docs: Clean up build section in CHANGELOG.md (#38671 )

docs: update changelog for 1.27.1 (#38668 )
added the changelog for 1.27.1 --------- Signed-off-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
2026-09-13 00:13:25 +09:00 · 2026-07-27 20:43:03 +02:00 · 2026-07-27 20:08:22 +02:00 · 2026-07-27 16:23:49 +00:00 · 2026-07-27 15:24:53 +00:00 · 2026-07-27 14:47:14 +00:00
259 changed files with 5433 additions and 1130 deletions
@@ -72,6 +72,18 @@ jobs:
          BRANCH: ${{ steps.clean_name.outputs.branch }}
        run: |
          aws s3 sync dist/release "s3://$AWS_S3_BUCKET/gitea/$BRANCH" --no-progress
+      # configure-aws-credentials exports AWS_REGION job-wide and it wins over AWS_DEFAULT_REGION, so pin it here
+      - name: upload binaries to cloudflare r2
+        env:
+          AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
+          AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
+          AWS_DEFAULT_REGION: auto
+          AWS_REGION: auto
+          CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCOUNT_ID: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCOUNT_ID }}
+          CLOUDFLARE_R2_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_BUCKET }}
+          BRANCH: ${{ steps.clean_name.outputs.branch }}
+        run: |
+          aws s3 sync dist/release "s3://$CLOUDFLARE_R2_BUCKET/gitea/$BRANCH" --endpoint-url "https://$CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCOUNT_ID.r2.cloudflarestorage.com" --no-progress

  nightly-container:
    runs-on: namespace-profile-gitea-release-docker
@@ -73,6 +73,18 @@ jobs:
          BRANCH: ${{ steps.clean_name.outputs.branch }}
        run: |
          aws s3 sync dist/release "s3://$AWS_S3_BUCKET/gitea/$BRANCH" --no-progress
+      # configure-aws-credentials exports AWS_REGION job-wide and it wins over AWS_DEFAULT_REGION, so pin it here
+      - name: upload binaries to cloudflare r2
+        env:
+          AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
+          AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
+          AWS_DEFAULT_REGION: auto
+          AWS_REGION: auto
+          CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCOUNT_ID: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCOUNT_ID }}
+          CLOUDFLARE_R2_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_BUCKET }}
+          BRANCH: ${{ steps.clean_name.outputs.branch }}
+        run: |
+          aws s3 sync dist/release "s3://$CLOUDFLARE_R2_BUCKET/gitea/$BRANCH" --endpoint-url "https://$CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCOUNT_ID.r2.cloudflarestorage.com" --no-progress
      - name: Install GH CLI
        uses: dev-hanz-ops/install-gh-cli-action@af38ce09b1ec248aeb08eea2b16bbecea9e059f8 # v0.2.1
        with:
@@ -76,6 +76,18 @@ jobs:
          BRANCH: ${{ steps.clean_name.outputs.branch }}
        run: |
          aws s3 sync dist/release "s3://$AWS_S3_BUCKET/gitea/$BRANCH" --no-progress
+      # configure-aws-credentials exports AWS_REGION job-wide and it wins over AWS_DEFAULT_REGION, so pin it here
+      - name: upload binaries to cloudflare r2
+        env:
+          AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
+          AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
+          AWS_DEFAULT_REGION: auto
+          AWS_REGION: auto
+          CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCOUNT_ID: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCOUNT_ID }}
+          CLOUDFLARE_R2_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_R2_BUCKET }}
+          BRANCH: ${{ steps.clean_name.outputs.branch }}
+        run: |
+          aws s3 sync dist/release "s3://$CLOUDFLARE_R2_BUCKET/gitea/$BRANCH" --endpoint-url "https://$CLOUDFLARE_R2_ACCOUNT_ID.r2.cloudflarestorage.com" --no-progress
      - name: Install GH CLI
        uses: dev-hanz-ops/install-gh-cli-action@af38ce09b1ec248aeb08eea2b16bbecea9e059f8 # v0.2.1
        with:
@@ -4,13 +4,81 @@ This changelog goes through the changes that have been made in each release
 without substantial changes to our git log; to see the highlights of what has
 been added to each release, please refer to the [blog](https://blog.gitea.com).

-## [1.27.0-rc0](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0-rc0) - 2026-06-28
+## [1.27.1](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.1) - 2026-07-27
+
+* SECURITY
+  * fix(oauth2): enforce mandatory 2FA policy on OAuth2 authorize/grant endpoints (#38591) (#38606)
+
+* API
+  * fix(api): align Swagger schemas for UserSettings and TopicListResponse (#38590) (#38592)
+
+* ENHANCEMENTS
+  * enhance: improve diff contrast in light and dark themes (#37477) (#38574)
+
+* BUGFIXES
+  * fix: skip OIDC end-session after password login for OAuth2 users (#38439) (#38666)
+  * fix: make Actions log parser support multiple line message encoding (#38659) (#38664)
+  * fix(actions): use base branch ref for pull_request_target context (#38636) (#38657)
+  * fix(actions): skip already-approved runs in `ApproveRuns` (#38653) (#38654)
+  * fix: orgmode render include path (#38642) (#38645)
+  * fix(actions): cancel tasks immediately when the runner stopped reporting (#38616) (#38644)
+  * fix(issues): fix label bulk-load key and reduce log noise in LoadLabel (#38632) (#38643)
+  * fix(actions): improve runner list status sorting, labels and task job links (#38586) (#38633)
+  * fix(actions): correctness and hardening fixes (#38518) (#38631)
+  * fix(repo): prevent double-write redirect collisions on dependency errors, fix ui (#38627) (#38628)
+  * fix: delete repo-scoped rows of seven more tables when deleting a repository (#38534) (#38618)
+  * fix(webhook): remove slack channel name check (#38608) (#38612)
+  * fix: download dropdown menu clipped on the branches page (#38604) (#38609)
+  * fix(project): prevent database mutations on invalid MoveIssues payload (#38600) (#38602)
+  * fix(actions): make SingleWorkflow.Marshal round-trip multi-line run blocks (stop silent job stranding) (#38520) (#38599)
+  * fix(file-tree): handle submodule links and missing view container (#38033) (#38589)
+  * fix(actions): fail unexpandable reusable workflow callers and decouple the job emitter's cross-run processing (#38565) (#38587)
+  * fix: keep serving valid ACME cert when renewal fails at startup (#38554) (#38583)
+  * fix: branch protection user list (#38570) (#38584)
+  * fix(pulls): respect diff.orderFile in diff file tree (#38566) (#38578)
+  * fix(issue): make issue action (issue list batch operation) elements have correct attributes (#38575) (#38580)
+  * fix(actions): support `matrix` when evaluating workflow `if` expression (#38474) (#38557)
+  * fix(actions): align status icon span for Safari rendering (#38558) (#38562)
+  * fix: revert git clone http redirection forbidden (#38530) (#38545)
+  * fix: clean up orphaned user-keyed tables in deleteUser (#38511) (#38514)
+  * fix(actions): coerce workflow_dispatch boolean inputs to native types (#38472) (#38521)
+  * fix: make the merge box button red if some checks fail (#38508) (#38516)
+  * fix(pull): sign the commit when updating a branch by merge (#38441) (#38499)
+  * fix: make commit message merge correctly (#38490) (#38502)
+  * fix(actions): explain why a blocked or waiting job has not started (#38476) (#38498)
+  * fix(actions): make `cancelled()` work in job `if` evaluation (#38495) (#38497)
+  * fix(actions): show retention info on hover for expired artifacts (#38477) (#38493)
+  * fix(actions): group reusable-workflow matrix legs in the workflow graph (#38475) (#38492)
+  * fix: full file highlighting for git diff with CR char (#38484) (#38491)
+  * fix(packages): serve noarch Alpine index for any requested architecture (#38479) (#38486)
+  * fix: 500 error when updating user visibility (#38480) (#38483)
+  * fix(actions): make job list item fully clickable (#38462) (#38471)
+  * fix: mail template for push event (#38467) (#38468)
+  * fix: make "test push webhook" always work (#38425) (#38455)
+  * fix(actions): prevent bulk actions from affecting all runners (#38453) (#38457)
+  * fix(org): align follow button and wrap description (#38448) (#38454)
+  * fix(actions): populate `github.event` for scheduled runs (#38446) (#38452)
+
+* MISC
+  * refactor: git patch apply (#38637) (#38638)
+
+## [1.27.0](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0) - 2026-07-13

 * BREAKING
  * Feat(actions)!: improve support for reusable workflows (#37478)
  * Use Content-Security-Policy: script nonce (#37232)

 * SECURITY
+  * Fix: various security fixes (#38406) (#38426)
+  * Fix(security): harden access checks and migration validation (#38324) (#38400)
+  * Fix: enforce public-only token scope and harden push options / locale parsing (#38323) (#38399)
+  * Fix(pull): re-evaluate review official flag on target branch change (#38319) (#38402)
+  * Fix(api): stop leaking private repo metadata after access revocation (#38321) (#38390)
+  * Fix(lfs): require proof of possession for cross-repo objects (#38322) (#38389)
+  * Fix(mirror): disable HTTP redirects on pull mirror sync (#38320) (#38367)
+  * Fix: golang html template url escaping (#38363) (#38369)
+  * Fix(release): validate web attachment renames against allowed types (#38314) (#38328)
+  * Fix(release): gate draft release attachments on web download endpoints (#38318) (#38325)
  * Fix(deps): update module github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 to v5.19.1 [security] (#37786)
  * Fix(oauth): restrict introspection to the token's client (#38042)
  * Fix(api): don't expose private org membership via public_members (#38145)
@@ -44,6 +112,7 @@ been added to each release, please refer to the [blog](https://blog.gitea.com).
  * Feat(ssh): auto generate additional ssh keys (#33974)

 * ENHANCEMENTS
+  * Enhance(actions): only create filtered-out workflow commit status for required contexts (#38371) (#38385)
  * Enhance: allow builtin default git config options to be overridden (#38172)
  * Enhance: allow MathML core elements (#38034)
  * Enhance(markup): improve issue title rendering (#37908)
@@ -71,12 +140,34 @@ been added to each release, please refer to the [blog](https://blog.gitea.com).
  * Add API endpoint to reply to pull request review comments (#36683)

 * PERFORMANCE
+  * Perf(actions): debounce runner heartbeat writes and throttle task picks (#38281) (#38368)
  * Perf(web): sort the action_run query by a repo-scoped index when possible (#38155)
  * Perf: Various performance regression fixes (#38078)
  * Perf: extend action `c_u` index to include `created_unix` for faster dashboard feeds (#38076)
  * Batch-load related data in actions run, job, and task API endpoints (#37032)

 * BUGFIXES
+  * Fix(util): reject invalid characters between time-estimate units (#38416) (#38423)
+  * Fix: represent a deleted assignee team as a Ghost team (#38413) (#38419)
+  * Fix(turnstile): route CAPTCHA verification through the configured proxy (#38412) (#38420)
+  * Fix: refresh pull request merge box when the commit status is pending (#38410) (#38411)
+  * Fix: actions task state concurrent update (#38405) (#38409)
+  * Fix(actions): keep workflow run trailing on one row with long branch names (#38382) (#38403)
+  * Fix(web): use locale-aware date formatting for contribution calendar tooltips (#38398) (#38401)
+  * Fix: co-author detection (#38392) (#38397)
+  * Fix: incorrect co-author detection on commit page (#38386) (#38387)
+  * Fix(ui): restore commits table column widths (#38379) (#38383)
+  * Fix: minio init check (#38355) (#38361)
+  * Fix: org project view assignee list (#38357) (#38360)
+  * Fix(actions): release claimed task if context is cancelled during `FetchTask` (#38343) (#38347)
+  * Fix(actions): make runner list pagination order deterministic (#38313) (#38327)
+  * Fix: Improve since/until when counting commits for X-Total-Count (#38243) (#38304)
+  * Fix(actions): prevent chevron overlap with log text when timestamps are enabled (#38227) (#38307)
+  * Fix(workflows): branch protection status checks fail when workflow uses on: paths filter (#38237) (#38302)
+  * Fix(oauth2): persist linkAccountData during auto-link 2FA flow (#38274) (#38295)
+  * Fix(actions): allow Actions bot to push to protected branches (#38284) (#38293)
+  * Fix(actions): include all aggregable run statuses in status filter (#38280) (#38287)
+  * Fix(archiver): use serializable repo-archive queue payload (#38273) (#38283)
  * Fix: update npm dependencies, fix misc issues (#38257)
  * Fix(api): respect since/until when counting commits for X-Total-Count (#38204)
  * Fix: codemirror regressions (#38248)
@@ -134,6 +225,8 @@ been added to each release, please refer to the [blog](https://blog.gitea.com).
  * Refactor flash message and remove SanitizeHTML template func (#37179)

 * TESTING
+  * Test(e2e): fix race in pdf file render test (#38380) (#38381)
+  * Test: compare key file contents instead of `FileInfo` in `TestInitKeys` (#38330) (#38331)
  * Test: speed up two tests (#37905)
  * Test: Fix random failure test (#37887)
  * Test: fix flaky `issue-comment` close test (#37880)
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
@@ -93,10 +94,21 @@ func runACME(listenAddr string, m http.Handler) error {
 	myACME := certmagic.NewACMEIssuer(magic, certmagic.DefaultACME)
 	magic.Issuers = []certmagic.Issuer{myACME}

-	// this obtains certificates or renews them if necessary
-	err := magic.ManageSync(graceful.GetManager().HammerContext(), []string{setting.Domain})
+	// Obtain certificates or renew them if necessary. ManageSync fails closed on
+	// renewal errors even when a still-valid certificate is already on disk, which
+	// takes HTTPS down on restart (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/38519).
+	// Prefer keeping the existing cert and retrying renewals asynchronously.
+	ctx := graceful.GetManager().ShutdownContext()
+	err := magic.ManageSync(ctx, []string{setting.Domain})
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		cert, cacheErr := magic.CacheManagedCertificate(ctx, setting.Domain)
+		if cacheErr != nil || cert.Expired() {
+			return errors.Join(err, cacheErr)
+		}
+		log.Error("ACME certificate manage failed; continuing with existing certificate: %v", err)
+		if err := magic.ManageAsync(ctx, []string{setting.Domain}); err != nil {
+			log.Error("Failed to start async ACME management: %v", err)
+		}
 	}

 	tlsConfig := magic.TLSConfig()
@@ -536,6 +536,13 @@ INTERNAL_TOKEN =
 ;; Leave it empty to apply the default policy, or set it to "unset" to disable Content-Security-Policy.
 ;CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY_GENERAL =

+;; Webhook and oauth2 clients can only call allowed hosts for security reasons. Comma separated list, eg: external, 192.168.1.0/24, *.mydomain.com
+;; Built-in: loopback (for localhost), private (for LAN/intranet), external (for public hosts on internet), * (for all hosts)
+;; CIDR list: 1.2.3.0/8, 2001:db8::/32
+;; Wildcard hosts: *.mydomain.com, 192.168.100.*
+;; This list is enforced on direct connections only. When an HTTP proxy is configured, restricting the proxied target is the proxy server's responsibility.
+;ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = external
+
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
 [camo]
@@ -1754,13 +1761,6 @@ LEVEL = Info
 ;; Deliver timeout in seconds
 ;DELIVER_TIMEOUT = 5
 ;;
-;; Webhook can only call allowed hosts for security reasons. Comma separated list, eg: external, 192.168.1.0/24, *.mydomain.com
-;; Built-in: loopback (for localhost), private (for LAN/intranet), external (for public hosts on internet), * (for all hosts)
-;; CIDR list: 1.2.3.0/8, 2001:db8::/32
-;; Wildcard hosts: *.mydomain.com, 192.168.100.*
-;; Since 1.15.7. Default to * for 1.15.x, external for 1.16 and later
-;ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = external
-;;
 ;; Allow insecure certification
 ;SKIP_TLS_VERIFY = false
 ;;
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func (run *ActionRun) PrettyRef() string {
 	return refName.ShortName()
 }

-// RefTooltip return a tooltop of run's ref. For pull request, it's the title of the PR, otherwise it's the ShortName.
+// RefTooltip return a tooltip of run's ref. For pull request, it's the title of the PR, otherwise it's the ShortName.
 func (run *ActionRun) RefTooltip() string {
 	payload, err := run.GetPullRequestEventPayload()
 	if err == nil && payload != nil && payload.PullRequest != nil {
@@ -62,14 +62,16 @@ func (attempt *ActionRunAttempt) LoadAttributes(ctx context.Context) (err error)
 		attempt.Run = run
 	}

-	if attempt.TriggerUser == nil {
-		attempt.TriggerUserID, attempt.TriggerUser, err = user_model.GetPossibleUserByID(ctx, attempt.TriggerUserID)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
+	return attempt.LoadTriggerUser(ctx)
+}

-	return nil
+// LoadTriggerUser loads the attempt's trigger user if not already loaded.
+func (attempt *ActionRunAttempt) LoadTriggerUser(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
+	if attempt.TriggerUser != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	attempt.TriggerUserID, attempt.TriggerUser, err = user_model.GetPossibleUserByID(ctx, attempt.TriggerUserID)
+	return err
 }

 func GetRunAttemptByRepoAndID(ctx context.Context, repoID, attemptID int64) (*ActionRunAttempt, error) {
@@ -333,6 +333,14 @@ func GetDirectChildJobsByParent(ctx context.Context, parentJob *ActionRunJob) (A
 	return jobs, nil
 }

+// DeleteDirectChildJobsByParent deletes the direct child jobs of a parent job.
+func DeleteDirectChildJobsByParent(ctx context.Context, parentJob *ActionRunJob) error {
+	_, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).
+		Where("run_id=? AND parent_job_id=?", parentJob.RunID, parentJob.ID).
+		Delete(new(ActionRunJob))
+	return err
+}
+
 // CollectAllDescendantJobs returns every job in `allJobs` that lives under parent's subtree (recursively), excluding `parent` itself
 func CollectAllDescendantJobs(parent *ActionRunJob, allJobs []*ActionRunJob) []*ActionRunJob {
 	parents := map[int64]bool{parent.ID: true}
@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ type FindRunJobOptions struct {
 	UpdatedBefore    timeutil.TimeStamp
 	ConcurrencyGroup string
 	OrderBy          db.SearchOrderBy
+	// AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery, when non-nil, restricts results to the repo IDs selected by the
+	// subquery (the caller's accessible repos). A nil value means no restriction. Using a subquery
+	// instead of a materialized ID slice avoids exceeding DB parameter limits for large owners.
+	AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery *builder.Builder
 }

 var JobOrderByMap = map[string]map[string]db.SearchOrderBy{
@@ -132,6 +136,9 @@ func (opts FindRunJobOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
 		}
 		cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{"`action_run_job`.concurrency_group": opts.ConcurrencyGroup})
 	}
+	if opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery != nil {
+		cond = cond.And(builder.In("`action_run_job`.repo_id", opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery))
+	}
 	return cond
 }

@@ -152,3 +159,12 @@ func (opts FindRunJobOptions) ToOrders() string {
 }

 var _ db.FindOptionsOrder = FindRunJobOptions{}
+
+// CountRunJobsByRunAndAttemptID counts the jobs belonging to the given run attempt.
+// It is used to enforce MaxJobNumPerRun when reusable-workflow expansion inserts new jobs.
+func CountRunJobsByRunAndAttemptID(ctx context.Context, runID, runAttemptID int64) (int64, error) {
+	return db.Count[ActionRunJob](ctx, FindRunJobOptions{
+		RunID:        runID,
+		RunAttemptID: optional.Some(runAttemptID),
+	})
+}
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ type FindRunOptions struct {
 	Status           []Status
 	ConcurrencyGroup string
 	CommitSHA        string
+	// AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery, when non-nil, restricts results to the repo IDs selected by the
+	// subquery (the caller's accessible repos). A nil value means no restriction. Using a subquery
+	// instead of a materialized ID slice avoids exceeding DB parameter limits for large owners.
+	AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery *builder.Builder
 }

 func (opts FindRunOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
@@ -101,6 +105,9 @@ func (opts FindRunOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
 	if opts.CommitSHA != "" {
 		cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{"`action_run`.commit_sha": opts.CommitSHA})
 	}
+	if opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery != nil {
+		cond = cond.And(builder.In("`action_run`.repo_id", opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery))
+	}
 	return cond
 }

@@ -270,15 +270,31 @@ func (opts FindRunnerOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
 	return cond
 }

