Backport #38406 by @bircni
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:
- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.
### 📌 Attention for site admins
Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:
- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
Backport #38416 by @TowyTowy
### What / why
`TimeEstimateParse` (used by the issue time-estimate form) only checked
that the first token starts at the beginning of the string and the last
token ends at its end, but never checked the gaps between consecutive
tokens. Non-whitespace garbage embedded between two valid units was
silently dropped and the string accepted with a wrong value instead of
being reported as invalid.
Examples that were wrongly accepted before this change:
- `1h 2x 3m` → 3780s (parsed as 1h3m)
- `1h_2m` → 3720s
- `1h,1m` → 3660s
All three now return an "invalid time string" error, while valid inputs
such as `1h 1m 1s` and `1h1m1s` keep working.
### How
Reject any non-whitespace content between two matched units.
Signed-off-by: TowyTowy <towy@airreps.link>
Signed-off-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: TowyTowy <85077986+TowyTowy@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Backport #38410
Before: the merge box is only refreshed when the PR is being
conflict-checked.
After: also refresh the merge box when the commit status is pending
(e.g.: Action task is running)
By the way, slightly increase the refresh interval to 5s
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Backport #38382 by @bircni
The flex-list refactor (#37505) raised the shared `.item-trailing`
selector's specificity, so its `flex-wrap: wrap` started overriding the
run list's intended `flex-wrap: nowrap` — a long branch name pushed the
trailing content past its fixed 280px width and wrapped the kebab menu
onto its own line.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Backport #38319 by @bircni
The `official` flag of a pull request review is computed against the
target branch's protection rules at submit time and stored on the review
record. `ChangeTargetBranch` updated the base branch but never
re-evaluated it, so an `official` approval obtained against an
unprotected branch could be retargeted onto a protected branch and
satisfy its required approvals, bypassing the branch protection.
This re-evaluates the `official` flag of the latest approve/reject
reviews against the new base branch whenever the target branch changes.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38323 by @bircni
Three independent security hardening fixes, each with a regression test:
- **Locale DoS:** the `Locale` middleware passed the raw
`Accept-Language` header to `ParseAcceptLanguage`, whose guard only
counts `-` while the scanner aliases `_` to `-` — a large `_`-separated
header on an unauthenticated request burned CPU. The header is now
length-bounded before parsing.
- **Public-only token scope:** `GET /teams/{id}/repos`,
`.../repos/{org}/{repo}`, `/teams/{id}/activities/feeds`, and
`/users/{username}/orgs/{org}/permissions` still returned private
repo/activity/permission data to a public-only token. They now filter
via `TokenCanAccessRepo` / `ApplyPublicOnly` and reject non-public org
permissions.
- **Push-option visibility:** `repo.private` / `repo.template` push
options were applied to any existing repo, letting an owner/admin
silently flip visibility bypassing audit, webhooks, and notifications.
They are now honored only on push-to-create.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38321 by @bircni
The `/user/starred` and `/user/subscriptions` endpoints returned private
repositories a user had starred/watched even after their access to those
repositories was revoked, still exposing the repository name,
description and visibility (including later metadata changes).
Private repositories in the starred/watched queries are now gated on the
actor's current access via `AccessibleRepositoryCondition`, so users who
no longer have access no longer receive the metadata. Public
repositories and public-only tokens are unaffected.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38386 by @bircni
The commit page built its "co-authored by" list from
`AllParticipantIdentities()[1:]`, which only drops the author and leaves
the committer in the list even though the committer is already shown
separately as "committed by". This caused the committer to be wrongly
rendered as a co-author (issue #38384): a commit authored by
`silverwind`, committed by `bircni`, with a `Co-authored-by: silverwind`
trailer displayed "co-authored by bircni" instead of the actual trailer
identity. This adds a `Commit.CoAuthorIdentities()` method that excludes
both the author and the committer, uses it on the commit page, and
covers the fix with a regression test.
Closes#38384
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38322 by @bircni
The LFS batch and upload handlers linked an object that already existed
in the content store but was not linked to the current repo whenever the
token's user could access it in another repo. Deploy-key tokens carry
the repo owner's identity, so a single-repo write deploy key could link
and then download objects from any repo the owner can see.
This drops the cross-repo access check: the batch handler now makes the
client upload (hash-verified) any object not yet linked to the repo, and
the upload handler skips proof of possession only when the object is
already linked to the current repo.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38371 by @Zettat123
Follow #38237#38237 posts "skipped" commit statuses for every workflow that is not
triggered due to a filter (e.g. `paths` or `branches`) mismatch.
However, for non-required workflows, creating "skipped" commit statuses
for them would generate a lot of noise.
To address this issue, this PR adds a check before creating commit
status:
- For the context that matches any required status check patterns, a
"skipped" commit status will be created. The `Required` label can inform
users that this status check is required, but has been skipped because
of a filter mismatch.
<img width="800" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/264fd716-413c-457d-a5a6-6717175d3807"
/>
- For a non-required context, nothing will be created.
NOTE: Reducing noise is a best-effort approach and isn't entirely
accurate. When creating commit statuses, it is impossible to predict
which branch protection rule will take effect. Therefore, we have to
compare the commit status context against the required patterns from all
rules. If any rule matches, the context is considered "required".
Closes https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/38351
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
Backport #38379 by @silverwind
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/37594 widened the author column
from `three wide` to `four wide`, leaving a large empty gap around the
SHA column in the common single-author case. The old author cell was
capped at 180px, so the wider column only adds whitespace: avatar-stack
names ellipsize at 240px each, and wider multi-author rows still expand
naturally in the auto-layout table. Restore the pre-existing
`three`/`eight` widths.
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38380 by @silverwind
`data-render-name` is set before the plugin's async render runs, so
measuring the container height right after the attribute appears can
observe the pre-render 48px height when the `pdfobject` chunk loads
slowly (flaked in CI). Poll for the height instead, like the asciicast
test in the same file does.
