rel.Author.Username,
}
httpClient := NewMigrationHTTPClient()
httpClient := newMigrationHTTPClient()
for _, asset := range rel.Assets.Links {
assetID := asset.ID // Don't optimize this, for closure we need a local variable
+21 -8
View File
@@ -10,20 +10,33 @@ import (
"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
"gitea.dev/modules/proxy"
"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
"gitea.dev/modules/util"
)
// NewMigrationHTTPClient returns a HTTP client for migration
func NewMigrationHTTPClient() *http.Client {
// migrationHTTPClient is the shared migration client. Callers that would otherwise build a client per
// request use it (via getMigrationHTTPClient) so a single connection pool is reused across downloads —
// e.g. many release assets from the same host — instead of a fresh pool and TLS handshake each time. It
// is built lazily on first use and reset by Init whenever the allow/block lists change; OnceValue keeps
// concurrent callers sharing a single client instead of racing to create their own.
var migrationHTTPClient = util.OnceValue[*http.Client]{Func: newMigrationHTTPClient}
// newMigrationHTTPClient returns a HTTP client for migration
func newMigrationHTTPClient() *http.Client {
return &http.Client{
Transport: NewMigrationHTTPTransport(),
}
}
// NewMigrationHTTPTransport returns a HTTP transport for migration
// getMigrationHTTPClient returns the shared migration client, building it on first use so no request
// escapes the SSRF-validated transport even before Init has run.
func getMigrationHTTPClient() *http.Client {
return migrationHTTPClient.Value()
}
// NewMigrationHTTPTransport returns a HTTP transport for migration. The target is validated against the
// allow/block lists on both the direct-dial and proxy paths, so a configured proxy cannot be used to
// reach an otherwise-forbidden target (SSRF).
func NewMigrationHTTPTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: setting.Migrations.SkipTLSVerify},
Proxy: proxy.Proxy(),
DialContext: hostmatcher.NewDialContext("migration", allowList, blockList, setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed),
}
return hostmatcher.NewHTTPTransport("migration", allowList, blockList, proxy.Proxy(), setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed,
&tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: setting.Migrations.SkipTLSVerify})
}
+4
View File
@@ -528,5 +528,9 @@ func Init() error {
blockList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinLoopback)
}
// reset the shared client so it is rebuilt from the freshly parsed lists on next use; download paths
// then reuse one connection pool instead of creating a client (and pool) per request
migrationHTTPClient.Reset()
return nil
}