+// runnerStatusOrderExpr builds an ORDER BY fragment that ranks runners by their
+// computed status (see ActionRunner.Status): active (0), idle (1), offline (2).
+// The thresholds are evaluated against the current time, mirroring ToConds, so
+// sorting by status groups active and idle runners instead of interleaving them
+// by raw last_online.
+func runnerStatusOrderExpr() string {
+	now := time.Now()
+	offlineThreshold := now.Add(-RunnerOfflineTime).Unix()
+	idleThreshold := now.Add(-RunnerIdleTime).Unix()
+	return fmt.Sprintf("CASE WHEN last_online <= %d THEN 2 WHEN last_active <= %d THEN 1 ELSE 0 END", offlineThreshold, idleThreshold)
+}
+
 func (opts FindRunnerOptions) ToOrders() string {
 	// A unique tiebreaker (id) is appended so that runners sharing the same
-	// last_online or name keep a deterministic order across paginated queries,
-	// otherwise the same runner may appear on more than one page.
+	// status, last_online or name keep a deterministic order across paginated
+	// queries, otherwise the same runner may appear on more than one page.
+	statusRank := runnerStatusOrderExpr()
 	switch opts.Sort {
 	case "online":
-		return "last_online DESC, id ASC"
+		// Rank by computed status first so idle runners are not interleaved with
+		// active ones; disabled runners sink to the bottom of their status group
+		// (is_disabled ASC), then last_online breaks ties within a group.
+		return statusRank + " ASC, is_disabled ASC, last_online DESC, id ASC"
 	case "offline":
-		return "last_online ASC, id ASC"
+		return statusRank + " DESC, is_disabled ASC, last_online ASC, id ASC"
 	case "alphabetically":
 		return "name ASC, id ASC"
 	case "reversealphabetically":
@@ -288,7 +304,7 @@ func (opts FindRunnerOptions) ToOrders() string {
 	case "oldest":
 		return "id ASC"
 	}
-	return "last_online DESC, id ASC"
+	return statusRank + " ASC, is_disabled ASC, last_online DESC, id ASC"
 }

 // GetRunnerByUUID returns a runner via uuid
@@ -4,16 +4,12 @@
 package actions

 import (
-	"fmt"
 	"testing"
 	"time"

-	"gitea.dev/models/db"
-	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/timeutil"

 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 )

 func TestShouldPersistLastOnline(t *testing.T) {
@@ -85,65 +81,3 @@ func TestShouldPersistLastActive(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
-
-func TestFindRunnerOptions_ToOrders_StableTiebreaker(t *testing.T) {
-	// Sorts on a non-unique column must end with the unique id tiebreaker so
-	// pagination is deterministic; without it, runners sharing the same
-	// last_online or name can appear on more than one page. Sorts already on
-	// the unique id need no tiebreaker.
-	expected := map[string]string{
-		"":                      "last_online DESC, id ASC",
-		"online":                "last_online DESC, id ASC",
-		"offline":               "last_online ASC, id ASC",
-		"alphabetically":        "name ASC, id ASC",
-		"reversealphabetically": "name DESC, id ASC",
-		"newest":                "id DESC",
-		"oldest":                "id ASC",
-	}
-	for sort, want := range expected {
-		assert.Equal(t, want, FindRunnerOptions{Sort: sort}.ToOrders(), "sort %q", sort)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestFindRunners_PaginationNoDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
-	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
-	ctx := t.Context()
-
-	// Create several runners that all share the same last_online value so the
-	// primary sort key (last_online) is tied for all of them.
-	const ownerID = 1000
-	const count = 6
-	for i := range count {
-		runner := &ActionRunner{
-			Name:       "paginated-runner",
-			UUID:       fmt.Sprintf("PAGINATE-TEST-0000-0000-00000000000%d", i),
-			TokenHash:  fmt.Sprintf("paginate-test-token-hash-%d", i),
-			OwnerID:    ownerID,
-			RepoID:     0,
-			LastOnline: 42,
-		}
-		require.NoError(t, db.Insert(ctx, runner))
-	}
-
-	// Page through the runners and ensure every id is returned exactly once.
-	seen := make(map[int64]int)
-	const pageSize = 2
-	for page := 1; ; page++ {
-		runners, err := db.Find[ActionRunner](ctx, FindRunnerOptions{
-			ListOptions: db.ListOptions{Page: page, PageSize: pageSize},
-			OwnerID:     ownerID,
-		})
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		if len(runners) == 0 {
-			break
-		}
-		for _, r := range runners {
-			seen[r.ID]++
-		}
-	}
-
-	assert.Len(t, seen, count, "each runner should be returned exactly once across all pages")
-	for id, n := range seen {
-		assert.Equal(t, 1, n, "runner %d appeared on %d pages", id, n)
-	}
-}
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dev/models/db"
 	"gitea.dev/models/unit"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/actions/jobparser"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/globallock"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/log"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/timeutil"
@@ -59,6 +60,12 @@ type ActionTask struct {
 	Updated timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"updated index"`
 }

+// taskReportTimeout is how long a task may go without contact from its runner before the
+// runner is assumed gone. Runners report state and stream logs every few seconds, both of
+// which refresh ActionTask.Updated. Shorter than setting.Actions.ZombieTaskTimeout because
+// it only decides whether the runner is reachable, not whether the task should be killed.
+const taskReportTimeout = time.Minute
+
 var successfulTokenTaskCache *lru.Cache[string, any]

 func init() {
@@ -84,11 +91,15 @@ func (task *ActionTask) IsStopped() bool {
 	return task.Stopped > 0
 }

-func (task *ActionTask) GetRunLink() string {
-	if task.Job == nil || task.Job.Run == nil {
+func (task *ActionTask) GetRunJobLink() string {
+	// Run.Repo can be nil when the repository was deleted while task/run rows remain
+	// (TaskList.LoadAttributes copies job.Repo into run.Repo, leaving it nil on a miss).
+	// Run.Link() already returns "" in that case, so guard here to avoid emitting a
+	// broken relative "/jobs/N" link from the Sprintf below.
+	if task.Job == nil || task.Job.Run == nil || task.Job.Run.Repo == nil {
 		return ""
 	}
-	return task.Job.Run.Link()
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s/jobs/%d", task.Job.Run.Link(), task.Job.ID)
 }

 func (task *ActionTask) GetCommitLink() string {
@@ -438,6 +449,18 @@ func UpdateTask(ctx context.Context, task *ActionTask, cols ...string) error {
 	return err
 }

+func getRunIDByTaskID(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) (runID int64, _ error) {
+	if has, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Cols("action_run_job.run_id").
+		Table("action_task").
+		Join("INNER", "action_run_job", "action_run_job.id = action_task.job_id").
+		Where(builder.Eq{"action_task.id": taskID}).Get(&runID); err != nil {
+		return runID, err
+	} else if !has {
+		return runID, util.ErrNotExist
+	}
+	return runID, nil
+}
+
 // UpdateTaskByState updates the task by the state.
 // It will always update the task if the state is not final, even there is no change.
 // So it will update ActionTask.Updated to avoid the task being judged as a zombie task.
@@ -447,21 +470,26 @@ func UpdateTaskByState(ctx context.Context, runnerID int64, state *runnerv1.Task
 		stepStates[v.Id] = v
 	}

-	return db.WithTx2(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) (*ActionTask, error) {
-		e := db.GetEngine(ctx)
-
-		task := &ActionTask{}
-		if has, err := e.ID(state.Id).Get(task); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
+	// Only one request can update the task because the final state needs to be calculated with all job states.
+	// Otherwise, concurrent requests with transaction will make the SQL read stale job state and result in wrong final state.
+	taskID := state.Id
+	runID, err := getRunIDByTaskID(ctx, taskID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	task := &ActionTask{}
+	err = globallock.LockAndDo(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("UpdateTaskByState-run-%d", runID), func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		if has, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(taskID).Get(task); err != nil {
+			return err
 		} else if !has {
-			return nil, util.ErrNotExist
+			return util.ErrNotExist
 		} else if runnerID != task.RunnerID {
-			return nil, errors.New("invalid runner for task")
+			return errors.New("invalid runner for task")
 		}

 		if task.Status.IsDone() {
 			// the state is final, do nothing
-			return task, nil
+			return nil
 		}

 		// state.Result is not unspecified means the task is finished
@@ -474,7 +502,7 @@ func UpdateTaskByState(ctx context.Context, runnerID int64, state *runnerv1.Task
 			}
 			task.Stopped = timeutil.TimeStamp(state.StoppedAt.AsTime().Unix())
 			if err := UpdateTask(ctx, task, "status", "stopped"); err != nil {
-				return nil, err
+				return err
 			}
 			if _, err := UpdateRunJob(ctx, &ActionRunJob{
 				ID:      task.JobID,
@@ -482,18 +510,18 @@ func UpdateTaskByState(ctx context.Context, runnerID int64, state *runnerv1.Task
 				Status:  task.Status,
 				Stopped: task.Stopped,
 			}, nil, "status", "stopped"); err != nil {
-				return nil, err
+				return err
 			}
 		} else {
 			// Force update ActionTask.Updated to avoid the task being judged as a zombie task
 			task.Updated = timeutil.TimeStampNow()
 			if err := UpdateTask(ctx, task, "updated"); err != nil {
-				return nil, err
+				return err
 			}
 		}

 		if err := task.LoadAttributes(ctx); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
+			return err
 		}

 		for _, step := range task.Steps {
@@ -510,13 +538,13 @@ func UpdateTaskByState(ctx context.Context, runnerID int64, state *runnerv1.Task
 			} else if step.Started != 0 {
 				step.Status = StatusRunning
 			}
-			if _, err := e.ID(step.ID).Update(step); err != nil {
-				return nil, err
+			if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(step.ID).Update(step); err != nil {
+				return err
 			}
 		}
-
-		return task, nil
+		return nil
 	})
+	return task, err
 }

 func StopTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64, status Status) error {
@@ -545,6 +573,10 @@ func StopTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64, status Status) error {
 			status = StatusCancelled
 		} else if !runner.HasCancellingSupport {
 			status = StatusCancelled
+		} else if task.Updated.AddDuration(taskReportTimeout) < now {
+			// A runner that stopped reporting will never acknowledge the cancellation either,
+			// so skip the handshake instead of waiting for the zombie task cleanup.
+			status = StatusCancelled
 		}
 	}

@@ -559,7 +591,10 @@ func StopTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64, status Status) error {
 			return err
 		}

-		return UpdateTask(ctx, task, "status")
+		// NoAutoTime keeps "updated" at the runner's last contact: re-cancelling an already
+		// cancelling task must not defer the timeout above or the zombie task cleanup.
+		_, err := e.ID(task.ID).Cols("status").NoAutoTime().Update(task)
+		return err
 	}

 	task.Status = status
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (

 	runnerv1 "gitea.dev/actions-proto-go/runner/v1"
 	"gitea.dev/models/db"
+	repo_model "gitea.dev/models/repo"
 	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/actions/jobparser"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/timeutil"
@@ -18,6 +19,21 @@ import (
 	"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
 )

+func TestActionTask_GetRunJobLink(t *testing.T) {
+	repo := &repo_model.Repository{OwnerName: "org", Name: "consumer"}
+	run := &ActionRun{ID: 10, Repo: repo}
+	job := &ActionRunJob{ID: 42, Run: run}
+
+	// a task with a loaded job links to that specific job, not just the run
+	task := &ActionTask{Job: job}
+	assert.Equal(t, run.Link()+"/jobs/42", task.GetRunJobLink())
+
+	// missing job, run or repo yields an empty link instead of a broken URL
+	assert.Empty(t, (&ActionTask{}).GetRunJobLink())
+	assert.Empty(t, (&ActionTask{Job: &ActionRunJob{ID: 42}}).GetRunJobLink())
+	assert.Empty(t, (&ActionTask{Job: &ActionRunJob{ID: 42, Run: &ActionRun{ID: 10}}}).GetRunJobLink())
+}
+
 func TestMakeTaskStepDisplayName(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name     string
@@ -83,68 +99,11 @@ func TestMakeTaskStepDisplayName(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestTaskCancellingFinalizesToCancelled(t *testing.T) {
-	newRunningTask := func(t *testing.T) (*ActionTask, *ActionRunJob) {
-		t.Helper()
-
-		run := &ActionRun{
-			Title:         "cancelling-test-run",
-			RepoID:        1,
-			OwnerID:       2,
-			WorkflowID:    "test.yaml",
-			Index:         999,
-			TriggerUserID: 2,
-			Ref:           "refs/heads/master",
-			CommitSHA:     "c2d72f548424103f01ee1dc02889c1e2bff816b0",
-			Event:         "push",
-			TriggerEvent:  "push",
-			Status:        StatusRunning,
-			Started:       timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
-		}
-		require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), run))
-
-		job := &ActionRunJob{
-			RunID:     run.ID,
-			RepoID:    run.RepoID,
-			OwnerID:   run.OwnerID,
-			CommitSHA: run.CommitSHA,
-			Name:      "cancelling-finalization-job",
-			Attempt:   1,
-			JobID:     "cancelling-finalization-job",
-			Status:    StatusRunning,
-		}
-		require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), job))
-
-		runner := &ActionRunner{
-			UUID:                 "runner-cancelling-supported",
-			Name:                 "runner-cancelling-supported",
-			HasCancellingSupport: true,
-		}
-		require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), runner))
-
-		task := &ActionTask{
-			JobID:     job.ID,
-			Attempt:   1,
-			RunnerID:  runner.ID,
-			Status:    StatusRunning,
-			Started:   timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
-			RepoID:    run.RepoID,
-			OwnerID:   run.OwnerID,
-			CommitSHA: run.CommitSHA,
-		}
-		require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), task))
-
-		job.TaskID = task.ID
-		_, err := UpdateRunJob(t.Context(), job, nil, "task_id")
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-
-		return task, job
-	}
-
 	testResult := func(t *testing.T, result runnerv1.Result) {
 		t.Helper()
 		require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())

-		task, job := newRunningTask(t)
+		task, job := newRunningTaskForCancelling(t, "cancelling-finalization-job", true)
 		require.NoError(t, StopTask(t.Context(), task.ID, StatusCancelling))

 		taskAfterStop := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &ActionTask{ID: task.ID})
@@ -174,137 +133,92 @@ func TestTaskCancellingFinalizesToCancelled(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }

-func TestStopTaskCancellingFallsBackForLegacyRunner(t *testing.T) {
-	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+// TestStopTaskCancellingFallsBackToCancelled covers the cases where the cancelling handshake can
+// never complete, so StopTask must cancel right away instead of waiting for the zombie task cleanup.
+func TestStopTaskCancellingFallsBackToCancelled(t *testing.T) {
+	assertCancelled := func(t *testing.T, task *ActionTask, job *ActionRunJob) {
+		t.Helper()

-	run := &ActionRun{
-		Title:         "cancelling-test-run",
-		RepoID:        1,
-		OwnerID:       2,
-		WorkflowID:    "test.yaml",
-		Index:         999,
-		TriggerUserID: 2,
-		Ref:           "refs/heads/master",
-		CommitSHA:     "c2d72f548424103f01ee1dc02889c1e2bff816b0",
-		Event:         "push",
-		TriggerEvent:  "push",
-		Status:        StatusRunning,
-		Started:       timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
+		taskAfterStop := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &ActionTask{ID: task.ID})
+		assert.Equal(t, StatusCancelled, taskAfterStop.Status)
+		assert.NotZero(t, taskAfterStop.Stopped)
+
+		jobAfterStop := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &ActionRunJob{ID: job.ID})
+		assert.Equal(t, StatusCancelled, jobAfterStop.Status)
+		assert.NotZero(t, jobAfterStop.Stopped)
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), run))

-	job := &ActionRunJob{
-		RunID:     run.ID,
-		RepoID:    run.RepoID,
-		OwnerID:   run.OwnerID,
-		CommitSHA: run.CommitSHA,
-		Name:      "legacy-cancelling-job",
-		Attempt:   1,
-		JobID:     "legacy-cancelling-job",
-		Status:    StatusRunning,
-	}
-	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), job))
+	// A runner too old to know the cancelling state can only be stopped by a final status.
+	t.Run("legacy runner", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+		task, job := newRunningTaskForCancelling(t, "legacy-cancelling-job", false)

-	runner := &ActionRunner{
-		UUID:                 "runner-legacy-no-cancelling",
-		Name:                 "runner-legacy-no-cancelling",
-		HasCancellingSupport: false,
-	}
-	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), runner))
+		require.NoError(t, StopTask(t.Context(), task.ID, StatusCancelling))
+		assertCancelled(t, task, job)
+	})

-	task := &ActionTask{
-		JobID:     job.ID,
-		Attempt:   1,
-		RunnerID:  runner.ID,
-		Status:    StatusRunning,
-		Started:   timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
-		RepoID:    run.RepoID,
-		OwnerID:   run.OwnerID,
-		CommitSHA: run.CommitSHA,
-	}
-	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), task))
+	// The runner is gone, e.g. an ephemeral runner was cleaned up, so nobody can acknowledge.
+	t.Run("missing runner", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+		task, job := newRunningTaskForCancelling(t, "missing-runner-cancelling-job", true)

-	job.TaskID = task.ID
-	_, err := UpdateRunJob(t.Context(), job, nil, "task_id")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
+		_, err := db.DeleteByID[ActionRunner](t.Context(), task.RunnerID)
+		require.NoError(t, err)

-	require.NoError(t, StopTask(t.Context(), task.ID, StatusCancelling))
+		require.NoError(t, StopTask(t.Context(), task.ID, StatusCancelling))
+		assertCancelled(t, task, job)
+	})

-	taskAfterStop := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &ActionTask{ID: task.ID})
-	assert.Equal(t, StatusCancelled, taskAfterStop.Status)
-	assert.NotZero(t, taskAfterStop.Stopped)
+	// The runner went silent, e.g. it gave up while Gitea was restarting, so it never picks up the request.
+	t.Run("silent runner", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+		task, job := newRunningTaskForCancelling(t, "silent-runner-cancelling-job", true)

-	jobAfterStop := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &ActionRunJob{ID: job.ID})
-	assert.Equal(t, StatusCancelled, jobAfterStop.Status)
-	assert.NotZero(t, jobAfterStop.Stopped)
+		// NoAutoTime because the point of the test is an "updated" older than xorm would write
+		task.Updated = timeutil.TimeStampNow().AddDuration(-2 * taskReportTimeout)
+		_, err := db.GetEngine(t.Context()).ID(task.ID).Cols("updated").NoAutoTime().Update(task)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		require.NoError(t, StopTask(t.Context(), task.ID, StatusCancelling))
+		assertCancelled(t, task, job)
+
+		// A runner coming back still learns the outcome from the UpdateTask response,
+		// and its late result does not overwrite the cancellation.
+		late, err := UpdateTaskByState(t.Context(), task.RunnerID, &runnerv1.TaskState{
+			Id:        task.ID,
+			Result:    runnerv1.Result_RESULT_SUCCESS,
+			StoppedAt: timestamppb.Now(),
+		})
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.Equal(t, StatusCancelled, late.Status)
+		assert.Equal(t, runnerv1.Result_RESULT_CANCELLED, late.Status.AsResult())
+	})
 }

-func TestStopTaskCancellingFallsBackForMissingRunner(t *testing.T) {
+// TestStopTaskCancellingKeepsReportTime makes sure persisting the cancelling status does not refresh
+// "updated": re-cancelling would otherwise defer both the fallback to cancelled and the zombie task
+// cleanup, no matter how long the runner has been silent.
+func TestStopTaskCancellingKeepsReportTime(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+	task, _ := newRunningTaskForCancelling(t, "repeated-cancelling-job", true)

-	run := &ActionRun{
-		Title:         "cancelling-test-run",
-		RepoID:        1,
-		OwnerID:       2,
-		WorkflowID:    "test.yaml",
-		Index:         999,
-		TriggerUserID: 2,
-		Ref:           "refs/heads/master",
-		CommitSHA:     "c2d72f548424103f01ee1dc02889c1e2bff816b0",
-		Event:         "push",
-		TriggerEvent:  "push",
-		Status:        StatusRunning,
-		Started:       timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
-	}
-	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), run))
-
-	job := &ActionRunJob{
-		RunID:     run.ID,
-		RepoID:    run.RepoID,
-		OwnerID:   run.OwnerID,
-		CommitSHA: run.CommitSHA,
-		Name:      "missing-runner-cancelling-job",
-		Attempt:   1,
-		JobID:     "missing-runner-cancelling-job",
-		Status:    StatusRunning,
-	}
-	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), job))
-
-	runner := &ActionRunner{
-		UUID:                 "runner-cleaned-up-before-cancel",
-		Name:                 "runner-cleaned-up-before-cancel",
-		HasCancellingSupport: true,
-	}
-	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), runner))
-
-	task := &ActionTask{
-		JobID:     job.ID,
-		Attempt:   1,
-		RunnerID:  runner.ID,
-		Status:    StatusRunning,
-		Started:   timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
-		RepoID:    run.RepoID,
-		OwnerID:   run.OwnerID,
-		CommitSHA: run.CommitSHA,
-	}
-	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), task))
-
-	job.TaskID = task.ID
-	_, err := UpdateRunJob(t.Context(), job, nil, "task_id")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	_, err = db.DeleteByID[ActionRunner](t.Context(), runner.ID)
+	// NoAutoTime because the point of the test is an "updated" older than xorm would write
+	lastReport := timeutil.TimeStampNow().AddDuration(-taskReportTimeout / 2)
+	task.Updated = lastReport
+	_, err := db.GetEngine(t.Context()).ID(task.ID).Cols("updated").NoAutoTime().Update(task)
 	require.NoError(t, err)