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Backport #38281 by @bircni
3 reductions in the DB load generated by many runners polling `FetchTask`:
**1. Debounce runner heartbeat writes**
Every poll wrote `last_online`, and every `UpdateTask`/`UpdateLog` wrote
`last_active` — while a runner streams logs that is many writes per
second per runner. These are now persisted only when stale enough to
actually affect the active/offline status (`ShouldPersistLastOnline` /
`ShouldPersistLastActive`), using the existing columns.
**2. Throttle concurrent task picks**
A new in-process semaphore (`MAX_CONCURRENT_TASK_PICKS`) bounds how many
runners run the task-assignment transaction at once, so a fleet polling
together cannot stampede the query. Throttled polls retry on their next
poll without advancing the runner's tasks version.
**3. Paginate the task-pick query**
`CreateTaskForRunner` previously loaded every waiting job in the
runner's scope into memory on each poll (no `LIMIT`). Now it pages
through the waiting backlog oldest-first with `LIMIT`, claiming the
first label-matching job.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
Backport #38320 by @bircni
Pull mirror sync ran `git fetch` / `remote update` / `remote prune`
without disabling HTTP redirects. A mirror remote that later starts
redirecting to an otherwise-blocked or internal address could be used as
an SSRF/exfiltration vector on scheduled syncs, bypassing the
allow/block validation applied at migration time.
This sets `http.followRedirects=false` on all three remote-contacting
commands in the pull mirror path, matching the existing guard already
present on the clone path.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38330 by @Zettat123
`TestInitKeys` verified whether a host key file was regenerated by
comparing `os.FileInfo` before and after a `InitDefaultHostKeys` call.
On systems where the OS clock / filesystem timestamp granularity is
coarse, both writes land in the same tick and get an identical mtime.
The resulting `FileInfo` is then byte-for-byte equal even though the key
was actually regenerated, so `assert.NotEqual` fails.
Since a regenerated key always produces different random bytes,
comparing the content can reliably detect regeneration.
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
Backport #38314 by @lunny
This fixes the web release edit flow so renamed release attachments are
validated against `[repository.release] ALLOWED_TYPES`.
Previously, the API attachment edit endpoint already enforced release
attachment type restrictions, but the web release edit form passed
`attachment-edit-*` values into `release_service.UpdateRelease`, which
updated attachment names directly without validating the new filename
against `setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes`.
As a result, a user with repository write access could rename an
existing release attachment to a disallowed extension through the web
UI.
- validate edited release attachment names in
`release_service.UpdateRelease`
- reject forbidden attachment renames using
`setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes`
- re-render the web release edit page with a validation error instead of
returning an internal server error
- add regression coverage for both the service layer and the web flow
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Backport #38313 by @bircni
The runner-listing API endpoints (`admin`, `org`, `user`, `repo`, and
`shared`) return runners in a non-deterministic order across pages. When
paging through runners, some runners from page 1 could reappear on page
2 (and others get skipped entirely).
The cause is in `FindRunnerOptions.ToOrders()`. Most sort modes order by
a **non-unique** column only:
- default / `online` / `offline` → `last_online`
- `alphabetically` / `reversealphabetically` → `name`
When multiple runners tie on the sort key (e.g. every offline runner
shares `last_online = 0`, or two runners have the same name), the
database is free to return the tied rows in any order between separate
queries. Combined with `LIMIT`/`OFFSET` pagination, this means the same
runner can land on more than one page.
## Fix
Append the unique primary key `id` as a stable tiebreaker to each
non-unique sort order:
The `newest`/`oldest` modes already sort by the unique `id`, so they are
left unchanged.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38318 by @bircni
Draft-release access control was enforced only on the API release
endpoints (`/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/...`) but not on the
UUID-based web attachment endpoints (`/attachments/{uuid}`,
`/{owner}/{repo}/attachments/{uuid}`,
`/{owner}/{repo}/releases/attachments/{uuid}`).
Anyone who obtained an attachment UUID — including unauthenticated
callers — could download files belonging to a hidden draft release,
since `ServeAttachment` only checked repo-level read permission and
never the release's draft state.
This extends `ServeAttachment` to require write access to releases when
the attachment belongs to a draft release, mirroring the existing
API-side `canAccessReleaseDraft` gate. A regression test is included.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38227 by @SudhanshuMatrix
### Description
This PR resolves a UI alignment bug in the Gitea Actions log viewer
where the expand/collapse disclosure chevron overlaps with the log text
(specifically the timestamp) when timestamps are enabled.
### Cause
When log timestamps are enabled, the timestamp element
(`.log-time-stamp`) is rendered as the first element next to the line
number. Because it only had a default `10px` left margin, it positioned
itself exactly where the group's expand/collapse chevron is located,
causing them to overlap.
Fixes#38222.
Signed-off-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Shudhanshu Singh <sudhanshuwriterblc@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Backport #38274 by @afahey03
Fixes HTTP 500 when OIDC auto account linking (`ACCOUNT_LINKING=auto`)
requires local 2FA. `oauth2LinkAccount` set `linkAccount` in the session
before redirecting to 2FA but did not persist `linkAccountData`, so
`TwoFactorPost` failed with `not in LinkAccount session`. The manual
linking flow already stored both, this aligns auto-link with that
behavior.
Created the test, `TestOAuth2AutoLinkWithTwoFactor`, which verifies that
automatic account linking completes after the user passes local 2FA when
an OIDC identity matches an existing account.
DISCLAIMER: I used AI to create the test
Closes#38171
Co-authored-by: Aidan Fahey <afahey2003@yahoo.com>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Backport #38284 by @bircni
Fixes#38278
## Problem
When branch protection matches the branch an Actions workflow pushes to,
the runner's `git push` is rejected — even though the workflow token has
`contents: write` and the same push performed with a PAT (write access)
succeeds. Disabling protection or changing the pattern so it no longer
matches makes the push work.