+	// the runner reported recently enough, so the task waits for it to acknowledge
 	require.NoError(t, StopTask(t.Context(), task.ID, StatusCancelling))
-
 	taskAfterStop := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &ActionTask{ID: task.ID})
-	assert.Equal(t, StatusCancelled, taskAfterStop.Status)
-	assert.NotZero(t, taskAfterStop.Stopped)
+	assert.Equal(t, StatusCancelling, taskAfterStop.Status)
+	assert.Equal(t, lastReport, taskAfterStop.Updated)

-	jobAfterStop := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &ActionRunJob{ID: job.ID})
-	assert.Equal(t, StatusCancelled, jobAfterStop.Status)
-	assert.NotZero(t, jobAfterStop.Stopped)
+	// cancelling it again does not reset the clock either
+	require.NoError(t, StopTask(t.Context(), task.ID, StatusCancelling))
+	taskAfterSecondStop := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &ActionTask{ID: task.ID})
+	assert.Equal(t, StatusCancelling, taskAfterSecondStop.Status)
+	assert.Equal(t, lastReport, taskAfterSecondStop.Updated)
 }

 // TestReleaseTaskForRunner verifies that releasing a freshly-claimed task returns
@@ -442,3 +356,62 @@ func TestCreateTaskForRunnerPagination(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, StatusRunning, claimed.Status)
 	assert.Equal(t, task.ID, claimed.TaskID)
 }
+
+// newRunningTaskForCancelling inserts a running run/job/task assigned to a fresh runner,
+// which is the state every cancellation test starts from.
+func newRunningTaskForCancelling(t *testing.T, name string, hasCancellingSupport bool) (*ActionTask, *ActionRunJob) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	run := &ActionRun{
+		Title:         "cancelling-test-run",
+		RepoID:        1,
+		OwnerID:       2,
+		WorkflowID:    "test.yaml",
+		Index:         999,
+		TriggerUserID: 2,
+		Ref:           "refs/heads/master",
+		CommitSHA:     "c2d72f548424103f01ee1dc02889c1e2bff816b0",
+		Event:         "push",
+		TriggerEvent:  "push",
+		Status:        StatusRunning,
+		Started:       timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), run))
+
+	job := &ActionRunJob{
+		RunID:     run.ID,
+		RepoID:    run.RepoID,
+		OwnerID:   run.OwnerID,
+		CommitSHA: run.CommitSHA,
+		Name:      name,
+		Attempt:   1,
+		JobID:     name,
+		Status:    StatusRunning,
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), job))
+
+	runner := &ActionRunner{
+		UUID:                 name,
+		Name:                 name,
+		HasCancellingSupport: hasCancellingSupport,
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), runner))
+
+	task := &ActionTask{
+		JobID:     job.ID,
+		Attempt:   1,
+		RunnerID:  runner.ID,
+		Status:    StatusRunning,
+		Started:   timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
+		RepoID:    run.RepoID,
+		OwnerID:   run.OwnerID,
+		CommitSHA: run.CommitSHA,
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), task))
+
+	job.TaskID = task.ID
+	_, err := UpdateRunJob(t.Context(), job, nil, "task_id")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	return task, job
+}
@@ -36,7 +36,18 @@ import (

 const ssh2keyStart = "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"

+const (
+	// the longest RSA key ssh-keygen allows to generate is 16384 bits (2048 bytes), we still relax the limit a little here
+	maxKeyBinaryBytes        = 4096
+	maxKeyContentBase64Bytes = maxKeyBinaryBytes * 4 / 3
+	maxKeyContentExtraBytes  = 4 * 1024 // header, footer, comment
+	maxKeyContentBytes       = maxKeyContentBase64Bytes + maxKeyContentExtraBytes
+)
+
 func extractTypeFromBase64Key(key string) (string, error) {
+	if len(key) > maxKeyContentBase64Bytes {
+		return "", util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("SSH public key base64 is too long")
+	}
 	b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(key)
 	if err != nil || len(b) < 4 {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid key format: %w", err)
@@ -52,6 +63,10 @@ func extractTypeFromBase64Key(key string) (string, error) {

 // parseKeyString parses any key string in OpenSSH or SSH2 format to clean OpenSSH string (RFC4253).
 func parseKeyString(content string) (string, error) {
+	if len(content) > maxKeyContentBytes {
+		return "", util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("SSH public key content is too long")
+	}
+
 	// remove whitespace at start and end
 	content = strings.TrimSpace(content)

@@ -63,6 +78,8 @@ func parseKeyString(content string) (string, error) {
 		// Transform all legal line endings to a single "\n".
 		content = strings.NewReplacer("\r\n", "\n", "\r", "\n").Replace(content)

+		var b strings.Builder
+		b.Grow(len(content))
 		lines := strings.Split(content, "\n")
 		continuationLine := false

@@ -74,9 +91,10 @@ func parseKeyString(content string) (string, error) {
 			if continuationLine || strings.ContainsAny(line, ":-") {
 				continuationLine = strings.HasSuffix(line, "\\")
 			} else {
-				keyContent += line
+				b.WriteString(line)
 			}
 		}
+		keyContent = b.String()

 		t, err := extractTypeFromBase64Key(keyContent)
 		if err != nil {
@@ -473,10 +473,20 @@ func runErr(t *testing.T, stdin []byte, args ...string) {
 	}
 }

-func Test_PublicKeysAreExternallyManaged(t *testing.T) {
+func TestPublicKeysAreExternallyManaged(t *testing.T) {
 	key1 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &PublicKey{ID: 1})
 	externals, err := PublicKeysAreExternallyManaged(t.Context(), []*PublicKey{key1})
 	assert.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Len(t, externals, 1)
 	assert.False(t, externals[0])
 }
+
+// TestCheckPublicKeyStringOversized tests if oversized SSH2 public key strings are rejected before triggering costly operations.
+func TestCheckPublicKeyStringOversized(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := parseKeyString(strings.Repeat("a", maxKeyContentBytes+1))
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "SSH public key content is too long")
+
+	content := "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\n" + strings.Repeat("a", maxKeyContentBase64Bytes+1) + "\n--- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+	_, err = parseKeyString(content)
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "SSH public key base64 is too long")
+}
@@ -304,6 +304,36 @@ func (s AccessTokenScope) PublicOnly() (bool, error) {
 	return bitmap.hasScope(AccessTokenScopePublicOnly)
 }

+// CanCreateChildScope reports whether a request authenticated by this (parent) scope may mint a token
+// carrying the child scope. It rejects any grantable scope the parent does not hold, closing the
+// scope-escalation path. public-only is a restriction rather than a grantable permission, so it is
+// ignored here (a child may always be public-only); EnforcePublicOnlyFrom handles carrying it down.
+func (s AccessTokenScope) CanCreateChildScope(child AccessTokenScope) (bool, error) {
+	requested := child.StringSlice()
+	scopes := make([]AccessTokenScope, 0, len(requested))
+	for _, sc := range requested {
+		childScope := AccessTokenScope(sc)
+		if childScope == AccessTokenScopePublicOnly {
+			continue
+		}
+		scopes = append(scopes, childScope)
+	}
+	return s.HasScope(scopes...)
+}
+
+// EnforcePublicOnlyFrom adds the public-only restriction to s when the authorizing parent scope is
+// public-only, so a public-only token cannot mint a child token that drops the restriction.
+func (s AccessTokenScope) EnforcePublicOnlyFrom(parent AccessTokenScope) (AccessTokenScope, error) {
+	publicOnly, err := parent.PublicOnly()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if !publicOnly {
+		return s, nil
+	}
+	return AccessTokenScope(string(s) + "," + string(AccessTokenScopePublicOnly)).Normalize()
+}
+
 // HasScope returns true if the string has the given scope
 func (s AccessTokenScope) HasScope(scopes ...AccessTokenScope) (bool, error) {
 	bitmap, err := s.parse()
@@ -89,3 +89,26 @@ func TestAccessTokenScope_HasScope(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestAccessTokenScope_EnforcePublicOnlyFrom(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		in     AccessTokenScope
+		parent AccessTokenScope
+		out    AccessTokenScope
+	}{
+		// public-only parent forces the restriction onto the minted scope
+		{"write:user", "write:user,public-only", "public-only,write:user"},
+		// already public-only stays public-only
+		{"public-only,read:user", "public-only", "public-only,read:user"},
+		// non-public-only parent leaves the scope untouched
+		{"write:user", "write:user", "write:user"},
+		{"all", "all", "all"},
+	}
+	for _, test := range tests {
+		t.Run(string(test.parent)+"->"+string(test.in), func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := test.in.EnforcePublicOnlyFrom(test.parent)
+			assert.NoError(t, err)
+			assert.Equal(t, test.out, got)
+		})
+	}
+}
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ func updateApprovalWhitelist(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, c
 		return currentWhitelist, nil
 	}

-	prUserIDs, err := access_model.GetUserIDsWithUnitAccess(ctx, repo, perm.AccessModeRead, unit.TypePullRequests)
+	prUserIDs, err := access_model.GetUserIDsWithAnyUnitAccess(ctx, repo, perm.AccessModeRead, unit.TypePullRequests)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dev/modules/markup"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/optional"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/references"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/structs"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/timeutil"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/translation"
@@ -543,6 +544,9 @@ func (c *Comment) GetSanitizedContentHTML() template.HTML {

 // LoadLabel if comment.Type is CommentTypeLabel, then load Label
 func (c *Comment) LoadLabel(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if c.LabelID == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
 	var label Label
 	has, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(c.LabelID).Get(&label)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -550,8 +554,8 @@ func (c *Comment) LoadLabel(ctx context.Context) error {
 	} else if has {
 		c.Label = &label
 	} else {
-		// Ignore Label is deleted, but not clear this table
-		log.Warn("Commit %d cannot load label %d", c.ID, c.LabelID)
+		// label was deleted but comment rows referencing it were not cleaned up
+		log.Debug("Comment %d references deleted label %d", c.ID, c.LabelID)
 	}

 	return nil
@@ -626,11 +630,18 @@ func UpdateCommentAttachments(ctx context.Context, c *Comment, uuids []string) e
 		return nil
 	}
 	return db.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		issue, err := GetIssueByID(ctx, c.IssueID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		attachments, err := repo_model.GetAttachmentsByUUIDs(ctx, uuids)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("getAttachmentsByUUIDs [uuids: %v]: %w", uuids, err)
 		}
 		for i := range attachments {
+			if err := validateAttachmentForIssue(ctx, issue, attachments[i]); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
 			attachments[i].IssueID = c.IssueID
 			attachments[i].CommentID = c.ID
 			if err := repo_model.UpdateAttachment(ctx, attachments[i]); err != nil {
@@ -643,36 +654,18 @@ func UpdateCommentAttachments(ctx context.Context, c *Comment, uuids []string) e
 }

 // LoadAssigneeUserAndTeam if comment.Type is CommentTypeAssignees, then load assignees
-func (c *Comment) LoadAssigneeUserAndTeam(ctx context.Context) error {
-	var err error
-
+func (c *Comment) LoadAssigneeUserAndTeam(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
 	if c.AssigneeID > 0 && c.Assignee == nil {
-		c.Assignee, err = user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, c.AssigneeID)
+		_, c.Assignee, err = user_model.GetPossibleUserByID(ctx, c.AssigneeID)
 		if err != nil {
-			if !user_model.IsErrUserNotExist(err) {
-				return err
-			}
-			c.Assignee = user_model.NewGhostUser()
-		}
-	} else if c.AssigneeTeamID > 0 && c.AssigneeTeam == nil {
-		if err = c.LoadIssue(ctx); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-
-		if err = c.Issue.LoadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
+	}
+	if c.AssigneeTeamID > 0 && c.AssigneeTeam == nil {
+		_, c.AssigneeTeam, err = organization.GetPossibleTeamByID(ctx, c.AssigneeTeamID)
+		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-
-		if err = c.Issue.Repo.LoadOwner(ctx); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-
-		if c.Issue.Repo.Owner.IsOrganization() {
-			c.AssigneeTeam, err = organization.GetTeamByID(ctx, c.AssigneeTeamID)
-			if err != nil && !organization.IsErrTeamNotExist(err) {
-				return err
-			}
-		}
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -795,8 +788,7 @@ func (c *Comment) MetaSpecialDoerTr(locale translation.Locale) template.HTML {
 }

 func (c *Comment) TimelineRequestedReviewTr(locale translation.Locale, createdStr template.HTML) template.HTML {
-	if c.AssigneeID > 0 {
-		// it guarantees LoadAssigneeUserAndTeam has been called, and c.Assignee is Ghost user but not nil if the user doesn't exist
+	if c.Assignee != nil {
 		if c.RemovedAssignee {
 			if c.PosterID == c.AssigneeID {
 				return locale.Tr("repo.issues.review.remove_review_request_self", createdStr)
@@ -805,14 +797,20 @@ func (c *Comment) TimelineRequestedReviewTr(locale translation.Locale, createdSt
 		}
 		return locale.Tr("repo.issues.review.add_review_request", c.Assignee.GetDisplayName(), createdStr)
 	}
-	teamName := "Ghost Team"
 	if c.AssigneeTeam != nil {
-		teamName = c.AssigneeTeam.Name
+		if c.RemovedAssignee {
+			return locale.Tr("repo.issues.review.remove_review_request", c.AssigneeTeam.Name, createdStr)
+		}
+		return locale.Tr("repo.issues.review.add_review_request", c.AssigneeTeam.Name, createdStr)
 	}
+
+	// impossible fallback
+	assigneePrompt := fmt.Sprintf("(AssigneeID=%d, AssigneeTeamID=%d)", c.AssigneeID, c.AssigneeTeam.ID)
+	setting.PanicInDevOrTesting("unknown timeline pull request review event comment: id=%d, %s", c.ID, assigneePrompt)
 	if c.RemovedAssignee {
-		return locale.Tr("repo.issues.review.remove_review_request", teamName, createdStr)
+		return locale.Tr("repo.issues.review.remove_review_request", assigneePrompt, createdStr)
 	}
-	return locale.Tr("repo.issues.review.add_review_request", teamName, createdStr)
+	return locale.Tr("repo.issues.review.add_review_request", assigneePrompt, createdStr)
 }

 // CreateComment creates comment with context
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func (comments CommentList) loadLabels(ctx context.Context) error {
 	}

 	for _, comment := range comments {
-		comment.Label = commentLabels[comment.ID]
+		comment.Label = commentLabels[comment.LabelID]
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -45,12 +45,27 @@ func TestCreateComment(t *testing.T) {
 	unittest.AssertInt64InRange(t, now, then, int64(updatedIssue.UpdatedUnix))
 }

+func TestLoadAssigneeUserAndTeam_DeletedTeamBecomesGhostTeam(t *testing.T) {
+	assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+	issue := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Issue{ID: 15})
+	comment := &issues_model.Comment{
+		Type:           issues_model.CommentTypeAssignees,
+		IssueID:        issue.ID,
+		AssigneeTeamID: 999999, // non-existing team ID
+	}
+	assert.NoError(t, comment.LoadAssigneeUserAndTeam(t.Context()))
+	assert.NotNil(t, comment.AssigneeTeam)
+	assert.EqualValues(t, -1, comment.AssigneeTeam.ID)
+}
+
 func Test_UpdateCommentAttachment(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())

 	comment := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Comment{ID: 1})
+	issue := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Issue{ID: comment.IssueID})
 	attachment := repo_model.Attachment{
-		Name: "test.txt",
+		RepoID: issue.RepoID, // must match the comment's repo, else the cross-repo guard rejects it
+		Name:   "test.txt",
 	}
 	assert.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &attachment))

@@ -263,14 +263,46 @@ func AddDeletePRBranchComment(ctx context.Context, doer *user_model.User, repo *
 	return err
 }

+// validateAttachmentForIssue rejects a foreign or already-linked attachment before it is linked to
+// issue: a known UUID could otherwise re-link (and expose) another repo's private attachment. A
+// legacy attachment predating repo_id-on-upload is adopted into the issue's repo.
+func validateAttachmentForIssue(ctx context.Context, issue *Issue, attachment *repo_model.Attachment) error {
+	if attachment.RepoID == 0 && attachment.CreatedUnix < repo_model.LegacyAttachmentMissingRepoIDCutoff {
+		attachment.RepoID = issue.RepoID
+		if err := repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(ctx, attachment, "repo_id"); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("update attachment repo_id [id: %d]: %w", attachment.ID, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if attachment.RepoID != issue.RepoID {
+		return util.NewPermissionDeniedErrorf("attachment belongs to a different repository")
+	}
+	if attachment.IssueID != 0 && attachment.IssueID != issue.ID {
+		return util.NewPermissionDeniedErrorf("attachment is already linked to another issue")
+	}
+	if attachment.ReleaseID != 0 {
+		return util.NewPermissionDeniedErrorf("attachment is already linked to a release")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // UpdateIssueAttachments update attachments by UUIDs for the issue
 func UpdateIssueAttachments(ctx context.Context, issueID int64, uuids []string) (err error) {
+	if len(uuids) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
 	return db.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		issue, err := GetIssueByID(ctx, issueID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		attachments, err := repo_model.GetAttachmentsByUUIDs(ctx, uuids)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("getAttachmentsByUUIDs [uuids: %v]: %w", uuids, err)
 		}
 		for i := range attachments {
+			if err := validateAttachmentForIssue(ctx, issue, attachments[i]); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
 			attachments[i].IssueID = issueID
 			if err := repo_model.UpdateAttachment(ctx, attachments[i]); err != nil {
 				return fmt.Errorf("update attachment [id: %d]: %w", attachments[i].ID, err)
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package issues_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	issues_model "gitea.dev/models/issues"
+	repo_model "gitea.dev/models/repo"
+	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/util"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestUpdateIssueAttachmentsCrossRepo(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+
+	// attachment id 2 belongs to repo 2 / issue 4; issue 1 lives in repo 1
+	issue1 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Issue{ID: 1})
+	foreign := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Attachment{ID: 2})
+	require.NotEqual(t, issue1.RepoID, foreign.RepoID)
+
+	// re-linking a foreign repo's attachment by UUID must be rejected
+	err := issues_model.UpdateIssueAttachments(t.Context(), issue1.ID, []string{foreign.UUID})
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrPermissionDenied)
+
+	// the foreign attachment must be left untouched
+	reloaded := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Attachment{ID: 2})
+	assert.Equal(t, foreign.IssueID, reloaded.IssueID)
+}
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package issues

 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"slices"
 	"strconv"
@@ -27,12 +28,6 @@ type ErrRepoLabelNotExist struct {
 	RepoID  int64
 }

-// IsErrRepoLabelNotExist checks if an error is a RepoErrLabelNotExist.
-func IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err error) bool {
-	_, ok := err.(ErrRepoLabelNotExist)
-	return ok
-}
-
 func (err ErrRepoLabelNotExist) Error() string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("label does not exist [label_id: %d, repo_id: %d]", err.LabelID, err.RepoID)
 }
@@ -312,6 +307,18 @@ func GetLabelInRepoByName(ctx context.Context, repoID int64, labelName string) (
 	return l, nil
 }

+// GetLabelInRepoOrOrgByID returns the label with labelID scoped to the repo, falling back to the
+// repo's owning organization when ownerIsOrg is set. It returns ErrRepoLabelNotExist /
+// ErrOrgLabelNotExist when the label is in neither scope, so a foreign-but-existing label ID is
+// indistinguishable from a nonexistent one (no cross-repo enumeration oracle).
+func GetLabelInRepoOrOrgByID(ctx context.Context, repoID, ownerID int64, ownerIsOrg bool, labelID int64) (*Label, error) {
+	label, err := GetLabelInRepoByID(ctx, repoID, labelID)
+	if err != nil && errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) && ownerIsOrg {
+		return GetLabelInOrgByID(ctx, ownerID, labelID)
+	}
+	return label, err
+}
+
 // GetLabelInRepoByID returns a label by ID in given repository.
 func GetLabelInRepoByID(ctx context.Context, repoID, labelID int64) (*Label, error) {
 	if labelID <= 0 || repoID <= 0 {
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
 	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/timeutil"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/util"

 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 )
@@ -94,10 +95,10 @@ func TestGetLabelInRepoByName(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, "label1", label.Name)

 	_, err = issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByName(t.Context(), 1, "")
-	assert.True(t, issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err))
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)

 	_, err = issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByName(t.Context(), unittest.NonexistentID, "nonexistent")
-	assert.True(t, issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err))
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)
 }

 func TestGetLabelInRepoByNames(t *testing.T) {
@@ -131,10 +132,10 @@ func TestGetLabelInRepoByID(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.EqualValues(t, 1, label.ID)

 	_, err = issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByID(t.Context(), 1, -1)
-	assert.True(t, issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err))
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)

 	_, err = issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByID(t.Context(), unittest.NonexistentID, unittest.NonexistentID)
-	assert.True(t, issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err))
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)
 }

 func TestGetLabelsInRepoByIDs(t *testing.T) {
@@ -324,6 +324,59 @@ func IsOfficialReviewerTeam(ctx context.Context, issue *Issue, team *organizatio
 	return slices.Contains(pb.ApprovalsWhitelistTeamIDs, team.ID), nil
 }

+// RecalculateReviewsOfficial re-evaluates the "official" flag of the latest approve
+// and reject reviews of an issue against its pull request's current base branch.
+// It must be called whenever the target branch changes, otherwise an approval that
+// was official on the previous (possibly unprotected) branch would keep satisfying
+// the new branch's protection rules.
+func RecalculateReviewsOfficial(ctx context.Context, issue *Issue) error {
+	if err := issue.LoadPullRequest(ctx); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Clearing and restoring the official flags must happen atomically, otherwise a
+	// failure in between would leave the reviews without any official flag set.
+	return db.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		// Only the latest approve/reject review of each reviewer counts as official, so
+		// clear the flag on all of them first and restore it only where it still applies.
+		if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).
+			Where("issue_id = ?", issue.ID).
+			In("type", ReviewTypeApprove, ReviewTypeReject).
+			Cols("official").
+			Update(&Review{Official: false}); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		reviews, err := FindLatestReviews(ctx, FindReviewOptions{
+			Types:   []ReviewType{ReviewTypeApprove, ReviewTypeReject},
+			IssueID: issue.ID,
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		for _, review := range reviews {
+			if err := review.LoadReviewer(ctx); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if review.Reviewer == nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			official, err := IsOfficialReviewer(ctx, issue, review.Reviewer)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if official {
+				if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(review.ID).Cols("official").Update(&Review{Official: true}); err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
 // CreateReview creates a new review based on opts
 func CreateReview(ctx context.Context, opts CreateReviewOptions) (*Review, error) {
 	return db.WithTx2(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) (*Review, error) {
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ package issues_test
 import (
 	"testing"

+	"gitea.dev/models/db"
+	git_model "gitea.dev/models/git"
 	issues_model "gitea.dev/models/issues"
 	repo_model "gitea.dev/models/repo"
 	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
@@ -386,3 +388,45 @@ func TestAddReviewRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.NotNil(t, comment.CommentMetaData)
 	assert.Equal(t, issues_model.SpecialDoerNameCodeOwners, comment.CommentMetaData.SpecialDoerName)
 }
+
+func TestRecalculateReviewsOfficial(t *testing.T) {
+	assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+
+	// PR #2 targets repo1's "master" branch. Simulate an approval that became
+	// official while the PR targeted an unprotected branch.
+	issue := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Issue{ID: 3})
+	reviewer := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 4})
+	review, err := issues_model.CreateReview(t.Context(), issues_model.CreateReviewOptions{
+		Type:     issues_model.ReviewTypeApprove,
+		Issue:    issue,
+		Reviewer: reviewer,
+		Official: true,
+	})
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Protect the (now current) target branch with an approvals whitelist that
+	// does not include the reviewer, mirroring a retarget onto a protected branch.
+	rule := &git_model.ProtectedBranch{
+		RepoID:                    issue.RepoID,
+		RuleName:                  "master",
+		EnableApprovalsWhitelist:  true,
+		ApprovalsWhitelistUserIDs: []int64{2},
+		RequiredApprovals:         1,
+	}
+	assert.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), rule))
+
+	// Re-evaluating must strip the stale official flag, otherwise the approval
+	// would still satisfy the protected branch's required approvals.
+	assert.NoError(t, issues_model.RecalculateReviewsOfficial(t.Context(), issue))
+	review = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Review{ID: review.ID})
+	assert.False(t, review.Official)
+
+	// Once the reviewer is whitelisted, re-evaluating restores the official flag.
+	rule.ApprovalsWhitelistUserIDs = []int64{2, reviewer.ID}
+	_, err = db.GetEngine(t.Context()).ID(rule.ID).Cols("approvals_whitelist_user_i_ds").Update(rule)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	assert.NoError(t, issues_model.RecalculateReviewsOfficial(t.Context(), issue))
+	review = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Review{ID: review.ID})
+	assert.True(t, review.Official)
+}
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package organization

 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"strings"

@@ -92,6 +93,15 @@ func (t *Team) IsPublic() bool  { return t.Visibility.IsPublic() }
 func (t *Team) IsLimited() bool { return t.Visibility.IsLimited() }
 func (t *Team) IsPrivate() bool { return t.Visibility.IsPrivate() }

+const (
+	ghostTeamID   = -1
+	ghostTeamName = "(deleted team)"
+)
+
+func newGhostTeam() *Team {
+	return &Team{ID: ghostTeamID, Name: ghostTeamName, LowerName: ghostTeamName}
+}
+
 // CanNonMemberReadMeta reports whether a non-member, non-owner doer may read
 // the team's metadata, based on the team's visibility tier and the parent org's
 // visibility. Privileged callers (site admins, org owners, team members) are
@@ -270,6 +280,17 @@ func GetTeamByID(ctx context.Context, teamID int64) (*Team, error) {
 	return t, nil
 }

+func GetPossibleTeamByID(ctx context.Context, teamID int64) (int64, *Team, error) {
+	t, err := GetTeamByID(ctx, teamID)
+	if errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) {
+		t = newGhostTeam()
+		return t.ID, t, nil
+	} else if err != nil {
+		return 0, nil, err
+	}
+	return t.ID, t, nil
+}
+
 // IncrTeamRepoNum increases the number of repos for the given team by 1
 func IncrTeamRepoNum(ctx context.Context, teamID int64) error {
 	_, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Incr("num_repos").ID(teamID).Update(new(Team))
@@ -599,8 +599,8 @@ func HasAnyUnitAccess(ctx context.Context, userID int64, repo *repo_model.Reposi
 	return perm.HasAnyUnitAccess(), nil
 }

-func GetUsersWithUnitAccess(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, mode perm_model.AccessMode, unitType unit.Type) (users []*user_model.User, err error) {
-	userIDs, err := GetUserIDsWithUnitAccess(ctx, repo, mode, unitType)
+func GetUsersWithAnyUnitAccess(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, mode perm_model.AccessMode, unitType unit.Type, moreUnitTypes ...unit.Type) (users []*user_model.User, err error) {
+	userIDs, err := GetUserIDsWithAnyUnitAccess(ctx, repo, mode, unitType, moreUnitTypes...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ func GetUsersWithUnitAccess(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, mo
 	return users, nil
 }

-func GetUserIDsWithUnitAccess(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, mode perm_model.AccessMode, unitType unit.Type) (container.Set[int64], error) {
+func GetUserIDsWithAnyUnitAccess(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, mode perm_model.AccessMode, unitType unit.Type, moreUnitTypes ...unit.Type) (container.Set[int64], error) {
 	userIDs := container.Set[int64]{}
 	e := db.GetEngine(ctx)
 	accesses := make([]*Access, 0, 10)
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ func GetUserIDsWithUnitAccess(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository,
 	if !repo.Owner.IsOrganization() {
 		userIDs.Add(repo.Owner.ID)
 	} else {
-		teamUserIDs, err := organization.GetTeamUserIDsWithAccessToAnyRepoUnit(ctx, repo.OwnerID, repo.ID, mode, unitType)
+		teamUserIDs, err := organization.GetTeamUserIDsWithAccessToAnyRepoUnit(ctx, repo.OwnerID, repo.ID, mode, unitType, moreUnitTypes...)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
@@ -226,12 +226,12 @@ func testGetIndividualUserRepoPermission(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Equal(t, perm_model.AccessModeNone, perm.unitsMode[unit.TypeCode])
 		assert.Equal(t, perm_model.AccessModeRead, perm.unitsMode[unit.TypeIssues])

-		users, err := GetUsersWithUnitAccess(ctx, repo3, perm_model.AccessModeRead, unit.TypeIssues)
+		users, err := GetUsersWithAnyUnitAccess(ctx, repo3, perm_model.AccessModeRead, unit.TypeIssues)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 		require.Len(t, users, 1)
 		assert.Equal(t, user.ID, users[0].ID)

-		users, err = GetUsersWithUnitAccess(ctx, repo3, perm_model.AccessModeWrite, unit.TypeIssues)
+		users, err = GetUsersWithAnyUnitAccess(ctx, repo3, perm_model.AccessModeWrite, unit.TypeIssues)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 		require.Empty(t, users)
 	})
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ func testGetIndividualUserRepoPermission(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Equal(t, perm_model.AccessModeWrite, perm.unitsMode[unit.TypeCode])
 		assert.Equal(t, perm_model.AccessModeWrite, perm.unitsMode[unit.TypeIssues])

-		users, err := GetUsersWithUnitAccess(ctx, repo3, perm_model.AccessModeWrite, unit.TypeIssues)
+		users, err := GetUsersWithAnyUnitAccess(ctx, repo3, perm_model.AccessModeWrite, unit.TypeIssues)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 		require.Len(t, users, 1)
 		assert.Equal(t, user.ID, users[0].ID)
@@ -31,18 +31,28 @@ func GetOrgRepositoryIDs(ctx context.Context, orgID int64) (repoIDs []int64, _ e
 type SearchTeamRepoOptions struct {
 	db.ListOptions
 	TeamID int64
+	// PublicOnly restricts the result (and count) to non-private repositories.
+	PublicOnly bool
+}
+
+func (opts *SearchTeamRepoOptions) toCond() builder.Cond {
+	cond := builder.NewCond()
+	if opts.TeamID > 0 {
+		cond = cond.And(builder.In("id",
+			builder.Select("repo_id").
+				From("team_repo").
+				Where(builder.Eq{"team_id": opts.TeamID}),
+		))
+	}
+	if opts.PublicOnly {
+		cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{"is_private": false})
+	}
+	return cond
 }

 // GetTeamRepositories returns paginated repositories in team of organization.
 func GetTeamRepositories(ctx context.Context, opts *SearchTeamRepoOptions) (RepositoryList, error) {
-	sess := db.GetEngine(ctx)
-	if opts.TeamID > 0 {
-		sess = sess.In("id",
-			builder.Select("repo_id").
-				From("team_repo").
-				Where(builder.Eq{"team_id": opts.TeamID}),
-		)
-	}
+	sess := db.GetEngine(ctx).Where(opts.toCond())
 	if opts.PageSize > 0 {
 		sess.Limit(opts.PageSize, (opts.Page-1)*opts.PageSize)
 	}
@@ -51,6 +61,11 @@ func GetTeamRepositories(ctx context.Context, opts *SearchTeamRepoOptions) (Repo
 		Find(&repos)
 }

+// CountTeamRepositories returns the number of repositories in team of organization matching opts.
+func CountTeamRepositories(ctx context.Context, opts *SearchTeamRepoOptions) (int64, error) {
+	return db.GetEngine(ctx).Where(opts.toCond()).Count(new(Repository))
+}
+
 // AccessibleReposEnvironment operations involving the repositories that are
 // accessible to a particular user
 type AccessibleReposEnvironment interface {
@@ -310,11 +310,17 @@ func userOrgTeamRepoBuilder(userID int64) *builder.Builder {
 }

 // userOrgTeamUnitRepoBuilder returns repo ids where user's teams can access the special unit.
+// A team grants the unit either through an explicit team_unit row (access_mode > none) or by being an
+// admin/owner team (team.authorize >= admin), which grants every unit regardless of team_unit rows —
+// mirroring the HasAdminAccess() short-circuit in access.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission.
 func userOrgTeamUnitRepoBuilder(userID int64, unitType unit.Type) *builder.Builder {
 	return userOrgTeamRepoBuilder(userID).
-		Join("INNER", "team_unit", "`team_unit`.team_id = `team_repo`.team_id").
-		Where(builder.Eq{"`team_unit`.`type`": unitType}).
-		And(builder.Gt{"`team_unit`.`access_mode`": int(perm.AccessModeNone)})
+		Join("INNER", "team", "`team`.id = `team_repo`.team_id").
+		Join("LEFT", "team_unit", builder.Expr("`team_unit`.team_id = `team_repo`.team_id AND `team_unit`.`type` = ?", unitType)).
+		Where(builder.Or(
+			builder.Gte{"`team`.authorize": int(perm.AccessModeAdmin)},
+			builder.Gt{"`team_unit`.`access_mode`": int(perm.AccessModeNone)},
+		))
 }

 // userOrgTeamUnitRepoCond returns a condition to select repo ids where user's teams can access the special unit.
@@ -326,7 +332,7 @@ func userOrgTeamUnitRepoCond(idStr string, userID int64, unitType unit.Type) bui
 func UserOrgUnitRepoCond(idStr string, userID, orgID int64, unitType unit.Type) builder.Cond {
 	return builder.In(idStr,
 		userOrgTeamUnitRepoBuilder(userID, unitType).
-			And(builder.Eq{"`team_unit`.org_id": orgID}),
+			And(builder.Eq{"`team`.org_id": orgID}),
 	)
 }

@@ -755,6 +761,40 @@ func FindUserCodeAccessibleOwnerRepoIDs(ctx context.Context, ownerID int64, user
 	))
 }

+// PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond restricts to public repos whose owner is publicly visible: the
+// "genuinely public" set a public-only token or an anonymous caller may see (a public repo under a
+// limited/private owner is not publicly reachable and must be excluded).
+func PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond() builder.Cond {
+	return builder.And(
+		builder.Eq{"`repository`.is_private": false},
+		builder.In("`repository`.owner_id", builder.Select("id").From("`user`").Where(builder.Eq{"visibility": structs.VisibleTypePublic})),
+	)
+}
+
+// UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond selects the repos owned by ownerID whose Actions `user` may read.
+// It is used to list an org/user's Actions runs and jobs (see the callers in routers/api/v1/shared).
+//   - owner_id = ownerID: only that owner's repos.
+//   - AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, TypeActions): only repos whose Actions the user can read
+//     (admin/owner teams are handled inside it; a site admin is not, callers must skip the filter for one).
+//   - publicOnly (a public-only token): additionally limit to public repos under a public owner.
+func UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond(ownerID int64, user *user_model.User, publicOnly bool) builder.Cond {
+	cond := builder.NewCond().And(
+		builder.Eq{"`repository`.owner_id": ownerID},
+		AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeActions),
+	)
+	if publicOnly {
+		cond = cond.And(PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond())
+	}
+	return cond
+}
+
+// FindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDsSubQuery returns a subquery selecting the repository IDs the user
+// can see for the given owner. Callers embed it in an `IN (...)` condition so that a large owner does not
+// materialize every repo ID into the SQL statement, which could exceed database parameter limits.
+func FindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDsSubQuery(ownerID int64, user *user_model.User, publicOnly bool) *builder.Builder {
+	return builder.Select("id").From("repository").Where(UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond(ownerID, user, publicOnly))
+}
+
 // GetUserRepositories returns a list of repositories of given user.
 func GetUserRepositories(ctx context.Context, opts SearchRepoOptions) (RepositoryList, int64, error) {
 	if len(opts.OrderBy) == 0 {
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (

 	"gitea.dev/models/db"
 	repo_model "gitea.dev/models/repo"
+	"gitea.dev/models/unit"
 	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
 	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/optional"
@@ -466,3 +467,50 @@ func TestSearchRepositoryByTopicName(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestFindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDs(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+	// user2 is on org3's owner team, so it can access org3's private repo3 (which has the actions unit)
+	user := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})
+
+	// org3 is a public org owning repo3 (private) and repo32 (public), both with the actions unit
+	const orgID = 3
+
+	all, err := repo_model.SearchRepositoryIDsByCondition(t.Context(), repo_model.UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond(orgID, user, false))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, all, int64(3), "without public-only the private repo's actions are listed")
+
+	publicOnly, err := repo_model.SearchRepositoryIDsByCondition(t.Context(), repo_model.UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond(orgID, user, true))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.NotContains(t, publicOnly, int64(3), "a public-only token must not list a private repo's actions")
+	assert.Contains(t, publicOnly, int64(32), "a public repo under a public owner stays listed")
+}
+
+// TestUserOrgUnitRepoCondTeamAuthorize pins the team.authorize behavior of userOrgTeamUnitRepoBuilder
+// (exercised through UserOrgUnitRepoCond): an admin/owner team grants every unit even without an explicit
+// team_unit row, while a non-admin team only grants a unit it has an explicit row for. This guards both
+// directions — hiding repos from admin-team members, and over-broadening a plain team's access.
+func TestUserOrgUnitRepoCondTeamAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+
+	accessibleRepoIDs := func(userID, orgID int64, unitType unit.Type) []int64 {
+		ids, err := repo_model.SearchRepositoryIDsByCondition(t.Context(),
+			repo_model.UserOrgUnitRepoCond("`repository`.id", userID, orgID, unitType))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		return ids
+	}
+
+	// Case A: user18 is only on org17's owner team (team5, authorize=owner), linked to the private repo24
+	// but with no Actions team_unit row. The owner authorize must still grant it, mirroring the runtime
+	// HasAdminAccess() short-circuit in access.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission.
+	assert.Contains(t, accessibleRepoIDs(18, 17, unit.TypeActions), int64(24),
+		"an owner team grants a unit it has no explicit team_unit row for")
+
+	// Cases B and C share one subject so the team_unit row is the only difference: user4 is only on org3's
+	// write team (team2, authorize=write, non-admin), linked to the private repo3. team2 has an explicit
+	// Projects row but none for Actions.
+	assert.Contains(t, accessibleRepoIDs(4, 3, unit.TypeProjects), int64(3),
+		"a non-admin team grants a unit it has an explicit team_unit row for")
+	assert.NotContains(t, accessibleRepoIDs(4, 3, unit.TypeActions), int64(3),
+		"a non-admin team must NOT grant a unit it has no team_unit row for")
+}
@@ -46,9 +46,8 @@ func (opts *StarredReposOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
 		// only include private repos the actor can still access, so metadata does not leak after access revocation
 		cond = cond.And(AccessibleRepositoryCondition(opts.Actor, unit.TypeInvalid))
 	} else {
-		cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{
-			"repository.is_private": false,
-		})
+		// a public repo under a limited/private owner is not publicly reachable, so exclude it too
+		cond = cond.And(PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond())
 	}
 	return cond
 }
@@ -96,9 +95,8 @@ func (opts *WatchedReposOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
 		// only include private repos the actor can still access, so metadata does not leak after access revocation
 		cond = cond.And(AccessibleRepositoryCondition(opts.Actor, unit.TypeInvalid))
 	} else {
-		cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{
-			"repository.is_private": false,
-		})
+		// a public repo under a limited/private owner is not publicly reachable, so exclude it too
+		cond = cond.And(PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond())
 	}
 	return cond.And(builder.Neq{
 		"watch.mode": WatchModeDont,
@@ -84,3 +84,40 @@ func testUserRepoGetIssuePostersWithSearch(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Len(t, users, 1)
 	assert.Equal(t, "user2", users[0].Name)
 }
+
+func TestStarredWatchedReposExcludeNonPublicOwners(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+
+	const viewerID = 2
+	// repo1: public repo under a public owner; repo38: public repo under a limited org (not publicly reachable)
+	const publicOwnerRepo, limitedOwnerRepo = 1, 38
+
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &repo_model.Star{UID: viewerID, RepoID: publicOwnerRepo}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &repo_model.Star{UID: viewerID, RepoID: limitedOwnerRepo}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &repo_model.Watch{UserID: viewerID, RepoID: publicOwnerRepo, Mode: repo_model.WatchModeNormal}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &repo_model.Watch{UserID: viewerID, RepoID: limitedOwnerRepo, Mode: repo_model.WatchModeNormal}))
+
+	listOpts := db.ListOptions{Page: 1, PageSize: 50}
+
+	starred, err := repo_model.GetStarredRepos(t.Context(), &repo_model.StarredReposOptions{
+		ListOptions: listOpts, StarrerID: viewerID, IncludePrivate: false,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.NotContains(t, repoIDs(starred), int64(limitedOwnerRepo), "a public repo under a limited owner must be hidden from a public star listing")
+	assert.Contains(t, repoIDs(starred), int64(publicOwnerRepo), "a public repo under a public owner stays visible")
+
+	watched, _, err := repo_model.GetWatchedRepos(t.Context(), &repo_model.WatchedReposOptions{
+		ListOptions: listOpts, WatcherID: viewerID, IncludePrivate: false,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.NotContains(t, repoIDs(watched), int64(limitedOwnerRepo), "a public repo under a limited owner must be hidden from a public watch listing")
+	assert.Contains(t, repoIDs(watched), int64(publicOwnerRepo), "a public repo under a public owner stays visible")
+}
+
+func repoIDs(repos []*repo_model.Repository) []int64 {
+	ids := make([]int64, len(repos))
+	for i, r := range repos {
+		ids[i] = r.ID
+	}
+	return ids
+}
@@ -57,9 +57,14 @@ func NewInterpeter(
 	}