## Root cause
In `preReceiveBranch` (`routers/private/hook_pre_receive.go`), the "can
the doer push to this protected branch" check resolves the pusher with
`user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, ctx.opts.UserID)`. For an Actions push the
user ID is `-2` (the virtual `ActionsUserID`), which has no database
row, so the lookup fails. Even past that, `CanUserPush` →
`HasAccessUnit`/whitelist membership cannot evaluate a virtual user and
returns `false`. As a result the Actions bot was rejected on every
matching protected branch, despite the earlier `assertCanWriteRef`
already confirming the token's code-write via
`GetActionsUserRepoPermission`.
This was inconsistent: a PAT with identical write access passed the
exact same check.
## Fix
Evaluate the Actions bot against its already-computed token permission
instead of a user lookup, mirroring the existing
`IsUserMergeWhitelisted` pattern:
- Add `CanActionsUserPush` / `CanActionsUserForcePush` on
`ProtectedBranch`, which take the precomputed `access_model.Permission`.
- Allow the push when push is enabled, **no** push whitelist is
enforced, and the token has code-write.
- Keep the bot blocked when a whitelist is enforced — it cannot be added
to one, so it must use a pull request. This preserves the whitelist as a
real security boundary.
Force-push, signed-commit and protected-file-path checks are untouched.
Signed-off-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Backport #38280 by @bircni
The **Status** filter dropdown on the repository Actions run list does
not let you filter for **Blocked** runs (nor **Cancelled** or
**Skipped**). These statuses are missing from the dropdown even though a
run can legitimately end up in any of them.
A run's status is computed by `aggregateJobStatus`, which can return
`Blocked`, `Cancelled` and `Skipped`. Because the filter dropdown only
offered Success, Failure, Waiting, Running and Cancelling, runs in those
other states existed but were impossible to filter for.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #38273 by @Vinod-OAI
After upgrading from 1.25.x to 1.26.x, `repo-archive` workers can fail
to unmarshal queued items:
```
Failed to unmarshal item from queue "repo-archive":
json: unable to unmarshal into Go convert.Conversion within "/Repo/Units/0/Config":
cannot derive concrete type for nil interface with finite type set
```
`ArchiveRequest` started embedding `*repo_model.Repository` in 1.26,
which does not round-trip through the JSON queue.
This change stores a minimal `archiveQueueItem` (`RepoID`, `Type`,
`CommitID`, `Paths`) in `repo-archive` and loads the repository in the
worker. `UnmarshalJSON` accepts legacy payloads that used `RepoID` or
embedded `Repo.id`.
Fixes#38272
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Co-authored-by: Vinod-OAI <venkat.vinod@observe.ai>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
**Newline injection into the Debian Release and Packages indices**
The `distribution` and `component` come straight from the request path
and are written line by line into the generated `Release` and `Packages`
files (the `Suite`/`Codename`/`Components` lines and the `Filename:
pool/<distribution>/<component>/...` line), but `UploadPackageFile` only
checked they were non-empty. `ctx.PathParam` url-decodes the segment, so
an encoded newline such as `main%0AInjected-Field: x` is accepted,
stored and then re-emitted for that distribution, which lets an
authenticated uploader forge extra fields in the index apt consumes.
Restricted both values to a conservative name pattern in the handler,
since that is the layer that accepts them; this should also keep the
pool paths well formed.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
The `release-nightly-snapcraft` workflow’s `build-and-publish` job was
failing because `snapcraft remote-build` fell back to interactive
Launchpad authorization in CI. This change makes authentication explicit
and non-interactive before the remote build step.
- **Workflow change**
- Add an `Authenticate snapcraft` step before `Remote build`.
- Run `snapcraft login --with` using the existing
`SNAPCRAFT_STORE_CREDENTIALS` secret.
- Pin that step to `shell: bash` to support process substitution.
- **Why this fixes the failure**
- Prevents CI from entering browser-based Launchpad auth flow.
- Ensures `remote-build` runs with preloaded credentials.
```yaml
- name: Authenticate snapcraft
shell: bash
env:
SNAPCRAFT_STORE_CREDENTIALS: ${{ secrets.SNAPCRAFT_STORE_CREDENTIALS }}
run: snapcraft login --with <(printf '%s' "$SNAPCRAFT_STORE_CREDENTIALS")
```
---------
Signed-off-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
The repository commits API (`GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits`) accepts
`since` and `until` query parameters and filters the returned page of
commits by commit date. However, the `X-Total-Count` and `X-Total`
response headers reported the *unfiltered* total number of commits, so
the advertised total could be far larger than the number of commits
actually returned for the requested date range. With a range that
matches no commits, the page is correctly empty while the headers still
claim the full repository total.
## Root cause
`gitrepo.CommitsCount` declared `Since` and `Until` options and the API
handler populated them, but the function never appended
`--since`/`--until` to the underlying `git rev-list --count` invocation.
The date filters were silently dropped, so the count always reflected
the entire revision history.
## Fix
Pass the `Since`/`Until` options through to `git rev-list`, mirroring
the existing commit-listing path (`commitsByRangeWithTime`). The
reported total now matches the filtered range used to build the page.
## Testing
Added `TestCommitsCountWithSinceUntil` in
`modules/gitrepo/commit_test.go`, a table-driven unit test against the
`repo1_bare` fixture covering `since`, `until`, and a bounded
`since`+`until` range. It fails on the pre-fix code (every case returns
the full count of 3) and passes after the change. Existing
`CommitsCount` tests remain green.
## Notes
- No new settings, no default changes; this corrects an incorrect header
value and is backward compatible. Clients that depend on `since`/`until`
already filter the returned commits, and the headers now agree with that
filtering.
Fixes#35886.
---
*AI-assistance disclosure:* this change was developed with the
assistance of Claude Code (Claude Opus 4.8). I have reviewed and
understand the change and take responsibility for it.
Fixes#38226
## Summary
Add `chi_middleware.GetHead` as the first `BeforeRouting` middleware on
the API router. This makes every API `GET` endpoint automatically handle
`HEAD` requests, as required by RFC 9110 §9.3.2.