 	ee := &exprparser.EvaluationEnvironment{
-		Github:   gitCtx,
-		Env:      nil, // no need
-		Job:      nil, // no need
+		Github: gitCtx,
+		Env:    nil, // no need
+		// Job must be non-nil because cancelled() dereferences Job.Status unconditionally.
+		// See: https://gitea.com/gitea/runner/src/commit/ad967330a8788c9b8ab723abbc1a86d53c3bc5e6/act/exprparser/functions.go#L299
+		// TODO: The empty JobContext.Status is right for now because Gitea never checks `if` condition when the workflow run is cancelled.
+		// This is an implementation gap in Gitea Actions. When a workflow run is cancelled, Gitea should check the job's `if` condition,
+		// and if the condition is met (e.g. `if: ${{ cancelled() }}` ), the job should be executed rather than cancelled.
+		Job:      &model.JobContext{},
 		Steps:    nil, // no need
 		Runner:   nil, // no need
 		Secrets:  nil, // no need
@@ -75,7 +75,22 @@ func (w *SingleWorkflow) SetJob(id string, job *Job) error {
 }

 func (w *SingleWorkflow) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
-	return yaml.Marshal(w)
+	// Encode with the same indentation SetJob uses (2). yaml.Marshal's default
+	// indentation (4) makes the encoder emit multi-line block scalars (e.g. a
+	// `run:` step that begins with blank lines) with a wrong explicit indentation
+	// indicator (`run: |4`) that then fails to re-parse, which silently strands
+	// the job during concurrency evaluation. Keeping both encoders at indent 2
+	// makes the serialized single workflow round-trip.
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	enc := yaml.NewEncoder(&buf)
+	enc.SetIndent(2)
+	if err := enc.Encode(w); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := enc.Close(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return buf.Bytes(), nil
 }

 type Job struct {
@@ -490,7 +505,19 @@ func EvaluateJobIfExpression(jobID string, job *Job, gitCtx map[string]any, resu
 			RawMatrix:         job.Strategy.RawMatrix,
 		},
 	}
-	evaluator := NewExpressionEvaluator(NewInterpeter(jobID, actJob, nil, toGitContext(gitCtx), results, vars, inputs))
+	// Each per-matrix job carries its single matrix combination in RawMatrix so resolve it and pass it in;
+	// otherwise `matrix.*` references in `if:` evaluate to null.
+	// GetMatrixes always returns at least one element (an empty map for a job without a matrix),
+	// so only a non-empty combination should populate `matrix.*`, leaving it nil otherwise.
+	var matrix map[string]any
+	matrixes, err := actJob.GetMatrixes()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	if len(matrixes) > 0 && len(matrixes[0]) > 0 {
+		matrix = matrixes[0]
+	}
+	evaluator := NewExpressionEvaluator(NewInterpeter(jobID, actJob, matrix, toGitContext(gitCtx), results, vars, inputs))
 	expr, err := rewriteSubExpression(job.If.Value, false)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, err
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 package jobparser

 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"

@@ -464,3 +465,106 @@ func TestParseMappingNode(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestEvaluateJobIfExpressionMatrix(t *testing.T) {
+	ifExprs := []string{
+		`${{ contains(fromJSON('["linux","windows"]'), matrix.target) }}`,
+		`${{ contains('["linux","windows"]', matrix.target) }}`,
+	}
+
+	want := map[string]bool{
+		"build (linux)":   true,
+		"build (windows)": true,
+		"build (macos)":   false,
+	}
+
+	for _, ifExpr := range ifExprs {
+		t.Run(ifExpr, func(t *testing.T) {
+			content := fmt.Sprintf(`
+name: test
+on: push
+jobs:
+  build:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    if: %s
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        target: [linux, windows, macos]
+    steps:
+      - run: echo ${{ matrix.target }}
+`, ifExpr)
+
+			swfs, err := Parse([]byte(content))
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.Len(t, swfs, 3)
+
+			got := make(map[string]bool, len(swfs))
+			for _, swf := range swfs {
+				id, job := swf.Job()
+				shouldRun, err := EvaluateJobIfExpression(id, job, map[string]any{}, map[string]*JobResult{id: {}}, nil, nil)
+				require.NoError(t, err)
+				got[job.Name] = shouldRun
+			}
+			assert.Equal(t, want, got)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEvaluateJobIfExpression(t *testing.T) {
+	kases := []struct {
+		name       string
+		ifCond     string
+		needResult string
+		expected   bool
+	}{
+		{name: "empty need success", ifCond: "${{ 1 == 1 }}", needResult: "success", expected: true},
+		{name: "always", ifCond: "${{ always() }}", needResult: "failure", expected: true},
+		{name: "failure true", ifCond: "${{ failure() }}", needResult: "failure", expected: true},
+		{name: "failure false", ifCond: "${{ failure() }}", needResult: "success", expected: false},
+		{name: "success true", ifCond: "${{ success() }}", needResult: "success", expected: true},
+		// cancelled() is always false on the server: a cancelled run never evaluates a blocked job's `if:`
+		{name: "cancelled", ifCond: "${{ cancelled() }}", needResult: "success", expected: false},
+		{name: "not cancelled or failure", ifCond: "${{ !(cancelled() || failure()) }}", needResult: "success", expected: true},
+		{name: "not cancelled or failure, need failed", ifCond: "${{ !(cancelled() || failure()) }}", needResult: "failure", expected: false},
+	}
+	for _, kase := range kases {
+		t.Run(kase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			content := strings.ReplaceAll(`
+name: test
+on: push
+jobs:
+  job1:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - run: echo job1
+  job2:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    needs: [job1]
+    if: IF_COND
+    steps:
+      - run: echo job2
+`, "IF_COND", kase.ifCond)
+
+			workflows, err := Parse([]byte(content))
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+
+			var job2 *Job
+			for _, wf := range workflows {
+				if id, job := wf.Job(); id == "job2" {
+					job2 = job
+				}
+			}
+			require.NotNil(t, job2)
+
+			// mirrors findJobNeedsAndFillJobResults: the needs' results plus a self entry carrying Needs
+			results := map[string]*JobResult{
+				"job1": {Result: kase.needResult},
+				"job2": {Needs: []string{"job1"}},
+			}
+			got, err := EvaluateJobIfExpression("job2", job2, map[string]any{}, results, nil, nil)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			assert.Equal(t, kase.expected, got)
+		})
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package jobparser
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// A step whose `run:` block starts with blank lines must still survive the
+// Parse -> SingleWorkflow.Marshal -> Parse round-trip. Previously Marshal used a
+// different indentation than SetJob, which made the encoder emit the block scalar
+// with a wrong explicit indentation indicator (`run: |4`) that no longer parsed;
+// the job then stayed silently blocked during concurrency evaluation.
+func TestSingleWorkflowRoundTripRunBlockLeadingBlankLines(t *testing.T) {
+	const wf = `name: demo
+on:
+  workflow_call:
+    inputs:
+      app_name:
+        type: string
+        required: true
+jobs:
+  build:
+    name: build
+    env:
+      IMAGE_TAG: ${{ inputs.app_name }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - if: ${{ inputs.app_name != '' }}
+        name: packages
+        run: |
+
+
+          echo start
+          echo done
+`
+	sws, err := Parse([]byte(wf))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, sws, 1)
+
+	// pin the original run block as the baseline
+	_, origJob := sws[0].Job()
+	require.Len(t, origJob.Steps, 1)
+	const wantRun = "\n\necho start\necho done\n"
+	require.Equal(t, wantRun, origJob.Steps[0].Run)
+
+	payload, err := sws[0].Marshal()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// the serialized single workflow must be parseable again -- this is what the
+	// server does in EvaluateJobConcurrencyFillModel -> ParseJob. Before the fix
+	// Marshal emitted `run: |4`, which failed here and left the job blocked.
+	roundTripped, err := Parse(payload)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "serialized single workflow must round-trip; got payload:\n%s", payload)
+	require.Len(t, roundTripped, 1)
+
+	// the round-trip must preserve the run block byte-for-byte
+	_, gotJob := roundTripped[0].Job()
+	require.Len(t, gotJob.Steps, 1)
+	require.Equal(t, wantRun, gotJob.Steps[0].Run, "round-trip must preserve run content; got payload:\n%s", payload)
+}
@@ -4,8 +4,14 @@
 package openid

 import (
+	"net/http"
+	"sync"
 	"time"

+	"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/proxy"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
+
 	"github.com/yohcop/openid-go"
 )

@@ -19,11 +25,23 @@ import (
 var (
 	nonceStore     = openid.NewSimpleNonceStore()
 	discoveryCache = newTimedDiscoveryCache(24 * time.Hour)
+
+	// openIDInstance does discovery/verification via an SSRF-protected client, so a user-supplied
+	// OpenID identifier can't reach internal/loopback/reserved addresses. It honors the operator's
+	// [security] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST (empty defaults to "external"), matching the avatar/webhook/migration
+	// clients, and validates the proxy path too. Lazy: reads proxy/settings once.
+	openIDInstance = sync.OnceValue(func() *openid.OpenID {
+		allowList := hostmatcher.ParseHostMatchList("security.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", setting.Security.AllowedHostList)
+		return openid.NewOpenID(&http.Client{
+			Timeout:   30 * time.Second,
+			Transport: hostmatcher.NewHTTPTransport("openid", allowList, nil, proxy.Proxy(), setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed, nil),
+		})
+	})
 )

 // Verify handles response from OpenID provider
 func Verify(fullURL string) (id string, err error) {
-	return openid.Verify(fullURL, discoveryCache, nonceStore)
+	return openIDInstance().Verify(fullURL, discoveryCache, nonceStore)
 }

 // Normalize normalizes an OpenID URI
@@ -33,5 +51,5 @@ func Normalize(url string) (id string, err error) {

 // RedirectURL redirects browser
 func RedirectURL(id, callbackURL, realm string) (string, error) {
-	return openid.RedirectURL(id, callbackURL, realm)
+	return openIDInstance().RedirectURL(id, callbackURL, realm)
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package openid
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestOpenIDDiscoveryBlocksInternalHost(t *testing.T) {
+	var reached atomic.Bool
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		reached.Store(true)
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	// RedirectURL performs server-side discovery of the identifier URL; a loopback URL
+	// must be refused at dial time instead of reaching the internal server
+	_, err := RedirectURL(srv.URL, "http://example.com/callback", "http://example.com/")
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	assert.False(t, reached.Load(), "OpenID discovery must not reach an internal/loopback host")
+}
@@ -77,8 +77,12 @@ func (c *CommitMessage) MessageTrailer() CommitMessageTrailerValues {
 }

 var commitMessageTrailerSplit = sync.OnceValue(func() *regexp.Regexp {
-	// the sep is either something like "\n---\n" or "\n\n" in the body, or at the start of the body like "---\n"
-	return regexp.MustCompile(`(?s)^(?P<content>.*?)(?P<sep>^|^\n|^-{3,}\n+|\n-{3,}\n+|\n\n)(?P<trailer>(?:[A-Za-z0-9][-A-Za-z0-9]*:[^\n]*\n?)*\n*)$`)
+	// ref: https://git-scm.com/docs/git-interpret-trailers
+	// TODO: the regexp is not able to perfectly parse the all kinds of trailers
+	// It was just copied from legacy code, it is not exactly the same as how Git parses the trailer and not quite right in some cases.
+	// For the key characters: it follows RFC 822 field name syntax (or RFC 2822/RFC 5322): printable ASCII characters between 33 and 126 except the colon (:),
+	// but maybe we don't want to make it that complicated, so here we only support some common "symbol-like" characters.
+	return regexp.MustCompile(`(?s)^(?P<content>.*?)(?P<sep>^|^\n|^-{3,}\n+|\n+-{3,}\n+|\n{2,})(?P<trailer>(?:[A-Za-z0-9][-\w]*:[^\n]*(\n\s+[^\n]*)*\n?)*\n*)$`)
 })

 // CommitMessageSplitTrailer tries to split the message by the trailer separator
@@ -93,6 +97,41 @@ func CommitMessageSplitTrailer(s string) (content, sep, trailer string) {
 	return v[re.SubexpIndex("content")], v[re.SubexpIndex("sep")], v[re.SubexpIndex("trailer")]
 }

+// CommitMessageMerge merges two commit messages with their trailers
+func CommitMessageMerge(m1, m2 string) string {
+	c1, s1, t1 := CommitMessageSplitTrailer(m1)
+	c2, s2, t2 := CommitMessageSplitTrailer(m2)
+	c1, t1 = strings.TrimSpace(c1), strings.TrimSpace(t1)
+	c2, t2 = strings.TrimSpace(c2), strings.TrimSpace(t2)
+	out := strings.Builder{}
+	if c1 != "" && c2 != "" {
+		out.WriteString(c1)
+		out.WriteString("\n\n")
+		out.WriteString(c2)
+	} else if c1 != "" {
+		out.WriteString(c1)
+	} else if c2 != "" {
+		out.WriteString(c2)
+	}
+	if t1 != "" || t2 != "" {
+		sep := util.Iif(t1 == "", s2, s1)
+		sep = util.IfZero(sep, "\n\n")
+		if c1 != "" || c2 != "" {
+			out.WriteString(sep)
+		}
+		if t1 != "" {
+			out.WriteString(t1)
+		}
+		if t1 != "" && t2 != "" {
+			out.WriteString("\n")
+		}
+		if t2 != "" {
+			out.WriteString(t2)
+		}
+	}
+	return out.String()
+}
+
 func CommitMessageParseTrailer(s string) CommitMessageTrailerValues {
 	ret := CommitMessageTrailerValues{}
 	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(util.NormalizeStringEOL(s), "\n") {
@@ -26,10 +26,12 @@ func TestCommitMessageTrailer(t *testing.T) {
 		{"a", "a", "", ""},
 		{"a\n\nk", "a\n\nk", "", ""},
 		{"a\n\nk:v", "a", "\n\n", "k:v"},
+		{"a\n\nk:v\n  next-line", "a", "\n\n", "k:v\n  next-line"},
+		{"a\n\nk:v\n  next-line\nother: v", "a", "\n\n", "k:v\n  next-line\nother: v"},
 		{"a\n\nk:v\n\n", "a", "\n\n", "k:v\n\n"},
 		{"a\n--\nk:v", "a\n--\nk:v", "", ""},
-		{"a\n---\nk:v", "a", "\n---\n", "k:v"},
-		{"a\n\n---\n\nk:v", "a\n", "\n---\n\n", "k:v"},
+		{"a\n---\nk:v", "a", "\n---\n", "k:v"}, // TODO: should we support such case? No empty line between "---" and the trailer
+		{"a\n\n---\n\nk:v", "a", "\n\n---\n\n", "k:v"},

 		{"k: v", "", "", "k: v"},
 		{"\nk:v", "", "\n", "k:v"},
@@ -127,3 +129,31 @@ func TestCommitMessageParticipants(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 }
+
+func TestCommitMessageMerge(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		m1, m2 string
+		out    string
+	}{
+		{"", "", ""},
+		{"msg1", "", "msg1"},
+		{"", "msg2", "msg2"},
+		{"msg1", "msg2", "msg1\n\nmsg2"},
+		{"k1: a", "", "k1: a"},
+		{"", "k2: b", "k2: b"},
+		{"k1: a", "k2: b", "k1: a\nk2: b"},
+		{"msg1", "k2: b", "msg1\n\nk2: b"},
+		{"k1: a", "msg2", "msg2\n\nk1: a"},
+		{"msg1\n\nk1: a", "msg2", "msg1\n\nmsg2\n\nk1: a"},
+		{"msg1\n----\nk1: a", "msg2", "msg1\n\nmsg2\n----\nk1: a"},
+		{"msg1\n\n----\n\nk1: a", "msg2", "msg1\n\nmsg2\n\n----\n\nk1: a"},
+		{"msg1", "msg2\n----\nk2: b", "msg1\n\nmsg2\n----\nk2: b"},
+		{"msg1", "msg2\n\nk2: b", "msg1\n\nmsg2\n\nk2: b"},
+		{"msg1\n\nk1: a", "msg2\n\nk2: b", "msg1\n\nmsg2\n\nk1: a\nk2: b"},
+	}
+
+	for i, c := range cases {
+		out := CommitMessageMerge(c.m1, c.m2)
+		assert.Equal(t, c.out, out, "idx=%d, m1=%q m2=%q", i, c.m1, c.m2)
+	}
+}
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func syncGitConfig(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
 		}
 	}

-	// By default partial clones are disabled, enable them from git v2.22
+	// By default, partial clones are disabled, enable them from git v2.22
 	if !setting.Git.DisablePartialClone && DefaultFeatures().CheckVersionAtLeast("2.22") {
 		if err = configSet(ctx, "uploadpack.allowfilter", "true"); err != nil {
 			return err
@@ -114,9 +114,23 @@ func syncGitConfig(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
 		}
 	}

+	GlobalConfig = &GlobalConfigStruct{}
+	// HINT: GIT-DIFF-TREE-UI-CONFIG: Git's bug: git-diff-tree loads config with /* no "diff" UI options */ (since 20 years ago).
+	// https://github.com/git/git/blame/5d2e7709234afea1b6ddb25cd4f60d3d5fb3c200/builtin/diff-tree.c#L127
+	// Although document and manual say that "git-diff-tree" supports "diff.orderfile" option, but it is not actually supported.
+	// So we need to apply the diff.orderfile explicitly in our code.
+	GlobalConfig.DiffOrderFile, _ = configGet(ctx, "diff.orderfile")
 	return nil
 }

+func configGet(ctx context.Context, key string) (string, error) {
+	stdout, _, err := gitcmd.NewCommand("config", "--global", "--get").AddDynamicArguments(key).RunStdString(ctx)
+	if err != nil && !gitcmd.IsErrorExitCode(err, 1) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get git config %s, err: %w", key, err)
+	}
+	return strings.TrimRight(stdout, "\r\n"), nil
+}
+
 func configSet(ctx context.Context, key, value string) error {
 	stdout, _, err := gitcmd.NewCommand("config", "--global", "--get").
 		AddDynamicArguments(key).
@@ -36,7 +36,14 @@ type Features struct {
 	SupportGitMergeTree        bool           // >= 2.40 // we also need "--merge-base"
 }