Previously, `HEAD` requests to endpoints like `GET
/repos/{owner}/{repo}/git/commits/{sha}` returned `405 Method Not
Allowed`.
The web router already used this same middleware (see
`routers/web/web.go:261`), so this aligns API behaviour with the web
router.
## Changes
- `routers/api/v1/api.go`: add `chi_middleware.GetHead` middleware to
the API router
- `tests/integration/api_repo_git_commits_test.go`: add
`TestAPIReposGitCommitsHEAD` verifying HEAD returns 200 on a valid ref
and 404 (not 405) on a missing ref
In the Actions log viewer, a double-quoted URL renders with a stray
extra `;` after it.
Reported in `gitea/runner#1046`
Remove the buggy AI slop `linkifyURLs` and use new approach to process
URLs in text
---------
Signed-off-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
### What
`GetActionsUserRepoPermission` (`models/perm/access/repo_permission.go`)
decides whether an Actions task token may access a target repo. Its
cross-repo branches each enforce a fork-PR discriminator — except the
collaborative-owner branch, which was missing the
`!task.IsForkPullRequest` guard that its sibling
`checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess` has.
As a result, when a private repo **B** lists owner **A** as a
collaborative owner, an attacker-controlled fork pull-request workflow
whose base repo is owned by A was granted code-read on B — i.e. the
fork's workflow could clone a third private repository it has no rights
to (read-only confidentiality breach).
### Fix
Add the same fork-PR guard the sibling path already enforces:
```go
if taskRepo.IsPrivate && !task.IsForkPullRequest {
actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions)
if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) {
return maxPerm, nil
}
}
```
## Summary
This PR adds **scoped workflows** to Gitea Actions. Workflows defined
centrally in a "source" repository that automatically run on every
repository in scope: an organization's repositories, or (for instance
admins) every repository on the instance. Each scoped run executes in
the consuming repository's own context (its runners, secrets, and
branch) while its content is read from the source repository, so an org
or instance can mandate shared CI across many repositories without
copying workflow files into each one.
An owner or instance admin registers source repositories on a settings
page and can mark individual workflows as **required**. A required
scoped workflow cannot be opted out by a consuming repository and gates
its pull-request merges; an optional one can be disabled per repository.
Scoped workflows live under a dedicated `SCOPED_WORKFLOW_DIRS` (default
`.gitea/scoped_workflows`), kept separate from regular `WORKFLOW_DIRS`.
## Main changes
### Configuration
New `SCOPED_WORKFLOW_DIRS` setting, validated to not overlap with
`WORKFLOW_DIRS`. Default: `.gitea/scoped_workflows`
### Data model & migration
- New `action_scoped_workflow_source` table mapping a registering owner
(`owner_id`, where `0` = instance-level) to a source repository, with a
per-workflow `WorkflowConfigs` map.
- `ActionRun` gains `WorkflowRepoID` / `WorkflowCommitSHA` (the pinned
content source) and an `IsScopedRun` flag.
### Detection & run creation
On consumer events, scoped workflows from the effective sources (the
owner's own sources plus instance-level ones) are matched and turned
into runs that execute in the consumer's context, with content pinned to
the source repo's default-branch commit.
`on: workflow_run` and `on: schedule` are currently not supported.
### Opt-out
A consuming repository can disable an optional scoped workflow (tracked
separately from regular `DisabledWorkflows`); required scoped workflows
can never be disabled, opted out, or bypassed.
### Commit status
A scoped run's status context format is `"<source repo full name>:
<workflow display name> / <job> (<event>)"`
(for example: `my-org/scoped-workflows: db-tests / test-sqlite
(pull_request)`),
keeping it distinct from a same-named repo-level workflow and from other
sources.
### Required status checks
Admins mark workflows required and supply status-check patterns.
`EffectiveRequiredContexts` appends those patterns to the branch
protection's required contexts and they are matched
must-present-and-pass. If the status checks from scoped workflows fail,
the PR cannot be merged.
NOTE: scoped workflows' required status checks patterns can protect any
target branch that has a protection rule, even though the rule's "Status
Check" is disabled. A target branch with no protection rule cannot be
protected.
<details>
<summary>Screenshots</summary>
<img width="1400" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a5d1db33-15ec-487e-93be-2bc04b4e6643"
/>
</details>
### Reusable workflows (`uses:`)
A scoped workflow's local `uses: ./...` resolves against the source
repository. `uses:` directory validation honors the
instance-configurable `WORKFLOW_DIRS` and `SCOPED_WORKFLOW_DIRS`
(previously hardcoded to `.gitea`/`.github/workflows`).
### Manual dispatch
`workflow_dispatch` is supported for scoped workflows (web and API),
resolving inputs/content from the source repo.
### Performance
A process-local LRU cache keyed by source repo ID for the per-source
workflow parse, so instance-level and owner-level sources don't open the
source repo and parse workflow files on every event.
### UI
Org / user / admin pages to register and remove sources, search
repositories, and mark workflows required with their status-check
patterns. The repository Actions sidebar groups scoped workflows by
source with owner/instance labels and required/disabled badges.
<details>
<summary>Screenshots</summary>
Scoped workflows setting page:
<img width="1600" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9d19f667-97a5-4935-92b2-e53f105e3642"
/>
Consumer repo's Actions runs list:
<img width="1600" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a77241f9-0aa9-41aa-ba73-12a9a688cb64"
/>
- `Owner`: this is a owner-level scoped workflows source repo
- `Global`: this is a global scoped workflows source repo
- `Required`: this scoped workflow is required, repo admin cannot
disable it
</details>
---
Docs: https://gitea.com/gitea/docs/pulls/447
---------
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Bind OAuth token introspection responses to the authenticated client.
Return an inactive response when the token grant belongs to a different
OAuth application to avoid leaking token metadata across clients.
Add integration coverage for cross-client introspection attempts against
both access tokens and refresh tokens.