-var defaultFeatures *Features
+type GlobalConfigStruct struct {
+	DiffOrderFile string
+}
+
+var (
+	defaultFeatures *Features
+	GlobalConfig    *GlobalConfigStruct
+)

 func (f *Features) CheckVersionAtLeast(atLeast string) bool {
 	return f.gitVersion.Compare(version.Must(version.NewVersion(atLeast))) >= 0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package git
+
+import "gitea.dev/modules/git/gitcmd"
+
+func HandleGitCmdHTTPRedirection(cmd *gitcmd.Command, targets ...string) {
+	// Protect from SSRF vector (e.g. migrating from an attacker URL).
+	// cmd.AddConfig("http.followRedirects", "false")
+	// However, we can't do so at the moment:
+	// this fails due to 301: git -c http.followRedirects=false clone -v https://gitlab.com/{owner}/{repo}
+	// this succeeds: git -c http.followRedirects=false clone -v https://gitlab.com/{owner}/{repo}.git
+	// FIXME: GIT-CLONE-HTTP-REDIRECT-SSRF: need a complete solution in the future
+}
@@ -121,9 +121,7 @@ func Clone(ctx context.Context, from, to string, opts CloneRepoOptions) error {
 	}

 	cmd := gitcmd.NewCommand().AddArguments("clone")
-	// Never follow HTTP redirects: no clone caller needs them, and a remote redirecting to an
-	// otherwise-blocked address would be an SSRF vector (e.g. migrating from an attacker URL).
-	cmd.AddArguments("-c", "http.followRedirects=false")
+	HandleGitCmdHTTPRedirection(cmd, from, to)
 	if opts.SkipTLSVerify {
 		cmd.AddArguments("-c", "http.sslVerify=false")
 	}
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ func TestRepoIsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 // TestCloneRefusesRedirects ensures Clone never follows HTTP redirects, so a remote
 // cannot redirect to an otherwise-blocked address (SSRF, e.g. during migration).
 func TestCloneRefusesRedirects(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Skip("FIXME: GIT-CLONE-HTTP-REDIRECT-SSRF: need a complete solution in the future")
 	var targetHit atomic.Bool
 	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		targetHit.Store(true)
@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@ package hostmatcher

 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
+	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
@@ -63,3 +65,17 @@ func NewDialContext(usage string, allowList, blockList *HostMatchList, proxy *ur
 		return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addrOrHost)
 	}
 }
+
+// NewHTTPTransport builds an http.Transport that validates the request target against the allow/block
+// lists on the direct-dial path (DialContext). When an HTTP proxy is configured the proxy resolves and
+// dials the target itself, so restricting the proxied target is the proxy server's responsibility, not
+// Gitea's. proxyFunc selects the proxy URL per request (the http.Transport.Proxy selector, e.g.
+// proxy.Proxy()); proxyURLFixed is the fixed proxy address the dialer must always permit; tlsConfig may
+// be nil. blockList may be nil for callers that only maintain an allow-list.
+func NewHTTPTransport(usage string, allowList, blockList *HostMatchList, proxyFunc func(*http.Request) (*url.URL, error), proxyURLFixed *url.URL, tlsConfig *tls.Config) *http.Transport {
+	return &http.Transport{
+		TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig,
+		Proxy:           proxyFunc,
+		DialContext:     NewDialContext(usage, allowList, blockList, proxyURLFixed),
+	}
+}
@@ -70,7 +70,15 @@ func Render(ctx *markup.RenderContext, input io.Reader, output io.Writer) error
 	w := &orgWriter{rctx: ctx, HTMLWriter: htmlWriter}
 	htmlWriter.ExtendingWriter = w

-	res, err := org.New().Silent().Parse(input, "").Write(w)
+	cfg := org.New()
+	cfg.ReadFile = func(path string) ([]byte, error) {
+		// actually the orgmode render doesn't support rendering the content from the content again,
+		// so just leave the plain text to end users
+		content := fmt.Sprintf("#+INCLUDE: [[%s]]", path)
+		return []byte(content), nil
+	}
+	doc := cfg.Silent().Parse(input, "")
+	res, err := doc.Write(w)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("orgmode.Render failed: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -21,86 +21,74 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 	os.Exit(m.Run())
 }

-func TestRender_StandardLinks(t *testing.T) {
-	test := func(input, expected string) {
-		buffer, err := orgmode.RenderString(markup.NewTestRenderContext(), input)
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-		assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(buffer))
-	}
+func testRender(t *testing.T, input, expected string) {
+	buffer, err := orgmode.RenderString(markup.NewTestRenderContext(), input)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(buffer))
+}

-	test("[[https://google.com/]]",
+func TestRender_StandardLinks(t *testing.T) {
+	testRender(t, "[[https://google.com/]]",
 		`<p><a href="https://google.com/">https://google.com/</a></p>`)
-	test("[[ImageLink.svg][The Image Desc]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[ImageLink.svg][The Image Desc]]",
 		`<p><a href="ImageLink.svg">The Image Desc</a></p>`)
 }

 func TestRender_InternalLinks(t *testing.T) {
-	test := func(input, expected string) {
-		buffer, err := orgmode.RenderString(markup.NewTestRenderContext(), input)
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-		assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(buffer))
-	}
-
-	test("[[file:test.org][Test]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[file:test.org][Test]]",
 		`<p><a href="test.org">Test</a></p>`)
-	test("[[./test.org][Test]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[./test.org][Test]]",
 		`<p><a href="./test.org">Test</a></p>`)
-	test("[[test.org][Test]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[test.org][Test]]",
 		`<p><a href="test.org">Test</a></p>`)
-	test("[[path/to/test.org][Test]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[path/to/test.org][Test]]",
 		`<p><a href="path/to/test.org">Test</a></p>`)
 }

 func TestRender_Media(t *testing.T) {
-	test := func(input, expected string) {
-		buffer, err := orgmode.RenderString(markup.NewTestRenderContext(), input)
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-		assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(buffer))
-	}
-
-	test("[[file:../../.images/src/02/train.jpg]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[file:../../.images/src/02/train.jpg]]",
 		`<p><img src="../../.images/src/02/train.jpg" alt="../../.images/src/02/train.jpg"></p>`)
-	test("[[file:train.jpg]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[file:train.jpg]]",
 		`<p><img src="train.jpg" alt="train.jpg"></p>`)

 	// With description.
-	test("[[https://example.com][https://example.com/example.svg]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[https://example.com][https://example.com/example.svg]]",
 		`<p><a href="https://example.com"><img src="https://example.com/example.svg" alt="https://example.com/example.svg"></a></p>`)
-	test("[[https://example.com][pre https://example.com/example.svg post]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[https://example.com][pre https://example.com/example.svg post]]",
 		`<p><a href="https://example.com">pre <img src="https://example.com/example.svg" alt="https://example.com/example.svg"> post</a></p>`)
-	test("[[https://example.com][https://example.com/example.mp4]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[https://example.com][https://example.com/example.mp4]]",
 		`<p><a href="https://example.com"><video src="https://example.com/example.mp4">https://example.com/example.mp4</video></a></p>`)
-	test("[[https://example.com][pre https://example.com/example.mp4 post]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[https://example.com][pre https://example.com/example.mp4 post]]",
 		`<p><a href="https://example.com">pre <video src="https://example.com/example.mp4">https://example.com/example.mp4</video> post</a></p>`)

 	// Without description.
-	test("[[https://example.com/example.svg]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[https://example.com/example.svg]]",
 		`<p><img src="https://example.com/example.svg" alt="https://example.com/example.svg"></p>`)
-	test("[[https://example.com/example.mp4]]",
+	testRender(t, "[[https://example.com/example.mp4]]",
 		`<p><video src="https://example.com/example.mp4">https://example.com/example.mp4</video></p>`)

 	// test [[LINK][DESCRIPTION]] syntax with "file:" prefix
-	test(`[[https://example.com/][file:https://example.com/foo%20bar.svg]]`,
+	testRender(t, `[[https://example.com/][file:https://example.com/foo%20bar.svg]]`,
 		`<p><a href="https://example.com/"><img src="https://example.com/foo%20bar.svg" alt="https://example.com/foo%20bar.svg"></a></p>`)
-	test(`[[file:https://example.com/foo%20bar.svg][Goto Image]]`,
+	testRender(t, `[[file:https://example.com/foo%20bar.svg][Goto Image]]`,
 		`<p><a href="https://example.com/foo%20bar.svg">Goto Image</a></p>`)
-	test(`[[file:https://example.com/link][https://example.com/image.jpg]]`,
+	testRender(t, `[[file:https://example.com/link][https://example.com/image.jpg]]`,
 		`<p><a href="https://example.com/link"><img src="https://example.com/image.jpg" alt="https://example.com/image.jpg"></a></p>`)
-	test(`[[file:https://example.com/link][file:https://example.com/image.jpg]]`,
+	testRender(t, `[[file:https://example.com/link][file:https://example.com/image.jpg]]`,
 		`<p><a href="https://example.com/link"><img src="https://example.com/image.jpg" alt="https://example.com/image.jpg"></a></p>`)
 }

 func TestRender_Source(t *testing.T) {
-	test := func(input, expected string) {
-		buffer, err := orgmode.RenderString(markup.NewTestRenderContext(), input)
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-		assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(buffer))
-	}
-
-	test(`#+begin_src c
+	testRender(t, `#+begin_src c
 int a;
 #+end_src
 `, `<div class="src src-c">
 <pre><code class="chroma language-c"><span class="kt">int</span> <span class="n">a</span><span class="p">;</span></code></pre>
 </div>`)
 }
+
+func TestRender_IncludeLink(t *testing.T) {
+	testRender(t, `#+INCLUDE: "./other.org" src text`, `<div class="src src-text">
+<pre><code class="chroma language-plaintext">#+INCLUDE: [[other.org]]</code></pre>
+</div>`)
+}
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"

+	"gitea.dev/modules/packages"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/util"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/validation"

@@ -46,6 +47,11 @@ var (
 	namePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`\A[a-zA-Z0-9@._+-]+\z`)
 	// (epoch:pkgver-pkgrel)
 	versionPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`\A(?:\d:)?[\w.+~]+(?:-[-\w.+~]+)?\z`)
+
+	// caps on the accumulated package file list (vars so tests can lower them); far above
+	// any legitimate package, but low enough to stop metadata amplification
+	maxFileEntries   = 100000
+	maxFileNameBytes = 16 * 1024 * 1024
 )

 type Package struct {
@@ -124,7 +130,7 @@ func ParsePackage(r io.Reader) (*Package, error) {
 	}

 	var p *Package
-	files := make([]string, 0, 10)
+	files := packages.NewBoundedFileList(maxFileEntries, maxFileNameBytes)

 	tr := tar.NewReader(inner)
 	for {
@@ -147,7 +153,9 @@ func ParsePackage(r io.Reader) (*Package, error) {
 				return nil, err
 			}
 		} else if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ".") {
-			files = append(files, hd.Name)
+			if err := files.Add(hd.Name); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
 		}
 	}

@@ -155,7 +163,7 @@ func ParsePackage(r io.Reader) (*Package, error) {
 		return nil, ErrMissingPKGINFOFile
 	}

-	p.FileMetadata.Files = files
+	p.FileMetadata.Files = files.Files()
 	p.FileCompressionExtension = compressionType

 	return p, nil
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"testing"

+	"gitea.dev/modules/test"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/util"
+
 	"github.com/klauspost/compress/zstd"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/ulikunitz/xz"
@@ -167,3 +170,25 @@ func TestParsePackageInfo(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"usr/bin/paket1"}, p.FileMetadata.Backup)
 	})
 }
+
+// TestParsePackageTooManyFiles ensures the accumulated file list is bounded to prevent
+// metadata amplification from a package with a huge number of (tiny) file entries.
+func TestParsePackageTooManyFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	defer test.MockVariableValue(&maxFileEntries, 3)()
+	buf := test.WriteTarCompression(func(w io.Writer) io.WriteCloser { return gzip.NewWriter(w) }, map[string]string{
+		"file1":    "content1",
+		".PKGINFO": string(createPKGINFOContent(packageName, packageVersion)),
+	})
+	_, err := ParsePackage(buf)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	buf = test.WriteTarCompression(func(w io.Writer) io.WriteCloser { return gzip.NewWriter(w) }, map[string]string{
+		"file1":    "content1",
+		"file2":    "content2",
+		"file3":    "content3",
+		"file4":    "content4",
+		".PKGINFO": string(createPKGINFOContent(packageName, packageVersion)),
+	})
+	_, err = ParsePackage(buf)
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrInvalidArgument)
+}
@@ -135,7 +135,10 @@ func ParsePackage(r io.Reader) (*Package, error) {
 				return nil, GlobalVars().ErrUnsupportedCompression
 			}

-			tr := tar.NewReader(inner)
+			// bound the decompressed control archive: it holds only the small control file
+			// and maintainer scripts, so a much larger stream is a decompression bomb
+			const maxControlTarSize = 32 * 1024 * 1024
+			tr := tar.NewReader(io.LimitReader(inner, maxControlTarSize))
 			for {
 				hd, err := tr.Next()
 				if err == io.EOF {
@@ -168,6 +171,7 @@ func ParseControlFile(r io.Reader) (*Package, error) {
 	key := ""
 	var depends strings.Builder
 	var control strings.Builder
+	var description strings.Builder

 	// https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-controlfields.html#syntax-of-control-files
 	s := bufio.NewScanner(r)
@@ -189,10 +193,13 @@ func ParseControlFile(r io.Reader) (*Package, error) {
 		control.WriteString(line)
 		control.WriteByte('\n')

+		// a leading space or tab marks a folded continuation line that belongs to the previous field
+		// (identified by key), not a new "Key: value" pair; only the multi-line fields append here.
+		// Continuation lines may themselves contain a colon, so they must not be re-split on ":".
 		if line[0] == ' ' || line[0] == '\t' {
 			switch key {
 			case "Description":
-				p.Metadata.Description += line
+				description.WriteString(line)
 			case "Depends":
 				depends.WriteString(trimmed)
 			}
@@ -219,7 +226,8 @@ func ParseControlFile(r io.Reader) (*Package, error) {
 					p.Metadata.Maintainer = a.Name
 				}
 			case "Description":
-				p.Metadata.Description = value
+				description.Reset()
+				description.WriteString(value)
 			case "Depends":
 				depends.WriteString(value)
 			case "Homepage":
@@ -243,6 +251,8 @@ func ParseControlFile(r io.Reader) (*Package, error) {
 		return nil, GlobalVars().ErrInvalidArchitecture
 	}

+	p.Metadata.Description = description.String()
+
 	dependencies := strings.Split(depends.String(), ",")
 	for i := range dependencies {
 		dependencies[i] = strings.TrimSpace(dependencies[i])
@@ -232,3 +232,15 @@ func TestValidateDistributionOrComponent(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.True(t, IsValidDistributionOrComponent(name), "good=%q", name)
 	}
 }
+
+// TestParseControlFileMultilineDescription verifies a multi-line Description is assembled in order
+// (the parser accumulates it in a strings.Builder); it guards the assembled value, not its timing.
+func TestParseControlFileMultilineDescription(t *testing.T) {
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	buf.WriteString("Package: testpkg\nVersion: 1.0\nArchitecture: amd64\nDescription: short summary\n more details\n even more\n")
+
+	p, err := ParseControlFile(&buf)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.NotNil(t, p)
+	assert.Equal(t, "short summary more details even more", p.Metadata.Description)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package packages
+
+import "gitea.dev/modules/util"
+
+// BoundedFileList accumulates file names from a package archive while enforcing caps on the number of
+// entries and their total name length, returning an error once either cap would be exceeded.
+type BoundedFileList struct {
+	files     []string
+	nameBytes int
+	maxFiles  int
+	maxBytes  int
+}
+
+// NewBoundedFileList creates a BoundedFileList with the given caps; a non-positive cap falls back to the
+// corresponding default.
+func NewBoundedFileList(maxFiles, maxNameBytes int) *BoundedFileList {
+	return &BoundedFileList{maxFiles: maxFiles, maxBytes: maxNameBytes}
+}
+
+// Add appends name, returning util.ErrInvalidArgument once the entry count or accumulated byte length
+// would exceed the configured cap.
+func (b *BoundedFileList) Add(name string) error {
+	if len(b.files) >= b.maxFiles || b.nameBytes+len(name) > b.maxBytes {
+		return util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("package contains too many file entries")
+	}
+	b.nameBytes += len(name)
+	b.files = append(b.files, name)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Files returns the accumulated file names.
+func (b *BoundedFileList) Files() []string {
+	return b.files
+}
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto/tls"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -53,12 +54,37 @@ func dialContextInternalAPI(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (conn
 	return conn, nil
 }

+// internalAPIConnectionIsLocal reports whether the internal API transport connects to a local target,
+// where the self-signed local certificate cannot be verified so skipping verification is safe. It mirrors
+// what dialContextInternalAPI actually dials: a unix socket whenever Protocol is HTTPUnix (always local,
+// whatever LOCAL_ROOT_URL says), otherwise the LOCAL_ROOT_URL host directly. A non-loopback LOCAL_ROOT_URL
+// is a real network hop, so its certificate must be verified, else the internal token can be MITM'd. An
+// unparseable LOCAL_ROOT_URL is a hard misconfiguration and fails closed (verify).
+func internalAPIConnectionIsLocal(protocol setting.Scheme, localURL string) bool {
+	if protocol == setting.HTTPUnix {
+		return true
+	}
+	u, err := url.Parse(localURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	host := u.Hostname()
+	if host == "localhost" {
+		return true
+	}
+	ip := net.ParseIP(host)
+	return ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback()
+}
+
 var internalAPITransport = sync.OnceValue(func() http.RoundTripper {
 	return &http.Transport{
 		DialContext: dialContextInternalAPI,
 		TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{
-			InsecureSkipVerify: true,
-			ServerName:         setting.Domain,
+			// Skip verification only for a local target (unix socket, or a loopback LOCAL_ROOT_URL), where the
+			// self-signed local cert can't be verified anyway; a non-loopback LOCAL_ROOT_URL is a real network
+			// hop and must be verified so the internal token can't be MITM'd. When verifying, Go's default
+			// ServerName (the dialed LOCAL_ROOT_URL host) is already correct, so it is not overridden.
+			InsecureSkipVerify: internalAPIConnectionIsLocal(setting.Protocol, setting.LocalURL),
 		},
 	}
 })
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package private
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestInternalAPIConnectionIsLocal(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name     string
+		protocol setting.Scheme
+		localURL string
+		want     bool
+	}{
+		// HTTPUnix always dials the unix socket (a local target), whatever LOCAL_ROOT_URL says
+		{"unix socket", setting.HTTPUnix, "https://gitea.example.com/", true},
+		{"localhost", setting.HTTP, "http://localhost:3000/", true},
+		{"loopback ipv4", setting.HTTPS, "https://127.0.0.1:3000/", true},
+		{"loopback ipv6", setting.HTTPS, "https://[::1]:3000/", true},
+		// a non-loopback LOCAL_ROOT_URL is a real network hop and must be verified
+		{"remote host", setting.HTTPS, "https://gitea.internal:443/", false},
+		{"remote ip", setting.HTTPS, "https://10.0.0.5:3000/", false},
+		// an unparseable LOCAL_ROOT_URL is a hard misconfiguration; fail closed to verification
+		{"invalid url", setting.HTTPS, "://bad", false},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			assert.Equal(t, c.want, internalAPIConnectionIsLocal(c.protocol, c.localURL))
+		})
+	}
+}
@@ -8,4 +8,10 @@ const (
 	KeyUname = "uname"

 	KeyUserHasTwoFactorAuth = "userHasTwoFactorAuth"
+
+	// KeySignInMethod records how the current session was authenticated so logout
+	// can decide whether RP-initiated OIDC logout is appropriate.
+	KeySignInMethod = "signInMethod"
+
+	SignInMethodOAuth2 = "oauth2"
 )
@@ -20,9 +20,11 @@ var Security = struct {
 	XContentTypeOptions string

 	ContentSecurityPolicyGeneral string // it only supports empty (default policy) or "unset", maybe it can support more in the future
+	AllowedHostList              string
 }{
 	XFrameOptions:       "SAMEORIGIN",
 	XContentTypeOptions: "nosniff",
+	AllowedHostList:     "external",
 }

 var (
@@ -10,13 +10,20 @@ import (
 )

 func TestLoadSecurityFrom(t *testing.T) {
+	assert.Equal(t, "SAMEORIGIN", Security.XFrameOptions)
+	assert.Equal(t, "nosniff", Security.XContentTypeOptions)
+	assert.Equal(t, "external", Security.AllowedHostList)
+
 	cfg, err := NewConfigProviderFromData(`[security]
 X_FRAME_OPTIONS = DENY
 X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS = unset
-CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY_GENERAL = "script-src *; foo"`)
+ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = foo
+CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY_GENERAL = "script-src *; foo"
+`)
 	assert.NoError(t, err)
 	loadSecurityFrom(cfg)
 	assert.Equal(t, "DENY", Security.XFrameOptions)
 	assert.Equal(t, "unset", Security.XContentTypeOptions)
+	assert.Equal(t, "foo", Security.AllowedHostList)
 	assert.Equal(t, `"script-src *`, Security.ContentSecurityPolicyGeneral) // holy shit ini package bug
 }
@@ -34,7 +34,10 @@ func loadWebhookFrom(rootCfg ConfigProvider) {
 	Webhook.QueueLength = sec.Key("QUEUE_LENGTH").MustInt(1000)
 	Webhook.DeliverTimeout = sec.Key("DELIVER_TIMEOUT").MustInt(5)
 	Webhook.SkipTLSVerify = sec.Key("SKIP_TLS_VERIFY").MustBool()
-	Webhook.AllowedHostList = sec.Key("ALLOWED_HOST_LIST").MustString("")
+
+	deprecatedSetting(rootCfg, "webhook", "ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", "security", "ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", "v28.0.0")
+	Webhook.AllowedHostList = sec.Key("ALLOWED_HOST_LIST").MustString(Security.AllowedHostList)
+
 	Webhook.Types = []string{"gitea", "gogs", "slack", "discord", "dingtalk", "telegram", "msteams", "feishu", "matrix", "wechatwork", "packagist"}
 	Webhook.PagingNum = sec.Key("PAGING_NUM").MustInt(10)
 	Webhook.ProxyURL = sec.Key("PROXY_URL").MustString("")
@@ -32,3 +32,8 @@ type RepoTopicOptions struct {
 	// list of topic names
 	Topics []string `json:"topics"`
 }
+
+// TopicListResponse returns a list of TopicResponse
+type TopicListResponse struct {
+	Topics []*TopicResponse `json:"topics"`
+}
@@ -12,9 +12,20 @@ import (
 	"strings"