Assisted-by: GPT-5.4
## What
npm allows `repository` and `bin` in `package.json` to be either an
object or a plain string (npm docs:
[repository](https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/configuring-npm/package-json#repository),
[bin](https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/configuring-npm/package-json#bin)).
The npm registry creator modeled `repository` as a struct and `bin` as
`map[string]string`, so publishing a package whose `package.json` uses
the string form failed with:
```
json: cannot unmarshal string into Go struct field PackageMetadataVersion.PackageMetadata.versions.bin of type map[string]string
```
## Fix
`modules/packages/npm/creator.go`: add `UnmarshalJSON` to `Repository`
(string → `URL`) and a `Bin` type with `UnmarshalJSON` (string → a
single command named after the package, per npm semantics), mirroring
the existing `License` / `User` string-or-object handling. The stored
`Metadata` field types are unchanged.
`bundledDependencies` as a boolean (also noted in #38235) is left out of
scope — it is rare and semantically different (`true` = bundle all
deps).
## Test
`TestParsePackage/ValidRepositoryAndBinAsString` parses a package with
string `repository` and `bin`: it fails on `main` with the error above
and passes with this change. The full `modules/packages/npm` suite is
green and `gofmt` is clean.
Fixes#38235
_AI disclosure: prepared with AI assistance; I reviewed and verified it
(reproduction + tests) and can explain and defend the change._
## Summary
Fixes two related bugs that cause jobs in large workflows (50+ parallel
jobs) to never get a runner assigned even though runners are free.
### Bug 1 — Concurrent runner race
When N runners all poll `FetchTask` with a stale `tasksVersion`
simultaneously, they all query the same waiting job list sorted by
`(updated, id)` and all pick **job #1**. Only one wins the `UPDATE WHERE
task_id=0` optimistic lock; the rest return empty-handed but still
receive `latestVersion` in the response. They then consider themselves
"up to date" and skip `PickTask` on every subsequent poll, leaving jobs
#2–50 permanently unassigned.
**Fix:** `CreateTaskForRunner` now iterates through all matching waiting
jobs. When the optimistic lock fails on job #1, it immediately tries job
#2, then #3, etc., each in its own independent transaction so a failed
attempt rolls back cleanly before the next candidate is tried.
`PickTask` no longer wraps this call in an outer `db.WithTx` (which
caused `halfCommitter` entanglement that prevented per-attempt
rollbacks).
### Bug 2 — Idle runner doesn't re-check after finishing a task
`tasks_version` only bumps when a job transitions **to** waiting (new
workflow triggered, blocked→unblocked). After a runner finishes its
current task it polls `FetchTask` with `tasksVersion == latestVersion`,
so the server skips `PickTask` entirely — the remaining 45 waiting jobs
are invisible to the now-idle runner.
**Fix:** Also call `IncreaseTaskVersion` in `UpdateRunJob` when a
(non-reusable-caller) job transitions to a **done** state. Idle runners
then see a version mismatch on their next poll and attempt `PickTask`,
picking up the remaining jobs.
This PR replaces a set of struct-based `Get` lookups with explicit
`db.Get` / `db.Exist` conditions in places where zero-value fields can
lead to ambiguous matches or incorrect records being returned.
The main goal is to make read paths deterministic and avoid accidentally
matching the wrong row when only part of a struct is populated.
### What changed
- replace many `db.GetEngine(ctx).Get(bean)` calls with explicit
`builder.Eq` conditions across models such as actions, admin tasks,
issues, pull requests, repositories, users, packages, redirects,
watches, stars, and follows
- use quoted column names where needed for reserved fields like `index`,
`type`, and `name`
- add dedicated user lookup helpers for:
- primary email
- OAuth login source / login name
- update sign-in and OAuth-related flows to use explicit individual-user
lookups instead of partially populated `User` structs
- tighten package property and Terraform lock lookups to avoid ambiguous
reads and updates
- keep existing fallback behavior where needed, while removing reliance
on zero-value struct matching
### User-facing impact
These changes primarily affect authentication and account lookup paths:
- email/username sign-in now re-fetches users through explicit keys
- OAuth2 auto-linking now resolves users by name or primary email
explicitly
- OAuth2 login/sync now looks up users by login source, login type, and
login name explicitly
- non-individual accounts are no longer implicitly matched through
partial user lookups in these flows
This should reduce the risk of incorrect account matches and make query
behavior more predictable across the codebase.
---------
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
## Problem
The repository restorer (`services/migrations/restore.go`) builds
`file://` URLs for release attachments and PR patches by joining
user-supplied paths from `release.yml` and `pull_request.yml` onto the
dump directory:
```go
*asset.DownloadURL = "file://" + filepath.Join(r.baseDir, *asset.DownloadURL)
pr.PatchURL = "file://" + filepath.Join(r.baseDir, pr.PatchURL)
```
`filepath.Join` cleans the path, so a crafted relative value such as
`../../../../etc/passwd` resolves to an absolute path **outside** the
dump directory. `uri.Open` then reads it via `os.Open` and stores the
content as a release attachment, which is retrievable through the API —
an arbitrary file read (Local File Inclusion) from a dump archive
supplied to `restore-repo`.
## Fix
Add a `localFileURL` helper that resolves the relative path against
`baseDir` and rejects anything that escapes it. Malicious entries are
skipped with a warning so a legitimate restore still completes; in-dump
files keep working unchanged.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
The `index` column is unique per repo, but the `id` column is scoped to
the whole table
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/240d0efa7e3860dfde0eb94932287602cbfae533/models/migrations/v1_27/v331.go#L62-L67.
We have over 60000 action runs in our repo and loading the "Actions" tab
has been very slow, so scoping the sort to the repo helps it load much
faster
## Summary of perf change
Ran tests based on commit 240d0efa7e
| Case | Run | Duration |
|------|-----|----------|
| Before | 1 | 16717.3ms |
| Before | 2 | 9052.5ms |
| Before | 3 | 9347.1ms |
| Before | 4 | 8091.2ms |
| Before | 5 | 8732.1ms |
| **Before** | **Median** | **9052.5ms** |
| After | 1 | 3654.2ms |
| After | 2 | 287.4ms |
| After | 3 | 253.6ms |
| After | 4 | 278.0ms |
| After | 5 | 313.6ms |
| **After** | **Median** | **287.4ms** |
Speedup of 30x on our instance.
## Logs
### Before
```log
2026/06/26 20:33:06 HTTPRequest [W] router: slow GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:39730, elapsed 3037.6ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:33:08 models/actions/run_list.go:156:GetRunWorkflowIDs() [W] [Slow SQL Query] SELECT DISTINCT `workflow_id` FROM `action_run` WHERE repo_id=? ORDER BY `workflow_id` ASC [29] - 5.069413167s
2026/06/26 20:33:12 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:39748, 404 Not Found in 2.1ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 20:33:20 models/db/list.go:208:FindAndCount() [W] [Slow SQL Query] SELECT `id`, `title`, `repo_id`, `owner_id`, `workflow_id`, `index`, `trigger_user_id`, `schedule_id`, `ref`, `commit_sha`, `is_fork_pull_request`, `need_approval`, `approved_by`, `event`, `event_payload`, `trigger_event`, `status`, `version`, `raw_concurrency`, `started`, `stopped`, `previous_duration`, `latest_attempt_id`, `created`, `updated` FROM `action_run` WHERE `action_run`.repo_id=? ORDER BY `action_run`.`id` DESC LIMIT 30 [29] - 11.375193667s
2026/06/26 20:33:20 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:39730, 200 OK in 16717.3ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:33:20 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:39730, 404 Not Found in 0.9ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 20:33:20 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /avatars/4aa9c7878cdb541dbdd37da61a586af554baf6c0930283e0281edf3a366b8c36?size=48 for 127.0.0.1:39730, 200 OK in 1.0ms @ web/base.go:25(avatars)
2026/06/26 20:33:20 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:35914, 200 OK in 0.1ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 20:33:24 HTTPRequest [I] router: polling GET /user/events for 127.0.0.1:35882, elapsed 3736.2ms @ events/events.go:18(events.Events)
2026/06/26 20:33:29 HTTPRequest [W] router: slow GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:35896, elapsed 3542.4ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:33:35 models/db/list.go:208:FindAndCount() [W] [Slow SQL Query] SELECT `id`, `title`, `repo_id`, `owner_id`, `workflow_id`, `index`, `trigger_user_id`, `schedule_id`, `ref`, `commit_sha`, `is_fork_pull_request`, `need_approval`, `approved_by`, `event`, `event_payload`, `trigger_event`, `status`, `version`, `raw_concurrency`, `started`, `stopped`, `previous_duration`, `latest_attempt_id`, `created`, `updated` FROM `action_run` WHERE `action_run`.repo_id=? ORDER BY `action_run`.`id` DESC LIMIT 30 [29] - 8.581414814s
2026/06/26 20:33:35 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:35896, 200 OK in 9052.5ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:33:35 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:35914, 200 OK in 0.2ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 20:33:35 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:35896, 404 Not Found in 0.9ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 20:33:35 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /avatars/4aa9c7878cdb541dbdd37da61a586af554baf6c0930283e0281edf3a366b8c36?size=48 for 127.0.0.1:39748, 200 OK in 1.2ms @ web/base.go:25(avatars)
2026/06/26 20:33:39 HTTPRequest [I] router: polling GET /user/events for 127.0.0.1:35874, elapsed 3818.6ms @ events/events.go:18(events.Events)
2026/06/26 20:34:05 HTTPRequest [W] router: slow GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:39730, elapsed 3889.5ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:34:11 models/db/list.go:208:FindAndCount() [W] [Slow SQL Query] SELECT `id`, `title`, `repo_id`, `owner_id`, `workflow_id`, `index`, `trigger_user_id`, `schedule_id`, `ref`, `commit_sha`, `is_fork_pull_request`, `need_approval`, `approved_by`, `event`, `event_payload`, `trigger_event`, `status`, `version`, `raw_concurrency`, `started`, `stopped`, `previous_duration`, `latest_attempt_id`, `created`, `updated` FROM `action_run` WHERE `action_run`.repo_id=? ORDER BY `action_run`.`id` DESC LIMIT 30 [29] - 8.861572113s
2026/06/26 20:34:11 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:39730, 200 OK in 9347.1ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:34:11 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:35914, 200 OK in 0.1ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 20:34:11 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:39730, 404 Not Found in 0.6ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 20:34:11 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /avatars/4aa9c7878cdb541dbdd37da61a586af554baf6c0930283e0281edf3a366b8c36?size=48 for 127.0.0.1:39730, 200 OK in 1.3ms @ web/base.go:25(avatars)
2026/06/26 20:34:18 HTTPRequest [W] router: slow GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:39748, elapsed 3974.2ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:34:22 models/db/list.go:208:FindAndCount() [W] [Slow SQL Query] SELECT `id`, `title`, `repo_id`, `owner_id`, `workflow_id`, `index`, `trigger_user_id`, `schedule_id`, `ref`, `commit_sha`, `is_fork_pull_request`, `need_approval`, `approved_by`, `event`, `event_payload`, `trigger_event`, `status`, `version`, `raw_concurrency`, `started`, `stopped`, `previous_duration`, `latest_attempt_id`, `created`, `updated` FROM `action_run` WHERE `action_run`.repo_id=? ORDER BY `action_run`.`id` DESC LIMIT 30 [29] - 7.68828429s
2026/06/26 20:34:22 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:39748, 200 OK in 8091.2ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:34:22 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:35914, 200 OK in 0.1ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 20:34:22 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:39748, 404 Not Found in 0.7ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 20:34:23 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /avatars/4aa9c7878cdb541dbdd37da61a586af554baf6c0930283e0281edf3a366b8c36?size=48 for 127.0.0.1:39748, 200 OK in 0.7ms @ web/base.go:25(avatars)
2026/06/26 20:34:28 HTTPRequest [W] router: slow GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:34462, elapsed 3193.2ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:34:34 models/db/list.go:208:FindAndCount() [W] [Slow SQL Query] SELECT `id`, `title`, `repo_id`, `owner_id`, `workflow_id`, `index`, `trigger_user_id`, `schedule_id`, `ref`, `commit_sha`, `is_fork_pull_request`, `need_approval`, `approved_by`, `event`, `event_payload`, `trigger_event`, `status`, `version`, `raw_concurrency`, `started`, `stopped`, `previous_duration`, `latest_attempt_id`, `created`, `updated` FROM `action_run` WHERE `action_run`.repo_id=? ORDER BY `action_run`.`id` DESC LIMIT 30 [29] - 8.180339918s