 	"gitea.dev/modules/json"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/proxy"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/util"
 )

+// httpClient returns an HTTP client that honors Gitea's proxy configuration.
+var httpClient = util.OnceValue[*http.Client]{
+	Func: func() *http.Client {
+		transport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
+		transport.Proxy = proxy.Proxy()
+		return &http.Client{Transport: transport}
+	},
+}
+
 // Response is the structure of JSON returned from API
 type Response struct {
 	Success     bool        `json:"success"`
@@ -40,7 +51,7 @@ func Verify(ctx context.Context, response string) (bool, error) {
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")

-	resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+	resp, err := httpClient.Value().Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, fmt.Errorf("Failed to send CAPTCHA response: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package turnstile
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/test"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestHTTPClientHonorsProxy(t *testing.T) {
+	proxyURL, err := url.Parse("http://proxy.example.com:3128")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer test.MockVariableValue(&setting.Proxy.Enabled, true)()
+	defer test.MockVariableValue(&setting.Proxy.ProxyURL, proxyURL.String())()
+	defer test.MockVariableValue(&setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed, proxyURL)()
+	defer test.MockVariableValue(&setting.Proxy.ProxyHosts, []string{"**"})()
+	httpClient.Reset()
+	transport, ok := httpClient.Value().Transport.(*http.Transport)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	require.NotNil(t, transport.Proxy)
+
+	// The Turnstile verification request must be routed through the configured proxy.
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://any.example.com", nil)
+	got, err := transport.Proxy(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, got)
+	assert.Equal(t, proxyURL.String(), got.String())
+}
@@ -23,13 +23,21 @@ func (e ErrURISchemeNotSupported) Error() string {

 // Open open a local file or a remote file
 func Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
+	return OpenWithClient(uriStr, http.DefaultClient)
+}
+
+// OpenWithClient opens a local file or a remote file, using the given (non-nil) HTTP client
+// for http/https URLs. Callers that must confine remote access (e.g. to defeat SSRF via
+// redirects) should pass a client whose transport validates the peer at dial time; Open
+// passes http.DefaultClient.
+func OpenWithClient(uriStr string, client *http.Client) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
 	u, err := url.Parse(uriStr)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) {
 	case "http", "https":
-		f, err := http.Get(uriStr)
+		f, err := client.Get(uriStr)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
@@ -4,10 +4,18 @@
 package uri

 import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"

 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 )

 func TestReadURI(t *testing.T) {
@@ -17,3 +25,45 @@ func TestReadURI(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.NoError(t, err)
 	defer f.Close()
 }
+
+// TestOpenWithClientValidatesRedirectTarget verifies OpenWithClient routes the
+// whole request chain (including redirects) through the provided client, so a
+// client whose transport refuses to dial an internal target blocks a redirect to
+// it — whereas the default client (old Open behavior) follows it.
+func TestOpenWithClientValidatesRedirectTarget(t *testing.T) {
+	var internalHit atomic.Bool
+	internal := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		internalHit.Store(true)
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte("secret"))
+	}))
+	defer internal.Close()
+
+	front := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		http.Redirect(w, r, internal.URL, http.StatusFound)
+	}))
+	defer front.Close()
+
+	internalAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(internal.URL, "http://")
+
+	// a client that refuses to dial the internal target, mimicking the migration
+	// hostmatcher dialer that re-validates every hop
+	blockingClient := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{
+		DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+			if addr == internalAddr {
+				return nil, errors.New("blocked internal address")
+			}
+			return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
+		},
+	}}
+
+	_, err := OpenWithClient(front.URL, blockingClient)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	assert.False(t, internalHit.Load(), "the redirect target must not be reached through the validating client")
+
+	// the default client (the previous behavior) follows the redirect to the internal target
+	internalHit.Store(false)
+	rc, err := Open(front.URL)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_ = rc.Close()
+	assert.True(t, internalHit.Load(), "sanity check: the default client follows the redirect")
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package util
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+)
+
+type onceValueResult[T any] struct {
+	value T
+	panic any
+}
+
+// OnceValue is similar to Golang's "sync.OnceValue", but can be reset.
+type OnceValue[T any] struct {
+	Func func() T
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	res  atomic.Pointer[onceValueResult[T]]
+}
+
+func (o *OnceValue[T]) Value() T {
+	res := o.res.Load()
+	if res == nil {
+		o.mu.Lock()
+		defer o.mu.Unlock()
+		res = o.res.Load()
+		if res == nil {
+			res = &onceValueResult[T]{}
+			defer func() {
+				res.panic = recover()
+				o.res.Store(res)
+				if res.panic != nil {
+					panic(res.panic)
+				}
+			}()
+			res.value = o.Func()
+		}
+	}
+	if res.panic != nil {
+		panic(res.panic)
+	}
+	return res.value
+}
+
+func (o *OnceValue[T]) Reset() {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+	o.res.Store(nil)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package util
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestOnceValue(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("RepeatCall", func(t *testing.T) {
+		callCount := 0
+		o := OnceValue[int]{Func: func() int {
+			callCount++
+			return 42
+		}}
+		assert.Equal(t, 42, o.Value())
+		assert.Equal(t, 42, o.Value())
+		assert.Equal(t, 1, callCount)
+		o.Reset()
+		assert.Equal(t, 42, o.Value())
+		assert.Equal(t, 2, callCount)
+		assert.Equal(t, 42, o.Value())
+		assert.Equal(t, 2, callCount)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Panic", func(t *testing.T) {
+		callCount := 0
+		doPanic := true
+		o := OnceValue[int]{Func: func() int {
+			callCount++
+			if doPanic {
+				panic("some error")
+			}
+			return 42
+		}}
+		assert.PanicsWithValue(t, "some error", func() { o.Value() })
+		assert.PanicsWithValue(t, "some error", func() { o.Value() })
+		assert.Equal(t, 1, callCount)
+		doPanic = false
+		o.Reset()
+		assert.Equal(t, 42, o.Value())
+		assert.Equal(t, 2, callCount)
+		assert.Equal(t, 42, o.Value())
+		assert.Equal(t, 2, callCount)
+	})
+}
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ var timeStrGlobalVars = sync.OnceValue(func() *timeStrGlobalVarsType {
 })

 func TimeEstimateParse(timeStr string) (int64, error) {
+	timeStr = strings.TrimSpace(timeStr)
 	if timeStr == "" {
 		return 0, nil
 	}
@@ -51,7 +52,13 @@ func TimeEstimateParse(timeStr string) (int64, error) {
 	if matches[0][0] != 0 || matches[len(matches)-1][1] != len(timeStr) {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid time string: %s", timeStr)
 	}
+	prevEnd := 0
 	for _, match := range matches {
+		// only whitespace may separate two units, otherwise the string contains invalid content like "1h x 2m"
+		if strings.TrimSpace(timeStr[prevEnd:match[0]]) != "" {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid time string: %s", timeStr)
+		}
+		prevEnd = match[1]
 		amount, err := strconv.ParseInt(timeStr[match[2]:match[3]], 10, 64)
 		if err != nil {
 			return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid time string: %v", err)
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ func TestTimeStr(t *testing.T) {
 			{"1s", 1, false},
 			{"1h 1m 1s", 3600 + 60 + 1, false},
 			{"1d1x", 0, true},
+			{"1h 2x 3m", 0, true},
+			{"1h_2m", 0, true},
+			{"1h,1m", 0, true},
 		}
 		for _, test := range tests {
 			t.Run(test.input, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -12,6 +12,24 @@ import (
 	"golang.org/x/text/language"
 )

+// maxAcceptLanguageLen bounds the Accept-Language header before it reaches
+// language.ParseAcceptLanguage. That parser has quadratic-time behavior on long
+// malformed inputs, and its built-in guard only counts "-" separators while the
+// scanner treats "_" as an alias for "-", so a "_"-heavy header slips past the
+// guard and burns CPU. Only the leading (highest-priority) languages are used, so
+// truncating a longer header is safe.
+const maxAcceptLanguageLen = 200
+
+// parseAcceptLanguage parses the Accept-Language header after bounding its length
+// to avoid a quadratic-time DoS on attacker-controlled input.
+func parseAcceptLanguage(header string) []language.Tag {
+	if len(header) > maxAcceptLanguageLen {
+		header = header[:maxAcceptLanguageLen]
+	}
+	tags, _, _ := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(header)
+	return tags
+}
+
 // Locale handle locale
 func Locale(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) translation.Locale {
 	// 1. Check URL arguments.
@@ -35,7 +53,7 @@ func Locale(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) translation.Locale {
 	// 3. Get language information from 'Accept-Language'.
 	// The first element in the list is chosen to be the default language automatically.
 	if len(lang) == 0 {
-		tags, _, _ := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(req.Header.Get("Accept-Language"))
+		tags := parseAcceptLanguage(req.Header.Get("Accept-Language"))
 		tag := translation.Match(tags...)
 		lang = tag.String()
 	}
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestParseAcceptLanguage(t *testing.T) {
+	// a normal header is parsed and its leading language preserved
+	tags := parseAcceptLanguage("de-DE,de;q=0.9,en;q=0.8")
+	assert.NotEmpty(t, tags)
+	assert.Equal(t, "de-DE", tags[0].String())
+
+	// an oversized "_"-separated header would drive ParseAcceptLanguage into its
+	// quadratic-time path (the built-in guard only counts "-"); the length bound
+	// keeps the input passed to the parser small so it cannot be used for a DoS.
+	malicious := strings.Repeat("_aaaaaaaaa", 1<<16) // ~640 KiB, zero "-" characters
+	assert.Greater(t, len(malicious), maxAcceptLanguageLen)
+	tags = parseAcceptLanguage(malicious)
+	// no panic / hang, and nothing meaningful is parsed out of the garbage
+	assert.Empty(t, tags)
+}
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@
  "artifacts": "Artifacts",
  "expired": "Expired",
  "artifact_expires_at": "Expires at %s",
+  "artifact_expired_at": "Expired at %s",
  "confirm_delete_artifact": "Are you sure you want to delete the artifact '%s'?",
  "archived": "Archived",
  "concept_system_global": "Global",
@@ -2251,7 +2252,6 @@
  "repo.settings.webhook_deletion_success": "The webhook has been removed.",
  "repo.settings.webhook.test_delivery": "Test Push Event",
  "repo.settings.webhook.test_delivery_desc": "Test this webhook with a fake push event.",
-  "repo.settings.webhook.test_delivery_desc_disabled": "To test this webhook with a fake event, activate it.",
  "repo.settings.webhook.request": "Request",
  "repo.settings.webhook.response": "Response",
  "repo.settings.webhook.headers": "Headers",
@@ -3742,7 +3742,7 @@
  "actions.runners.runner_title": "Runner",
  "actions.runners.task_list": "Recent tasks on this runner",
  "actions.runners.task_list.no_tasks": "There is no task yet.",
-  "actions.runners.task_list.run": "Run",
+  "actions.runners.task_list.job": "Job",
  "actions.runners.task_list.status": "Status",
  "actions.runners.task_list.repository": "Repository",
  "actions.runners.task_list.commit": "Commit",
@@ -3784,6 +3784,9 @@
  "actions.runs.pushed_by": "pushed by",
  "actions.runs.invalid_workflow_helper": "Workflow config file is invalid. Please check your config file: %s",
  "actions.runs.no_matching_online_runner_helper": "No matching online runner with label: %s",
+  "actions.runs.no_runner_online": "No runner is online to pick up this job.",
+  "actions.runs.waiting_for_available_runner": "Waiting for a matching runner to become available.",
+  "actions.runs.waiting_for_dependent_jobs": "Waiting for the following jobs to complete: %s",
  "actions.runs.no_job_without_needs": "The workflow must contain at least one job without dependencies.",
  "actions.runs.no_job": "The workflow must contain at least one job",
  "actions.runs.invalid_reusable_workflow_uses": "Invalid reusable workflow \"uses\": %s",
@@ -3804,6 +3807,7 @@
  "actions.runs.cancel": "Cancel workflow run",
  "actions.runs.delete.description": "Are you sure you want to permanently delete this workflow run? This action cannot be undone.",
  "actions.runs.not_done": "This workflow run is not done.",
+  "actions.runs.no_failed_jobs": "This workflow run has no failed jobs to re-run.",
  "actions.runs.view_workflow_file": "View workflow file",
  "actions.runs.summary": "Summary",
  "actions.runs.all_jobs": "All jobs",
@@ -67,15 +67,34 @@ func GetRepositoryFile(ctx *context.Context) {
 		return
 	}

+	branch := ctx.PathParam("branch")
+	repository := ctx.PathParam("repository")
+	architecture := ctx.PathParam("architecture")
+
 	s, u, pf, err := packages_service.OpenFileForDownloadByPackageVersion(
 		ctx,
 		pv,
 		&packages_service.PackageFileInfo{
 			Filename:     alpine_service.IndexArchiveFilename,
-			CompositeKey: fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%s", ctx.PathParam("branch"), ctx.PathParam("repository"), ctx.PathParam("architecture")),
+			CompositeKey: fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%s", branch, repository, architecture),
 		},
 		ctx.Req.Method,
 	)
+	// A repository that only contains "noarch" packages has no per-architecture
+	// index. Since noarch packages are installable on every architecture, fall
+	// back to the noarch index so clients requesting their own architecture
+	// (e.g. x86_64) can still discover them.
+	if errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) && architecture != alpine_module.NoArch {
+		s, u, pf, err = packages_service.OpenFileForDownloadByPackageVersion(
+			ctx,
+			pv,
+			&packages_service.PackageFileInfo{
+				Filename:     alpine_service.IndexArchiveFilename,
+				CompositeKey: fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%s", branch, repository, alpine_module.NoArch),
+			},
+			ctx.Req.Method,
+		)
+	}
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) {
 			apiError(ctx, http.StatusNotFound, err)
@@ -73,7 +73,9 @@ func reqPackageAccess(accessMode perm.AccessMode) func(ctx *context.Context) {
 				}

 				if publicOnly {
-					if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() {
+					// a public-only token must not reach limited-visibility owners either,
+					// matching how orgs/users are enforced elsewhere in this file
+					if ctx.Package != nil && !ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic() {
 						ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "reqToken", "token scope is limited to public packages")
 						return
 					}
@@ -333,11 +333,18 @@ func ListPackageTags(ctx *context.Context) {
 func AddPackageTag(ctx *context.Context) {
 	packageName := packageNameFromParams(ctx)

-	body, err := io.ReadAll(ctx.Req.Body)
+	// the dist-tag body is only a quoted version string; bound it to avoid an unbounded
+	// read that could exhaust memory
+	const maxDistTagBodySize = 4 * 1024
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(ctx.Req.Body, maxDistTagBodySize+1))
 	if err != nil {
 		apiError(ctx, http.StatusInternalServerError, err)
 		return
 	}
+	if len(body) > maxDistTagBodySize {
+		apiError(ctx, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, errors.New("request body too large"))
+		return
+	}
 	version := strings.Trim(string(body), "\"") // is as "version" in the body

 	pv, err := packages_model.GetVersionByNameAndVersion(ctx, ctx.Package.Owner.ID, packages_model.TypeNpm, packageName, version)
@@ -291,7 +291,9 @@ func checkTokenPublicOnly() func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 					return
 				}
 			case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryPackage:
-				if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() {
+				// a public-only token must not reach limited-visibility owners either,
+				// matching the org/user public-only enforcement above
+				if ctx.Package != nil && !ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic() {
 					ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "token scope is limited to public packages")
 					return
 				}
@@ -145,6 +145,13 @@ func GetUserOrgsPermissions(ctx *context.APIContext) {

 	op := api.OrganizationPermissions{}

+	// A public-only token must not disclose membership/permission details of a
+	// non-public org, even for the token owner's own private orgs.
+	if ctx.PublicOnly && !o.Visibility.IsPublic() {
+		ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
+		return
+	}
+
 	if !organization.HasOrgOrUserVisible(ctx, o, ctx.Doer) {
 		ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
 		return
@@ -567,10 +567,20 @@ func GetTeamRepos(ctx *context.APIContext) {

 	team := ctx.Org.Team
 	listOptions := utils.GetListOptions(ctx)
-	teamRepos, err := repo_model.GetTeamRepositories(ctx, &repo_model.SearchTeamRepoOptions{
+	// A public-only token must not expose (or count) private repos, even when the
+	// doer owning the token otherwise has access to them, so filter them out at the
+	// query level to keep the returned page and the total-count header consistent.
+	searchOpts := &repo_model.SearchTeamRepoOptions{
 		ListOptions: listOptions,
 		TeamID:      team.ID,
-	})
+		PublicOnly:  ctx.PublicOnly,
+	}
+	teamRepos, err := repo_model.GetTeamRepositories(ctx, searchOpts)
+	if err != nil {
+		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
+		return
+	}
+	count, err := repo_model.CountTeamRepositories(ctx, searchOpts)
 	if err != nil {
 		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
 		return
@@ -584,14 +594,16 @@ func GetTeamRepos(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		}
 		// A team's repo list is reachable by non-team-members through the team's
 		// visibility tier, so never expose repos (incl. their names) the doer
-		// cannot access.
+		// cannot access. This per-repo visibility trim can't be expressed in the
+		// SQL count above without regressing per-unit public access, so for such
+		// non-members the total-count header may be a small upper bound.
 		if !permission.HasAnyUnitAccessOrPublicAccess() {
 			continue
 		}
 		repos = append(repos, convert.ToRepo(ctx, repo, permission))
 	}
-	ctx.SetLinkHeader(int64(team.NumRepos), listOptions.PageSize)
-	ctx.SetTotalCountHeader(int64(team.NumRepos))
+	ctx.SetLinkHeader(count, listOptions.PageSize)
+	ctx.SetTotalCountHeader(count)
 	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, repos)
 }

@@ -630,6 +642,12 @@ func GetTeamRepo(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		return
 	}

+	// A public-only token must not confirm the existence of a private repo.
+	if !ctx.TokenCanAccessRepo(repo) {
+		ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
+		return
+	}
+
 	if !organization.HasTeamRepo(ctx, ctx.Org.Team.OrgID, ctx.Org.Team.ID, repo.ID) {
 		ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
 		return
@@ -664,6 +682,22 @@ func getRepositoryByParams(ctx *context.APIContext) *repo_model.Repository {
 	return repo
 }

+func canChangeTeamRepository(ctx *context.APIContext) bool {
+	if ctx.Org.Organization.RepoAdminChangeTeamAccess {
+		return true
+	}
+	isOwner, err := ctx.Org.Organization.IsOwnedBy(ctx, ctx.Doer.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
+		return false
+	}
+	if !isOwner {
+		ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "user is nor repo admin nor owner")
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
 // AddTeamRepository api for adding a repository to a team
 func AddTeamRepository(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	// swagger:operation PUT /teams/{id}/repos/{org}/{repo} organization orgAddTeamRepository
@@ -700,6 +734,9 @@ func AddTeamRepository(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	if ctx.Written() {
 		return
 	}
+	if !canChangeTeamRepository(ctx) {
+		return
+	}
 	if access, err := access_model.AccessLevel(ctx, ctx.Doer, repo); err != nil {
 		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
 		return
@@ -752,6 +789,9 @@ func RemoveTeamRepository(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	if ctx.Written() {
 		return
 	}
+	if !canChangeTeamRepository(ctx) {
+		return
+	}
 	if access, err := access_model.AccessLevel(ctx, ctx.Doer, repo); err != nil {
 		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
 		return
@@ -889,6 +929,8 @@ func ListTeamActivityFeeds(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		Date:           ctx.FormString("date"),
 		ListOptions:    listOptions,
 	}
+	// A public-only token must not receive private activity entries.
+	opts.ApplyPublicOnly(ctx.PublicOnly)

 	feeds, count, err := feed_service.GetFeeds(ctx, opts)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1503,7 +1503,14 @@ func RerunFailedWorkflowRun(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		return
 	}