2026/06/26 20:34:34 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:34462, 200 OK in 8732.1ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 20:34:34 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:35914, 200 OK in 0.1ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 20:34:34 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:34462, 404 Not Found in 0.8ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 20:34:38 HTTPRequest [I] router: polling GET /user/events for 127.0.0.1:58102, elapsed 3887.7ms @ events/events.go:18(events.Events)
```
### After
```log
2026/06/26 21:24:46 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:51940, 200 OK in 3654.2ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 21:24:46 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:51954, 404 Not Found in 0.6ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 21:24:46 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /avatars/4aa9c7878cdb541dbdd37da61a586af554baf6c0930283e0281edf3a366b8c36?size=48 for 127.0.0.1:51954, 200 OK in 18.0ms @ web/base.go:25(avatars)
2026/06/26 21:24:47 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:48712, 200 OK in 3.6ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 21:24:49 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:51960, 200 OK in 287.4ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 21:24:49 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:48712, 200 OK in 0.1ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 21:24:49 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:51956, 404 Not Found in 0.9ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 21:24:49 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /avatars/4aa9c7878cdb541dbdd37da61a586af554baf6c0930283e0281edf3a366b8c36?size=48 for 127.0.0.1:51960, 200 OK in 0.5ms @ web/base.go:25(avatars)
2026/06/26 21:24:51 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:51956, 200 OK in 253.6ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 21:24:51 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:48712, 200 OK in 0.1ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 21:24:51 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:51956, 404 Not Found in 0.6ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 21:24:51 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /avatars/4aa9c7878cdb541dbdd37da61a586af554baf6c0930283e0281edf3a366b8c36?size=48 for 127.0.0.1:51960, 200 OK in 1.4ms @ web/base.go:25(avatars)
2026/06/26 21:24:53 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:48738, 200 OK in 278.0ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 21:24:53 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:48712, 200 OK in 0.1ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 21:24:53 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:48738, 404 Not Found in 0.8ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 21:24:53 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /avatars/4aa9c7878cdb541dbdd37da61a586af554baf6c0930283e0281edf3a366b8c36?size=48 for 127.0.0.1:51960, 200 OK in 0.6ms @ web/base.go:25(avatars)
2026/06/26 21:24:55 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /CareHarmony/SymphonyApp/actions for 127.0.0.1:48738, 200 OK in 313.6ms @ actions/actions.go:78(actions.List)
2026/06/26 21:24:55 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /assets/site-manifest.json for 127.0.0.1:48712, 200 OK in 0.1ms @ misc/misc.go:23(misc.SiteManifest)
2026/06/26 21:24:55 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json for 127.0.0.1:48738, 404 Not Found in 0.8ms @ public/public.go:45(web.registerWebRoutes.(*Router).Group.registerWebRoutes.func19.FileHandlerFunc)
2026/06/26 21:24:55 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed GET /avatars/4aa9c7878cdb541dbdd37da61a586af554baf6c0930283e0281edf3a366b8c36?size=48 for 127.0.0.1:48738, 200 OK in 0.6ms @ web/base.go:25(avatars)
2026/06/26 21:24:58 HTTPRequest [I] router: polling GET /user/events for 127.0.0.1:48738, elapsed 3035.2ms @ events/events.go:18(events.Events)
```
---------
Signed-off-by: Keshane Gan <kgan@care-harmony.com>
## Problem
On MSSQL databases created by old Gitea versions, the real datetime
columns `external_login_user.expires_at` and `lfs_lock.created` were
created as `DATETIME`. `DATETIME` parses datetime literals in a
locale-dependent way, so the ISO string `'YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS'` that
xorm sends fails to convert when the session language is not English
(e.g. German defaults to `dmy`):
```
mssql: Bei der Konvertierung eines nvarchar-Datentyps in einen datetime-Datentyp liegt der Wert außerhalb des gültigen Bereichs.
```
This breaks linking an external (OAuth/Keycloak) account to an existing
user, and LFS lock creation, with a 500 error.
## Fix
Current xorm already maps `time.Time` to the locale-independent
`DATETIME2` for new installs, so only legacy databases are affected.
This adds migration `341` that converts these columns to `DATETIME2` on
legacy MSSQL databases (no-op on other databases and on columns already
using `DATETIME2`).
A full audit of persisted `time.Time` columns in `models/` confirmed
these two are the only real datetime columns affected — every other time
value is stored as a unix-timestamp integer.
A regression test (MSSQL-only, mirroring the existing v338 pattern)
downgrades the columns to legacy `DATETIME`, runs the migration, asserts
the type becomes `DATETIME2`, and verifies an ISO datetime insert
succeeds under `SET LANGUAGE German`.
Fixes#38211
Compare API requests with a `^` or `~N` revision suffix (for example
`compare/main...feature^`) were rejected with `400 Unsupported
comparison syntax: ref with suffix`. The fix resolves the suffix to a
commit before comparing, so `base...head^` and `~N` work on either side,
the same as git.
Only `^`/`~N` navigation is resolved. Pull request creation still
requires plain branch refs, and the web compare page keeps rejecting
suffixes since its branch selectors need separate UI work.
Closes#33943
This is really a follow-up to
[#38148](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/35305) , instead of
having specific mappings of options for git configurations, just honor
any user-provided gitconfig. I include a test which points out the
specific config I have which was previously not honored, but more
generally this means that gitea now only *adds* new gitconfig and never
overwrites any config provided under `[git.config]`.
---------
Signed-off-by: Royce Remer <royceremer@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
- Display the per-repository run number as `#N` next to the run title in
the run view, matching the runs list and GitHub
- Add the run `Index` to the run view API response (and the devtest
mock) to support that
- Restore the summary panel's `flex: 1` so the workflow graph fills the
right-column height even when a run has no job summaries
- Keep the job-summary section content-sized so it doesn't compete with
the graph for height
- Gate the devtest mock job summaries to a subset of runs so the devtest
page also exercises the no-summary layout
<img width="521" height="232" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a1f2f20b-65bd-4d98-ba6a-b8135580a6de"
/>
fix(indexer): fix assignee filters in issue search (#38021)
Issue search filtering still relied on the legacy single-assignee field,
so searches such as "Assigned to you" could miss issues when a keyword
query was used.
Index all issue assignee IDs and add an explicit no_assignee field so
specific, any-assignee, and no-assignee filters work consistently across
Bleve, Elasticsearch, and Meilisearch.
Fixes#36299.
Support `continue-on-error` for workflow jobs when aggregating an
Actions workflow run status.
Previously, `continue-on-error` was parsed from workflow YAML but was
not persisted or used when calculating the overall run result. As a
result, a failed job could incorrectly fail the entire workflow even
when the workflow explicitly allowed that job to fail.
This PR stores the parsed `continue-on-error` value on each action run
job and treats failed jobs with `continue-on-error: true` as successful
when computing the workflow run status, matching GitHub Actions
behavior.
## Changes
- Add `ContinueOnError` to `jobparser.Job`.
- Add `continue_on_error` to `ActionRunJob` with a `NOT NULL DEFAULT
FALSE` migration.
- Populate `ActionRunJob.ContinueOnError` when creating workflow run
jobs.
- Update workflow status aggregation so failed `continue-on-error` jobs
do not fail the overall run.
- Leave `resolveCheckNeeds` unchanged so dependent jobs still see the
job result as `failure` and are skipped by default.
## Compatibility
This is backward compatible.
If only the runner or only the server is updated, `continue-on-error`
continues to degrade to the previous behavior and is effectively ignored
until both sides support it.
Related runner PR: https://gitea.com/gitea/runner/pulls/1032
---------
Signed-off-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
;; Leave it empty to apply the default policy, or set it to "unset" to disable Content-Security-Policy.
;CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY_GENERAL =
;; Webhook and oauth2 clients can only call allowed hosts for security reasons. Comma separated list, eg: external, 192.168.1.0/24, *.mydomain.com
;; Built-in: loopback (for localhost), private (for LAN/intranet), external (for public hosts on internet), * (for all hosts)
;; CIDR list: 1.2.3.0/8, 2001:db8::/32
;; Wildcard hosts: *.mydomain.com, 192.168.100.*
;; This list is enforced on direct connections only. When an HTTP proxy is configured, restricting the proxied target is the proxy server's responsibility.
;; This section only does "set" config, a removed config key from this section won't be removed from git config automatically. The format is `some.configKey = value`.
;; The format is `some.configKey = value`.
;; These options will be written into the gitconfig file under "[git] HOME_PATH" when Gitea web starts.
;; ATTENTION:
;; * It only does "set" config, a removed config key from this section won't be removed from git config automatically.
;; * Some config options might affect the behavior of git and fail Gitea's git operation,
;; make sure you know what you are doing before making changes.
;[git.config]
;diff.algorithm = histogram
;core.logAllRefUpdates = true
@@ -1749,13 +1761,6 @@ LEVEL = Info
;; Deliver timeout in seconds
;DELIVER_TIMEOUT = 5
;;
;; Webhook can only call allowed hosts for security reasons. Comma separated list, eg: external, 192.168.1.0/24, *.mydomain.com
;; Built-in: loopback (for localhost), private (for LAN/intranet), external (for public hosts on internet), * (for all hosts)
;; CIDR list: 1.2.3.0/8, 2001:db8::/32
;; Wildcard hosts: *.mydomain.com, 192.168.100.*
;; Since 1.15.7. Default to * for 1.15.x, external for 1.16 and later
;ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = external
;;
;; Allow insecure certification
;SKIP_TLS_VERIFY = false
;;
@@ -2997,8 +3002,16 @@ LEVEL = Info
;; Comma-separated list of workflow directories, the first one to exist
;; in a repo is used to find Actions workflow files
;; Comma-separated list of scoped workflow directories in a source repository, the first one to exist is used.
;; Files here are picked up only when the repo is registered as a scoped-workflow source; in any other repo they neither run repo-level nor scope-level.
;; Must not overlap with WORKFLOW_DIRS. Leave empty so no directory is scanned; no scoped workflows are found or run.
;SCOPED_WORKFLOW_DIRS = .gitea/scoped_workflows
;; Maximum number of attempts a single workflow run can have. Default value is 50.
;MAX_RERUN_ATTEMPTS = 50
;; Maximum number of runners that may run the task-assignment query concurrently, per Gitea instance.
;; Caps this instance's DB load when many runners poll at once; excess runners retry on their next poll.
;; In a multi-instance deployment the cluster-wide limit is this value times the number of instances. Default value is 16.
{OwnerID:3,SourceRepoID:300,WorkflowConfigs:map[string]*ScopedWorkflowConfig{"c.yml":{Required:true,Patterns:[]string{"p"}}}},// a different owner's source
}
for_,r:=rangerows{
require.NoError(t,db.Insert(ctx,r))
}
// owner 2 sees its own sources plus instance-level ones, but not owner 3's.
// It deliberately does NOT validate that <dir> is an allowed workflow directory: the allowed directories are instance-configurable (WORKFLOW_DIRS / SCOPED_WORKFLOW_DIRS).
// The caller (services/actions.ResolveUses) enforces the directory allowlist. The returned Path is the cleaned, repo-relative file path.
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