-	if _, err := actions_service.RerunWorkflowRunJobs(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository, run, ctx.Doer, actions_service.GetFailedJobsForRerun(jobs)); err != nil {
+	failedJobs := actions_service.GetFailedJobsForRerun(jobs)
+	// Empty failedJobs means no failed jobs to re-run
+	if len(failedJobs) == 0 {
+		ctx.APIError(http.StatusBadRequest, "this workflow run has no failed jobs to re-run")
+		return
+	}
+
+	if _, err := actions_service.RerunWorkflowRunJobs(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository, run, ctx.Doer, failedJobs); err != nil {
 		handleWorkflowRerunError(ctx, err)
 		return
 	}
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ func TestHook(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	commit := convert.ToPayloadCommit(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository, ctx.Repo.Commit)

 	commitID := ctx.Repo.Commit.ID.String()
-	if err := webhook_service.PrepareWebhook(ctx, hook, webhook_module.HookEventPush, &api.PushPayload{
+	if err := webhook_service.PrepareTestWebhook(ctx, hook, webhook_module.HookEventPush, &api.PushPayload{
 		Ref:          ref,
 		Before:       commitID,
 		After:        commitID,
@@ -178,13 +178,12 @@ func DeleteIssueLabel(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		return
 	}

-	label, err := issues_model.GetLabelByID(ctx, ctx.PathParamInt64("id"))
+	// the label must belong to this repo (or its owning org); otherwise a foreign label ID
+	// is rejected the same way as a nonexistent one, closing a cross-repo enumeration oracle
+	labelID := ctx.PathParamInt64("id")
+	label, err := issues_model.GetLabelInRepoOrOrgByID(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository.ID, ctx.Repo.Owner.ID, ctx.Repo.Owner.IsOrganization(), labelID)
 	if err != nil {
-		if issues_model.IsErrLabelNotExist(err) {
-			ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err.Error())
-		} else {
-			ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
-		}
+		ctx.APIErrorAuto(err)
 		return
 	}

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (

 	"gitea.dev/models/db"
 	issues_model "gitea.dev/models/issues"
+	access_model "gitea.dev/models/perm/access"
 	"gitea.dev/models/unit"
 	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
 	api "gitea.dev/modules/structs"
@@ -132,11 +133,33 @@ func ListTrackedTimes(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
 		return
 	}
+	trackedTimes, err = filterTrackedTimesByAccess(ctx, trackedTimes)
+	if err != nil {
+		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
+		return
+	}

 	ctx.SetTotalCountHeader(count)
 	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, convert.ToTrackedTimeList(ctx, ctx.Doer, trackedTimes))
 }

+func filterTrackedTimesByAccess(ctx *context.APIContext, trackedTimes issues_model.TrackedTimeList) (issues_model.TrackedTimeList, error) {
+	filtered := make(issues_model.TrackedTimeList, 0, len(trackedTimes))
+	for _, trackedTime := range trackedTimes {
+		if trackedTime.Issue == nil || trackedTime.Issue.Repo == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		permission, err := access_model.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission(ctx, trackedTime.Issue.Repo, ctx.Doer)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if permission.HasAnyUnitAccessOrPublicAccess() {
+			filtered = append(filtered, trackedTime)
+		}
+	}
+	return filtered, nil
+}
+
 // AddTime add time manual to the given issue
 func AddTime(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	// swagger:operation Post /repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/times issue issueAddTime
@@ -198,7 +221,8 @@ func AddTime(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 			// allow only RepoAdmin, Admin and User to add time
 			user, err = user_model.GetUserByName(ctx, form.User)
 			if err != nil {
-				ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
+				ctx.APIErrorAuto(err)
+				return
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -542,6 +566,11 @@ func ListTrackedTimesByRepository(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
 		return
 	}
+	trackedTimes, err = filterTrackedTimesByAccess(ctx, trackedTimes)
+	if err != nil {
+		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
+		return
+	}

 	ctx.SetTotalCountHeader(count)
 	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, convert.ToTrackedTimeList(ctx, ctx.Doer, trackedTimes))
@@ -604,6 +633,11 @@ func ListMyTrackedTimes(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
 		return
 	}
+	trackedTimes, err = filterTrackedTimesByAccess(ctx, trackedTimes)
+	if err != nil {
+		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
+		return
+	}

 	ctx.SetTotalCountHeader(count)
 	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, convert.ToTrackedTimeList(ctx, ctx.Doer, trackedTimes))
@@ -106,11 +106,7 @@ func GetLabel(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		l, err = issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByID(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository.ID, intID)
 	}
 	if err != nil {
-		if issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err) {
-			ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
-		} else {
-			ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
-		}
+		ctx.APIErrorAuto(err)
 		return
 	}

@@ -214,11 +210,7 @@ func EditLabel(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*api.EditLabelOption)
 	l, err := issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByID(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository.ID, ctx.PathParamInt64("id"))
 	if err != nil {
-		if issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err) {
-			ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
-		} else {
-			ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
-		}
+		ctx.APIErrorAuto(err)
 		return
 	}

@@ -1251,6 +1251,13 @@ func UpdatePullRequest(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 		return
 	}

+	// a public-only token must not update (push into) a private head repo,
+	// even when the base repo named in the route is public
+	if !ctx.TokenCanAccessRepo(pr.HeadRepo) {
+		ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
+		return
+	}
+
 	// keep API back-compat: when no style is given, default to "merge" rather than the repo's DefaultUpdateStyle,
 	// so existing API clients keep getting a merge update.
 	rebase := repo_model.UpdateStyle(ctx.FormString("style", string(repo_model.UpdateStyleMerge))) == repo_model.UpdateStyleRebase
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ func TopicSearch(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	}

 	ctx.SetTotalCountHeader(total)
-	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
-		"topics": topicResponses,
+	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, api.TopicListResponse{
+		Topics: topicResponses,
 	})
 }
@@ -21,8 +21,21 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dev/routers/api/v1/utils"
 	"gitea.dev/services/context"
 	"gitea.dev/services/convert"
+
+	"xorm.io/builder"
 )

+// actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery returns the sub-query restricting an owner-scoped actions
+// listing to the repos whose actions the caller can read, or nil when no restriction applies. A bare
+// org member must not be able to enumerate runs/jobs of repos they have no access to. A site admin may
+// skip the access filter, but a public-only token must stay confined to public repos even for an admin.
+func actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery(ctx *context.APIContext, ownerID int64) *builder.Builder {
+	if ownerID > 0 && (ctx.Doer == nil || !ctx.Doer.IsAdmin || ctx.PublicOnly) {
+		return repo_model.FindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDsSubQuery(ownerID, ctx.Doer, ctx.PublicOnly)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // ListJobs lists jobs for api route validated ownerID and repoID
 // ownerID == 0 and repoID == 0 means all jobs
 // ownerID == 0 and repoID != 0 means all jobs for the given repo
@@ -60,6 +73,8 @@ func ListJobs(ctx *context.APIContext, ownerID, repoID, runID int64, runAttemptI
 		opts.Statuses = append(opts.Statuses, values...)
 	}

+	opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery = actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery(ctx, opts.OwnerID)
+
 	jobs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRunJob](ctx, opts)
 	if err != nil {
 		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
@@ -181,6 +196,8 @@ func ListRuns(ctx *context.APIContext, ownerID, repoID int64, workflowID string)
 	}
 	excludePullRequests := ctx.FormBool("exclude_pull_requests")

+	opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery = actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery(ctx, opts.OwnerID)
+
 	runs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRun](ctx, opts)
 	if err != nil {
 		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ type swaggerFileDeleteResponse struct {
 // swagger:response TopicListResponse
 type swaggerTopicListResponse struct {
 	// in: body
-	Body []api.TopicResponse `json:"body"`
+	Body api.TopicListResponse `json:"body"`
 }

 // TopicNames
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ type swaggerResponseUserHeatmapData struct {
 // swagger:response UserSettings
 type swaggerResponseUserSettings struct {
 	// in:body
-	Body []api.UserSettings `json:"body"`
+	Body api.UserSettings `json:"body"`
 }

 // BadgeList
@@ -126,6 +126,29 @@ func CreateAccessToken(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	}
 	t.Scope = scope

+	// a token-authenticated request must not mint a token with a broader scope than its own
+	if ctx.Data["IsApiToken"] == true {
+		apiTokenScope, ok := ctx.Data["ApiTokenScope"].(auth_model.AccessTokenScope)
+		if !ok {
+			ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "the authenticating token has no scope")
+			return
+		}
+		hasScope, err := apiTokenScope.CanCreateChildScope(scope)
+		if err != nil {
+			ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
+			return
+		}
+		if !hasScope {
+			ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "cannot create an access token with a broader scope than the authenticating token")
+			return
+		}
+		// a public-only token must not mint a token that drops the public-only restriction
+		if t.Scope, err = t.Scope.EnforcePublicOnlyFrom(apiTokenScope); err != nil {
+			ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
 	if err := auth_model.NewAccessToken(ctx, t); err != nil {
 		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
 		return
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"net/http"

 	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
 	api "gitea.dev/modules/structs"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/web"
 	"gitea.dev/services/context"
@@ -57,6 +58,11 @@ func AddEmail(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	//   "422":
 	//     "$ref": "#/responses/validationError"

+	if user_model.IsFeatureDisabledWithLoginType(ctx.Doer, setting.UserFeatureManageCredentials) {
+		ctx.APIErrorNotFound("emails are not allowed to be changed")
+		return
+	}
+
 	form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*api.CreateEmailOption)
 	if len(form.Emails) == 0 {
 		ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, "Email list empty")
@@ -114,6 +120,11 @@ func DeleteEmail(ctx *context.APIContext) {
 	//   "404":
 	//     "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"

+	if user_model.IsFeatureDisabledWithLoginType(ctx.Doer, setting.UserFeatureManageCredentials) {
+		ctx.APIErrorNotFound("emails are not allowed to be changed")
+		return
+	}
+
 	form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*api.DeleteEmailOption)
 	if len(form.Emails) == 0 {
 		ctx.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -33,13 +33,16 @@ func getStarredRepos(ctx *context.APIContext, user *user_model.User, private boo
 		return nil, err
 	}

-	repos := make([]*api.Repository, len(starredRepos))
-	for i, starred := range starredRepos {
+	repos := make([]*api.Repository, 0, len(starredRepos))
+	for _, starred := range starredRepos {
 		permission, err := access_model.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission(ctx, starred, user)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
-		repos[i] = convert.ToRepo(ctx, starred, permission)
+		if !permission.HasAnyUnitAccessOrPublicAccess() {
+			continue
+		}
+		repos = append(repos, convert.ToRepo(ctx, starred, permission))
 	}
 	return repos, nil
 }
@@ -160,10 +160,17 @@ func hookPostReceiveUpdateRepoByOptions(ctx *gitea_context.PrivateContext, opts
 			return false
 		}

-		// FIXME: these options are not quite right, for example: changing visibility should do more works than just setting the is_private flag
-		// These options should only be used for "push-to-create"
+		// Only honor these options while the repo is still empty (the push-to-create
+		// case). On a populated repo a bare "git push -o repo.private=..." would
+		// silently flip visibility, bypassing the audit log, webhooks and notifications.
+		if !repo.IsEmpty {
+			return true
+		}
+
+		// The repo is empty and being initialized by this push, so there is no
+		// dependent state (webhooks, notifications, visibility fan-out) to reconcile
+		// yet; setting the flags directly is sufficient in this push-to-create case.
 		if isPrivate.Has() && repo.IsPrivate != isPrivate.Value() {
-			// TODO: it needs to do more work
 			repo.IsPrivate = isPrivate.Value()
 			if err = repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(ctx, repo, "is_private"); err != nil {
 				log.Error("failed to update repo is_private: %v", err)
@@ -484,20 +484,26 @@ func SignOut(ctx *context.Context) {
 }

 func buildSignOutRedirectURL(ctx *context.Context) string {
-	if ctx.Doer != nil && ctx.Doer.LoginType == auth.OAuth2 {
+	if ctx.Doer != nil && shouldRedirectToOIDCEndSession(ctx) {
 		if s := buildOIDCEndSessionURL(ctx, ctx.Doer); s != "" {
 			return s
 		}
 	}

 	// The assumption is: if reverse proxy auth is enabled, then the users should only sign-in via reverse proxy auth.
-	// TODO: in the future, if we need to distinguish different sign-in methods, we need to save the sign-in method in session and check here
 	if setting.Service.EnableReverseProxyAuth && setting.ReverseProxyLogoutRedirect != "" {
 		return setting.ReverseProxyLogoutRedirect
 	}
 	return setting.AppSubURL + "/"
 }

+// shouldRedirectToOIDCEndSession reports whether this session should end at the
+// OIDC provider. Prefer the session sign-in method so an OAuth2-linked account
+// that signed in with a password does not hit end_session_endpoint.
+func shouldRedirectToOIDCEndSession(ctx *context.Context) bool {
+	return ctx.Session.Get(session.KeySignInMethod) == session.SignInMethodOAuth2
+}
+
 func prepareSignUpPageData(ctx *context.Context) bool {
 	ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("sign_up")
 	ctx.Data["SignUpLink"] = setting.AppSubURL + "/user/sign_up"
@@ -154,16 +154,31 @@ func TestWebAuthOAuth2(t *testing.T) {
 		authSource, err := auth_model.GetActiveOAuth2SourceByAuthName(t.Context(), "oidc-auth-source")
 		require.NoError(t, err)

-		mockOpt := contexttest.MockContextOption{SessionStore: session.NewMockMemStore("dummy-sid")}
-		ctx, resp := contexttest.MockContext(t, "/user/logout", mockOpt)
-		ctx.Doer = &user_model.User{ID: 1, LoginType: auth_model.OAuth2, LoginSource: authSource.ID}
-		SignOut(ctx)
-		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, resp.Code)
-		u, err := url.Parse(test.RedirectURL(resp))
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		expectedValues := url.Values{"oidc-key": []string{"oidc-val"}, "post_logout_redirect_uri": []string{setting.AppURL}, "client_id": []string{"mock-client-id"}}
-		assert.Equal(t, expectedValues, u.Query())
-		u.RawQuery = ""
-		assert.Equal(t, "https://example.com/oidc-logout", u.String())
+		oauthUser := &user_model.User{ID: 1, LoginType: auth_model.OAuth2, LoginSource: authSource.ID}
+
+		t.Run("OAuth2SignInRedirectsToOIDC", func(t *testing.T) {
+			mockOpt := contexttest.MockContextOption{SessionStore: session.NewMockMemStore("dummy-sid-oauth")}
+			ctx, resp := contexttest.MockContext(t, "/user/logout", mockOpt)
+			ctx.Doer = oauthUser
+			require.NoError(t, ctx.Session.Set(session.KeySignInMethod, session.SignInMethodOAuth2))
+			SignOut(ctx)
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, resp.Code)
+			u, err := url.Parse(test.RedirectURL(resp))
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			expectedValues := url.Values{"oidc-key": []string{"oidc-val"}, "post_logout_redirect_uri": []string{setting.AppURL}, "client_id": []string{"mock-client-id"}}
+			assert.Equal(t, expectedValues, u.Query())
+			u.RawQuery = ""
+			assert.Equal(t, "https://example.com/oidc-logout", u.String())
+		})
+
+		t.Run("PasswordSignInSkipsOIDC", func(t *testing.T) {
+			// OAuth2-linked account signed in via password form must not hit end_session_endpoint.
+			mockOpt := contexttest.MockContextOption{SessionStore: session.NewMockMemStore("dummy-sid-password")}
+			ctx, resp := contexttest.MockContext(t, "/user/logout", mockOpt)
+			ctx.Doer = oauthUser
+			SignOut(ctx)
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, resp.Code)
+			assert.Equal(t, "/", test.RedirectURL(resp))
+		})
 	})
 }
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dev/models/auth"
 	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/log"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/session"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/templates"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/util"
@@ -171,9 +172,10 @@ func oauth2LinkAccount(ctx *context.Context, u *user_model.User, linkAccountData

 	if err := regenerateSession(ctx, nil, map[string]any{
 		// User needs to use 2FA, save data and redirect to 2FA page.
-		"twofaUid":      u.ID,
-		"twofaRemember": remember,
-		"linkAccount":   true,
+		"twofaUid":              u.ID,
+		"twofaRemember":         remember,
+		"linkAccount":           true,
+		session.KeySignInMethod: session.SignInMethodOAuth2,
 	}); err != nil {
 		ctx.ServerError("RegenerateSession", err)
 		return
@@ -19,9 +19,11 @@ import (
 	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
 	auth_module "gitea.dev/modules/auth"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/container"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/httplib"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/log"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/optional"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/proxy"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/session"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
 	source_service "gitea.dev/services/auth/source"
@@ -296,7 +298,23 @@ func showLinkingLogin(ctx *context.Context, authSourceID int64, gothUser goth.Us
 	ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/link_account")
 }

-var oauth2AvatarHTTPClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
+// oauth2AvatarAllowList parses the host allow-list applied to avatar fetches from the global
+// [security] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST, defaulting an empty setting to the built-in "external" set. An empty
+// host-match list would otherwise disable the allow-list check entirely and permit any host, including
+// loopback/private addresses (SSRF).
+func oauth2AvatarAllowList() *hostmatcher.HostMatchList {
+	return hostmatcher.ParseHostMatchList("security.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", setting.Security.AllowedHostList)
+}
+
+// oauth2AvatarHTTPClient builds the SSRF-protected client for avatar fetches. It is constructed per call
+// so a changed allowlist takes effect (avatar fetches are infrequent, so this is not a hot path).
+func oauth2AvatarHTTPClient() *http.Client {
+	allowList := oauth2AvatarAllowList()
+	return &http.Client{
+		Timeout:   30 * time.Second,
+		Transport: hostmatcher.NewHTTPTransport("oauth2-avatar", allowList, nil, proxy.Proxy(), setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed, nil),
+	}
+}

 func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, avatarURL string, u *user_model.User) {
 	if !setting.OAuth2Client.UpdateAvatar || len(avatarURL) == 0 {
@@ -310,7 +328,7 @@ func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, avatarURL string, u *user_mo
 	// Some hosts (e.g. Wikimedia) reject Go's default User-Agent.
 	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Gitea "+setting.AppVer)

-	resp, err := oauth2AvatarHTTPClient.Do(req)
+	resp, err := oauth2AvatarHTTPClient().Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warn("fetch %q failed: %v", avatarURL, err)
 		return
@@ -373,7 +391,10 @@ func handleOAuth2SignIn(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, u *user_m
 			ctx.ServerError("GetExternalLogin", err)
 			return
 		}
-		isDisabledByAutoSync := hasExt && extLogin.RefreshToken == ""
+		// the cron clears all three token fields when it disables a user, so require the
+		// full signature; a RefreshToken alone is empty for many normal logins (e.g. GitHub
+		// or OIDC without offline_access), which would otherwise reactivate admin-disabled users
+		isDisabledByAutoSync := hasExt && extLogin.AccessToken == "" && extLogin.RefreshToken == "" && extLogin.ExpiresAt.IsZero()
 		if isDisabledByAutoSync {
 			opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true)
 		}
@@ -411,6 +432,7 @@ func handleOAuth2SignIn(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, u *user_m
 			session.KeyUID:                  u.ID,
 			session.KeyUname:                u.Name,
 			session.KeyUserHasTwoFactorAuth: userHasTwoFactorAuth,
+			session.KeySignInMethod:         session.SignInMethodOAuth2,
 		}); err != nil {
 			ctx.ServerError("updateSession", err)
 			return
@@ -434,8 +456,9 @@ func handleOAuth2SignIn(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, u *user_m

 	if err := regenerateSession(ctx, nil, map[string]any{
 		// User needs to use 2FA, save data and redirect to 2FA page.
-		"twofaUid":      u.ID,
-		"twofaRemember": false,
+		"twofaUid":              u.ID,
+		"twofaRemember":         false,
+		session.KeySignInMethod: session.SignInMethodOAuth2,
 	}); err != nil {
 		ctx.ServerError("updateSession", err)
 		return
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More